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ABSTRACT 
The transfer pricing, literature indicates that an investigation of 
some aspects of this subject could usefully be undertaken in order to 
contribute to the understanding of transfer pricing in both domestic and 
international markets. This study aims at exploring the current state of 
transfer pricing practice and establishing the importance attached to the 
ranking of transfer pricing determinants (i. e. objectives and environ- 
mental variables) and the extent to which the ranking varies across 
markets, industry, and according to the transfer pricing method used. It 
also seeks to discover interrelationship among the transfer pricing 
determinants in order to produce a reduced set of basic factors. Lastly, 
it aims at evaluating the relationship between transfer pricing 
determinants and transfer pricing methods and at discovering a means of 
predicting the latter from the company's perception of the relative 
importance of these determinants. 
To achieve the above objectives, an empirical study covering both 
domestic and international markets was undertaken in UK companies. The 
conclusions are concerned with transfer pricing policy, methods currently 
used, and problems apparent in practice. The overall ranking-by survey 
respondents of the transfer pricing determinants is given as well as the 
results of tests of certain hypotheses which relate to this ranking. The 
transfer pricing determinants used in the survey for domestic and 
international. markets (twelve and twenty respectively) have been reduced 
by Factor Analysis to four and six factors. The study made use of the 
results to obtain measures of the ranking of discovered factors. Finally, 
the relationship between the transfer pricing determinants and transfer 
pricing methods was quantitatively evaluated in the form of a set of 
classification functions by using Multi-Discriminant Analysis. The 
classification functions are able to predict the transfer pricing method 
actually used in companies with an acceptable degree of success. The 
study's results have been reviewed with a small number of senior managers 
who are involved in establishing transfer pricing policy within their 
companies. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
Transfer prices are the monetary values attaching to internal 
transactions between divisions* of a company. Transfer prices can be 
defined in both a narrow and a broader sense. The narrow definitions 
relates only to the value of trade transactions, while the broader one 
covers trade and non- trade transactions such as fees for the transfer of 
patents and technology (Plasschaert, 1979, (2)). The narrow definition of 
transfer prices represents the most obvious type of inter-divisional 
relationship, and is the focus of this research. 
Many writers have proposed various methods to determine transfer 
prices in the context of divisionalised companies. Ronen and McKinney 
(1970, (3)) suggested that a proper system of transfer prices should 
satisfy three requirements . (a) goal congruence, 
(b) performance 
evaluation of divisions, and (c) divisional autonomy. It is evident that 
the above requirements may conflict with each other. For example, profits 
are used in measuring performance of divisions. This may motivate 
divisional managers to act contrary to the company interest in some 
cases, e. g. by trading externally instead of internally. The interference 
of central management in such cases acts as a motivational discentive to 
the divisional managers. In other words, the problem of goal congruence 
may be solved in this case but the benefit of decentralised 
decision-making is lost. 
The complexity of the transfer pricing problem increases with the 
requirements of an efficient allocation of scarce resources if there is 
more than one division competing for common corporate scarce resources, 
or for the output of a supplying division. The allocation of scarce 
resources in the short run needs the involvement of corporate management 
to achieve corporate profit maximisation. This means that there is an 
*A 'division' may be a department of a company or a company having its 
own entity which is, wholly or partially owned by the holding company 
(Solomons, 1965, (1)). 
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obvious conflict between the goal congruence and autonomy objectives in 
this case. Therefore, it seems that difficulty may arise in selecting a 
transfer pricing method which satisfies more than one objective 
simultaneously. 
'Determinant' is the term used in this research to describe both the 
objectives of a transfer pricing system and the environmental variables 
affecting the system. 
Furthermore, the economic and legal circumstances of the company 
increase the complexity of the transfer pricing problem. Also, the 
existence of some divisions operating in different countries, i. e. 
multinational companies, introduces additional determinants (such as 
customs duties, home and foreign tax regulations) into the transfer 
pricing problem. Consequently, the relationship between transfer pricing 
determinants and transfer pricing method becomes even more complicated. 
1.2 The Research Problem and Objectives 
The transfer pricing literature although fairly limited in extent is 
rich with views and sometimes contradictory arguments based on 
theoretical or practical examinations for both domestic and international 
markets. The literature reviews (Chapters 2 and 3) indicate the scope for 
carrying out a full investigation of the relationship between the 
determinants of transfer pricing and transfer pricing methods in both 
domestic and international markets based on the use of more advanced 
statistical techniques than those which have been employed hitherto. 
The prime justification for this investigation is the disagreement 
among the writers on the relationships among transfer pricing methods, 
and transfer pricing objectives and conditions, i. e. determinants 
(Chapter 3). Different methods have been suggested for achieving 
different objectives under identical or dissimilar conditions. 
Furthermore, different methods have been proposed to accomplish the same 
objectives but under different conditions. 
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The interrelationship between transfer pricing methods and transfer 
pricing objectives and conditions is not easy to isolate. The selection 
of a transfer pricing method should be based on both the objectives of 
the transfer pricing system and the prevailing conditions of the company, 
i. e. the determinants as defined here. In view of the large numbers of 
transfer pricing determinants and the equally large number of available 
transfer pricing methods an aid to the selection of the appropriate 
transfer pricing method would seemingly be of great value. 
A review of the previous empirical studies in the UK and the US 
(Chapter 4) will be seen to indicate that the UK surveys are 
characterised by lack of information on transfer pricing practices in the 
international market. More information is required to promote the 
understanding of transfer pricing practice in the international market 
and to contrast it with that of the domestic one. Empirical studies in 
the US show that fairly simple statistical techniques may be effectively 
used to draw certain conclusions about transfer pricing practice. 
The previous surveys reveal a multiplicity of transfer pricing 
determinants in practice. It is noticed that some of these determinants 
appear to be related indicating that they may be reduced to a set of 
independent fundamental factors. No attempt appears to have been made 
previously to study the correlation between these determinants in order 
to disclose the fundamental factors which underlie transfer pricing in 
practice. 
In pursuit of the study of the above observations it was decided to 
undertake an empirical study of transfer pricing practice in UK 
comapnies. This study, which will be described in Chapter 5, will explore 
the following aspects of transfer pricing for both domestic and 
international markets: 
1- The current state of transfer pricing practice. This aspect will be 
dealt with in Chapter 5, which covers: (a) the extent to which 
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transfer pricing policy is centralized or decentralized, (b) the 
extent to which each transfer pricing method is used in practice, 
and whether the frequency of use of particular transfer pricing 
methods in the domestic market is significantly different from that 
in the international market, and (c) the problems apparent in 
transfer pricing practice. 
2- To discover the order of importance of the major determinants of 
transfer pricing and to derive statistical conclusions about how 
this order varies across markets (domestic and international), 
across industry, and across transfer pricing methods. This will be 
covered in Chapter 6, where three null hypotheses are tested. The 
first null hypothesis, Hol, is posed to assess the effect of the 
type of market, i. e. domestic and international, on the order of 
importance of transfer pricing determinants. The second null 
hypothesis, Ho2, is posed to assess whether the order of importance 
of the transfer pricing determinants varies from one industry to 
another for both domestic and international markets. The third null 
hypothesis, Ho3, is' posed to evaluate the relation between the 
general bases of transfer pricing methods and the order of 
importance of -transfer pricing determinants for both domestic and 
international markets. 
3- To explore the underlying interrelationships among the various 
transfer pricing determinants in order to produce a reduced set of 
independent basic factors for both domestic and international 
transfers and to investigate the order of importance of these 
factors in UK companies. This objective will be dealt with in 
Chapter 7. 
4- To discover the extent to which the weights given by individual 
companies to determinants can discriminate among the transfer 
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pricing methods employed, and accordingly, to produce a prediction 
formula which will suggest an appropriate transfer pricing method 
for a company depending on the weights it gives to the transfer 
pricing determinants. This objective will be covered in Chapter 8. 
The research will be seen to generate new questions which could be 
the basis of further topics for study. The scope for further research 
into the field of transfer pricing will be discussed in Chapter 10. 
1.3 Research Methodology 
The research employed involves a combination of theoretical and 
empirical approaches. The theoretical approach has been used in order to 
give direction to the research, for example to identify: 
a- those aspects of transfer pricing for which there is scope for 
further investigation. 
b- simple statistical techniques which may be used in analysis of 
the data. 
c- the scope for the application of multivariate analysis. 
d- the type of empirical data needed to be collected. 
The empirical approach will be seen to have used a postal 
questionnaire which was sent to 250 UK companies* (Chapter 5). The sample 
was selected in such a way as to give an overall representation of UK 
companies. The practical significance of the study's results was examined 
by conducting a number of in-company discussions (Chapter 9). 
1.4 Assumptions of the Research 
A number of assumptions were made in the research, namely that: 
(i) the extensive literature on transfer pricing is a sufficient 
basis for the identification of the main issues in this field 
of research. 
* The term 'company' is used in this research to refer to the parent 
organization as distinct from each of its divisions. Each division might 
in fact be a company. 
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(ii) the number of companies participating in the survey is 
sufficient to provide an adequate visualization of UK 
companies' transfer pricing practices in both domestic and 
international markets. 
(iii) the companies use transfer pricing methods which are consistent 
with the weights given by them to the transfer pricing 
determinants. (The relationship between transfer pricing 
determinants and transfer pricing methods can then be 
quantitatively evaluated and used to predict. the appropriate 
transfer pricing method for new cases). 
(iv) bias did not arise from the data gathering method employed viz. 
the mailed questionnaire. 
7 
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CHAPTER 2 
Review of Transfer Pricing Methods 
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2.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to review methods proposed for the deter- 
mination of transfer prices in both domestic and international markets. 
The methods are explained together with the advantages and disadvantages 
of the main methods which appear most widely in the literature. 
2.2 Transfer Pricing Methods in Domestic Market 
Transfer pricing methods in domestic markets are broadly classified 
into five approaches namely: economic, mathematical, accounting, 
behavioural, and other. 
2.2.1 Economic Approach 
Classical economic theory was first suggested as a basis for pricing 
intermediate commodities (transferred goods) in divisionalised companies 
by Hirshleifer (1956, (1)). Several investigators, such as Gould (1964, 
(2)), and Ronen and McKinney (1970, (3)), have proposed improvements to 
the initial analysis of Hirshleifer. The general operational assumptions 
of the economic approach (Hirshleifer, 1956, (4)) to transfer pricing may 
be summarized as follows: 
1- The firm comprises two profit centres a manufacturing 
division and a distributing division. 
2- Each division deals only with one product. 
3- Divisions are technologically independant of each other. 
4- The external market's demand for each division's product is 
independent of its demand for the others. 
2.2.1.1 Hirshleifer's Analysis 
In his first paper, Hirshleifer (1956, (5)) presented solutions for 
three situations. 
a- No market for the intermediate commodity exists (a single joint 
level of output is required). 
b- A perfectly competitive intermediate market exists. 
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c- An imperfectly competitive intermediate market exists. 
The general solution procedure proposed by Hirshleifer involves one 
of the divisions presenting to the other its production schedule as a 
function of the transfer price. The second division then establishes its 
output and transfer price by the rule which optimizes its profit and 
which in turn leads to the optimum solution for the firm as a whole. The 
application of this procedure shows that generally the transfer price 
should be the marginal cost of the selling division. However, if the 
intermediate market is competitive the marginal cost of the selling 
division equals the market price of the intermediate commodity. 
Therefore, in this case transfer price should be the market price of the 
transferred product. 
Hirshleifer also considered the effect of demand dependence and 
technological dependence on the marginal solution. He concluded that in 
these cases the analysis is complex and that generally the solution falls 
between market price and marginal cost. 
In his second paper, Hirshleifer (1957, (6)) attempted to solve the 
case of the multiproduct divisionalised firm. For this case, he found 
that the results do not lend themselves to an easy generalization. His 
work also emphasized that where non-marginal decisions, such as 
abandonment/continuation of one or more of the divisions, are involved, 
the marginal solution must be supplemented by conditions concerned with 
the firm as a whole. He also raised the operational difficulty of an 
optimal pricing rule where autonomous divisions convey misleading 
information in order to secure a more beneficial transfer price. To 
overcome this, he mentioned that in practice divisions should be 
permitted to resort to the external market if the price demanded by the 
internal partner is too unfavourable. 
Hirshleifer's analysis provided theoretical grounds for the use of 
market price as a transfer price which was first suggested by Cook (1955, 
(7)). 
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2.2.1.2 Gould's Modification 
Gould (1964, (8)) considered the problem of transfer pricing arising 
from the divergence of buying and selling prices which was also first 
mentioned by Cook. For the case where the intermediate product can be 
traded in a perfectly competitive market outside the firm, the net prices 
that the buying division and the selling division can get on the outside 
market may be different. The following three situations were solved by 
Gould. 
A- The buying price, PB' is greater than the selling price, PS, 
which itself is greater than the transfer price P at which the 
marginal cost of' the selling division equals its net marginal 
revenue. 
i. e., PB > PS >P 
Using the same notation the other two cases were 
B- P> PB > PS 
C- PB >P> PS 
The solution of the above three cases led Gould to conclude that the 
optimal transfer price should be the selling price in case (A), the 
market buying price in case (B), and marginal cost of the selling 
divisions, at optimal output, in case (C). This solution offers an answer 
to the problem raised by Cook (1955, (9)) when he asserted that the gap 
between the buying price and the selling price: 
"allows some room for negotiation, and there is no rule that can say 
where in this range the price should be" 
Gould also discussed the problem of relying on the divisional 
profits as computed from the optimal transfer price when abandonment 
decisions are to be taken. His analysis indicated that these profit 
computations are adequate for only the buying division in case (A) and 
for only the selling division in case (B). For case (C) profits computed 
from the optimal transfer price are inadequate for the decision to 
abandon either division. He also emphasized the point made earlier by 
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Hirshleifer. That is as divisional managers are required to supply 
information for the determination of transfer pricing and they are judged 
by their division's profits, they have the incentive and the opportunity 
to misinform. 
2.2.1.3 Ronen and McKinney's Proposal 
Ronen and McKinney (1970, (10)) presented a procedure for 
determining transfer prices by which divisional managers can make 
decisions which maximize corporate profits without imposing the 
restrictions implied in Hirshleifer's system. The procedure was described 
for the case of a firm with two divisions only. The point was made that 
the method can be applied for any number of divisions without loss of 
generality. 
The procedure is essentially a system of channelling information 
between divisions and central management. This enables, therefore, 
Hirshleifer's system to be implemented while maintaining divisional 
autonomy. The central office collects information from divisions which 
shows how much they would produce or purchase at various transfer prices. 
These represent the marginal manufacturing cost and net marginal revenue 
respectively. Then, central management transforms the marginal data to 
average cost and average revenue curves. These curves represent a supply 
schedule and an average cost curve, for the distribution division and a 
demand schedule and an average revenue curve, for the manufacturing 
division. A division is provided with a supply or a demand schedule 
relevant to its case (distribution or manufacturing). Then each division 
acts as an independent firm to determine its output level at the 
intersection of its marginal curves and to price the intermediate product 
along its average curve. The result is that divisions select the same 
level of output which is optimal for each division as well as for the 
whole company. 
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However, the divisions will not, in general, arrive at the same 
price for the intermediate product. Ronen and McKinney suggested that the 
difference between the transfer prices represents a subsidy to or a tax 
on the manufacturing division. 
The Ronen and McKinney system is identical for all intermediate 
market situations. Therefore, if the firm follows their rules, optimal 
decisions will be achieved regardless of the market situation it faces. 
However, it is important that divisional managers understand how to 
determine the amounts which they wish to buy or sell at each possible 
transfer price (Tomkins, 1973, (11)) which vary with the situation of the 
intermediate market. 
A further advantage of the Ronen and McKinney system is that the 
profit contribution shown by the accounting reports always reflects the 
amount by which corporate profits will be reduced in the short run if the 
division is abandoned. Hence, it allows the decision regarding 
continuation/ abandonment to be taken. Abdel-Khalik and Lusk (1974, (12)) 
argued that under this system any inefficiences incurred in the buying 
division may be passed on to the selling division. This undermines the 
basis for the abandonment decision and it may induce the selling division 
to call for cost auditing of the buying division which impairs divisional 
autonomy. 
Tomkins (1973, (13)) observed that the Ronen and McKinney method has 
the advantage of overcoming the zero profit problem. This problem arises 
with constant marginal cost or revenues. The suggested method offers a 
solution even where no capacity constraints are considered. 
2.2.1.4 Tomkins' Contribution 
The models proposed by Hirshleifer and Gould provide a means to 
determine transfer price. This price ensures that the output of the 
divisions is consistent with maximum profit for the firm as a whole. 
Situations where the net marginal revenue of the manufacturing division 
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decreases with increasing output and its marginal cost increases as 
output increases can be satisfactorily solved by these models. 
However, Tomkins (1973, (14)) noted that problems arise if either of 
the net marginal revenue function or the marginal cost function are found 
to be constant throughout all the output levels. For instance, if the 
marginal cost function of the manufacturing division is constant, this 
division will get no benefit from internal transfers. Therefore, this 
division has no motivation to increase output beyond the level required 
to maximize its profit from trade with the intermediate market. 
Tomkins' analysis (1973, (15)) showed that, if constraints upon the 
manufacturing division or distribution division are binding below the 
level of production which would be optimal in the absence of the 
constraints, it is always possible to devise a satisfactory transfer 
price. This applies for all states of the intermediate market and in 
spite of the existence of constant marginal cost. Similarly, for a 
constant net marginal revenue function, a satisfactory transfer price can 
be determined, if production constraints exist at an output level below 
that which is optimal in the absence-of the constraints. 
Tomkins (1973, (16)) argued that his modifications to Hirshleifer's 
analysis to incorporate capacity constraints provide mathematical 
evidence to show that accounting transfer prices such as direct cost plus 
or market-price less a deduction are optimal in some cases. He concluded 
that economic models 
"should not be used to support the statement that accounting 
transfer prices are necessarily non-optimal unless further 
consideration has been given to the question of capacity 
constraints". 
2.2.1.5 Kanodia's Contribution 
A recent contribution by Kanodia (1979, (17)) extended the 
Hirshleifer analysis to companies working in uncertain market 
environments. He has demonstrated the possibility of malfunctioning of a 
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transfer price based on the certainty type of analysis for a firm which 
faces price uncertainty. This malfunctioning arises because of the 
differences in risk aversion among divisional managers and between them 
and the central management. Kanodia argued that as price uncertainty 
makes the total profits of the firm stochastic, simple profit 
maximization has no meaning. Accordingly, he has constructed a system 
which allows for risk sharing between centre and divisions and optimizes 
within this risk-sharing framework, but Kanodia (1979, (18)) admitted 
that his work 
"characterizes and analyzes several transfer price systems, in terms 
of such issues, but does not formulate mechanisms for achieving 
them. " 
2.2.2 Mathematical Approach 
Several mathematical programming techniques have been suggested by 
writers, such as Whinston (1964, (19)) to determine transfer prices. 
These writers aimed at extending the search for the optimal transfer 
price when the simplifying assumptions of Hirshleifer cannot be made. 
Mathematical programming models may be classified into three groups 
according to the technique used linear programming models, 
decomposition programming models, and goal decomposition models. 
2.2.2.1 Linear Programming Models 
Linear programming (Taha, 1973, (20)) seeks to identify the best 
value of variables to optimize certain objective functions subject to 
certain side conditions (constraints). It deals with problems which have 
the following characteristics: 
a- The objective function is deterministic. 
b- The variables can take any real positive value. 
c- The objective function and the constraints are linear. 
Every linear programming problem, which is called the primal 
problem, has a twin problem called the dual problem. The two problems 
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possess very closely related properties. The optimal solution of one of 
them can produce complete information about the optimal solution of the 
other one. The Simplex method is one of the methods used to solve linear 
programming problems. This method answers the primal problem and at the 
same time it provides the values of the variables of the dual problem. 
These values are known as the shadow prices, in the accounting 
literature, and represent the cost of using the common scarce resources, 
i. e. they impute values to the constraints of the primal problems. 
Solomons (1965, (21)) recommended the use of linear programming to 
determine the transfer prices of transferred goods where an external 
market for the intermediate product does not exist and production 
capacities are restricted. He showed that it is a simple matter to go 
from the value attached to the scarce resources limiting the output to 
the value of their products. In this case the transfer prices are the sum 
of two elements: a) variable cost of the product, and b) shadow prices of 
the scarce resources used in the production of this product. If any 
intermediate product involves the use of non-binding constraints only, 
this product will have a zero shadow price and its transfer price would 
be equal to its variable cost. 
Solomons' conclusion for this particular situation is consistent 
with Hirshleifer's suggestion about setting the transfer price equal to 
the marginal cost if no outside market for the intermediate product 
exists. Thus, generally, linear programming provides a transfer price 
equal to the sum of the variable cost of the transferred goods and the 
shadow prices of the scarce resources used in this product, which may in 
some special cases be equal to zero. 
In 1965, Samuels (1965, (22)) published his first article on the use 
of linear programming for determining transfer prices in large 
divisionalised companies. The purpose of Samuels' first study was to 
develop an accounting system which could aid large multidivisional 
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companies or those which produce different products to achieve their 
optimal position, and to realize control over the activities of 
divisions. 
In this article, Samuels handled the problem of several divisions 
competing for the same scarce inputs but which do not trade with each 
other. The proposed system depended on an integration or co-ordination 
between the linear programming model and the accounting model for 
planning and control. Linear programming can be regarded by accountants 
as an extension of the marginal costing concept (Hart, 1973, (23)). This 
concept gives the optimal policy for a company, if it has divisions 
competing to use only one limited resource. A complete system of marginal 
costing should, for any number of limiting resources, provide 
decision-makers with both the direct cost of production and the 
opportunity cost. This may be achieved by using a linear programming 
approach. 
The main point of Samuels' linear programming system is that any 
decrease in profit should be charged as an opportunity cost (taken equal 
to the shadow price) to whichever division(s) is responsible for the 
deviation. He proposed that the transfer pricing system focussing on 
scarce resources should incorporate such a charge. Samuels claimed that 
such a system allows large divisionalised non-vertically integrated 
companies to determine maximum profit for the company as a whole and 
provides a method of control. He also discussed the problems which might 
be encountered in the application of this model. 
Samuels (1969, (24)) aimed at achieving more freedom for the 
divisional. managers in decision-making in vertically integrated 
companies. He recommended using a transfer price schedule instead of one 
fixed transfer price. Samuels suggested that central management should 
collect data from divisions and apply a linear programming technique to 
determine the company-wide optimal plan. Then, a transfer price schedule 
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would be formulated giving different transfer prices for different levels 
of production. The transfer pricing schedule, Samuels assumed, would lead 
the divisional managers to transfer the correct internal quantities, and 
to sell the correct amount of the intermediate product outside the 
company. Another transfer price schedule would, also, be issued to the 
purchasing divisions. 
Among the characteristics of this system is that the selling 
division is not required to have the same transfer price as is paid by 
the buying division. The total corporate profit, which is calculated by 
the linear programming technique, may not equal the sum of all divisional 
profits. This difference of profit can be viewed by central management as 
charging tax or paying a subsidy. In other words, the sum of the profits 
of all divisions plus surplus (or minus deficit ) of the central 
management profit will equate with the total corporate profit. 
To sum up, the principal contributions of Samuels are: (1) he 
introduced the idea of using linear programming for planning and control 
in multi-divisional companies. (2) He launched the transfer price 
schedule idea to replace a fixed transfer price in order to increase the 
level of autonomy in vertically integrated companies. 
Manes (1970, (25)), also discussed the possibility of using shadow 
prices to set transfer prices between the divisions of a multidivisional 
or conglomerate company. He investigated the impact of a transfer price 
based on the shadow price upon the direct cost statements of the 
divisions. 
Manes' model is more complex than the previous models referred to 
since it represents the case of a vertical integration combined with 
horizontal extensions (i. e. more than one division at the same level 
requiring raw material from the selling division). He handled a case of 
three levels of vertically integrated divisions. The middle level 
division trades with both the outside market and the upstream division. 
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He confirmed Dopuch and Drake's view (1964, (26)) that whenever 
market prices of the intermediate products are introduced in the system 
difficulties arise in determining appropriate transfer prices. Manes also 
drew attention to the problem of shadow prices of constraints other than 
capacity constraints, such as demand constraints. If a shadow price is 
found for such a constraint, Manes asked, which divisions should be 
credited with this price? 
2.2.2.2 Problems Concerning The Application of Linear 
Programming to Transfer Pricing 
Several criticisms have been made of applying straightforward linear 
programming to transfer pricing. Some of these criticisms concern the 
basic concepts of the technique, and some relate to either the question 
of autonomy or performance measurement. Selected criticisms are as 
follows: 
1- There are certain simplifications in the statement of the 
operating conditions that have to be accepted if linear programming is 
used. For example, selling prices and variable costs per unit will be 
taken as constant over the output range in question. This means that the 
contribution made by each product is, also, taken as constant (Solomons, 
1965, (27)). It can be argued that these are not simplifications but the 
required conditions for adopting linear programming. In other words, the 
applications of linear programming are only justifiable if the problem 
under investigation has approximately the required characteristics for 
such an application. 
2- The technique imputes the total profits estimated in the optimal 
solution to those scarce resources which prevent the company moving to a 
solution better than that calculated by the model. This means that the 
model provides positive shadow prices only to the binding constraints. 
Therefore, the transfer prices are equal to the variable costs whenever 
no constraints exist. In such cases, it is hard to convince the selling 
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division manager to accept a transfer price (Tomkins, 1973 (28)). This 
argument is particularly important during recessions when binding 
constraints do not usually exist. 
3- Manes (1970, (29)) raised the point of the influence on planning 
for excess capacity of a system which strictly translates shadow prices 
to transfer prices. Under such a system no divisional manager will 
willingly plan to have excess plant capacity as is required in some cases 
to cope with peak loads or anticipated growth, because these would have a 
zero shadow price. It is seen that this criticism is justified as long as 
the divisional manager knows that his performance is assessed by top 
management on the basis of his division's profit. However, performance is 
measured in the system of transfer price by Samuels (1965, (30)) on the 
basis of the deviation of the actual division profit from its planned 
profit. Accordingly, this system does not prevent divisional managers 
from planning for excess capacity if they wish to. 
4- Tomkins' view (1973, (31)) is that the main objection to using 
linear programming is that 
"divisional managers cannot rely upon the use of transfer prices so 
derived to tell them how much of their profitable products to 
produce. " 
5- To achieve the optimal solution central management should 
receive information from both selling and buying divisions. The objective 
function is derived from the market data of the buying divisions and from 
the variable cost data of all divisions. Information about scarce 
resources might come from central management and/or divisions. Solomons 
(1965, (32)), Abdel-Khalik and Lusk (1974, (33)), and Tomkins (1973, 
(34)) agree that this way of calculating and applying transfer prices 
would strongly impair divisional autonomy. It is worth mentioning here 
that a company has to choose between achieving the optimal overall 
corporate's objective or a high level of autonomy. It should be borne in 
mind, however, that complete autonomy is difficult to obtain in practice, 
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even if the divisions have their entities. The empirical studies, 
reviewed in Chapter 4, indicate that, in many cases, transfer pricing 
policy is a centralized policy. 
6- Bernhard (1968, (35)) showed that the effectiveness of shadow 
prices as a control device is limited since these values apply only if 
the basis of the solution to the original problem is not changed. Also, 
Manes (1970, (36)) has mentioned that transfer prices based on shadow 
prices would have to be "ex ante". When operating conditions do not 
comply precisely with plans, difficulties arise in changing these prices. 
"Ex ante" transfer prices may be updated or reviewed at pre-determined 
periods. Indeed, a review period as short as one month has been used 
(C. B. R., 1973, (37)). 
7- Dopuch and Drake (1964, (38)), Manes (1970, (39)), and Solomons 
(1965, (40)) sought criteria other than profit, for measuring performance 
when using linear programming to determine output levels and 
intra-divisional pricing decisions. A similar aim has been implicitly put 
forward by Abdel- Khalik and Lusk (1974, (41)) who said 
"Imposing a transfer price by headquarters as determined by shadow 
prices may create adverse effects on morale similar to that of 
imposing any standard. " 
This argument is consistent with the accounting responsibility concept. A 
divisional manager should be responsible for his own division's profit as 
long as he is given the authority required. A divisional manager cannot 
be responsible for the profit of his division, if the power of 
determining the price at which he will sell to other divisions is taken 
from him. Clearly, this strongly conflicts with the divisional profit 
responsibility. 
2.2.2.3 Decomposition Programming Models 
In order to improve upon straightforward linear programming and 
mainly to increase the degree of autonomy, decomposition programming has 
been suggested by several writers. This technique was first developed by 
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Dantzig and Wolfe (1960, (42)) to solve large linear programming 
problems. The optimization problems of a large divisionalised company, 
which wishes to delegate some of its decision making process to its 
divisions, may be solved by the decomposition technique. 
The development of this approach is built on reducing the amount of 
transmitted information and interference of corporate management while 
the central control and co-ordination can be maintained. 
The basic idea of the decomposition algorithm is that the optimal 
output of each division can be calculated without top management knowing 
anything about the internal technology of the divisions. Top management 
only knows the requirements of each division for corporate resources, 
i. e. each division's coefficients for corporate constraints. The technique 
is explained by Baumol and Fabian (1964, (43)). The decomposition models 
may be (a) linear or (b) quadratic. 
2.2.2.3A Linear Decomposition Models 
Whinston's model (1964 (44)) deals with the case of technological 
inter-dependencies between the divisions. This means that the production 
ccsts of one division are partly based on the production level of another 
division. This model is considered a practical one relevant to the 
vertically integrated company. It includes a linear objective function 
and linear constraints in the executive program i. e. the corporate 
management program. Non-linear constraints in the sub-division programs 
are used to reflect technological inter-dependencies and diminishing 
returns. In this model, at each stage of the'iterative process, corporate 
management supplies divisional managers with price guides, i. e. transfer 
price guides for the corporate scarce resources and the transferred goods 
between the divisions. 
Baumol and Fabian reviewed Whinston's model and presented a 
numerical example involving external economies and diseconomies, i. e. 
demand interdependence and technology interdependence. They identified 
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the limitations of their suggested system as follows: 
1- The degree of autonomy should not be overstated. The reason is 
that in the final stage of the decomposition process the output decisions 
are made and enforced by the corporate management. (Baumol and Fabian, 
1964, (45)). At this point, the decentralization given by decomposition 
breaks down. 
2- A major difficulty may exist where the feasible solutions of 
divisions are not feasible for the overall company. In this case, the 
division must be supplied with enough information to help in adjusting 
its feasible solution to match the feasible solution for the company as a 
whole (Baumol and Fabian, 1964, (46)). 
With the aim of applying mathematical techniques to management 
accounting Onsi (1970, (47)) suggested a transfer pricing system, in the 
absence of a market price for the intermediate product, based on a linear 
decomposition technique which provides a joint optimization plan. Onsi's 
proposal is built on the notion that the transferred goods should be 
priced at. the opportunity costs of diverting divisional resources into 
producing the intermediate product which has no outside market instead of 
producing other kinds of goods that have an outside market. 
Onsi. showed that the production plan of selling division 
calculated by central management, may be less profitable for it than its 
own individual plan. The difference between the individually derived 
divisional profits and the division's jointly derived profits is paid, as 
"Motivation Costs", to the selling division. This procedure would 
motivate the selling division to take the optimal action from the 
corporate point of view, and would permit it to work as a profit centre. 
It can be seen that Onsi's suggested system was directed at finding 
a means of measuring performance of divisions as profit centres when the 
joint optimization plan is calculated. by a linear decomposition 
technique. It should also be noted that while Whinston's model, and 
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Baumol and Fabian's model are general decomposition models, Onsi's model 
is intended to handle a specific case, i. e. no external market for 
transferred goods. 
2.2.2.3B Quadratic Decomposition Models 
Hass (1968, (48)) developed a decomposition algorithm for quadratic 
programming. He used this algorithm to find the optimal set of prices for 
the corporate scarce resources and transferred goods. Hass' model took 
account of both demand and technology inter-dependencies. It can also be 
applied to a divisionalized company operating in an imperfectly 
competitive market, where the selling price of output depends upon the 
quantity of sales, and the purchasing price of input depends upon the 
quantity purchased. 
Hass' decomposition algorithm involves the solution of a quadratic 
objective function at both central management and division level. At each 
iteration central management provides divisions with demand and supply 
curves whereby the divisions review their plans in the light of these 
schedules. The final demand and supply curves would lead each division 
independently to the appropriate price setting and production schedule 
for joint profit maximization. 
In the case where there is a perfectly competitive market for the 
intermediate product and when the supplying division must trade 
internally, the central management must inform the supplying division 
about the quantity of transferred goods which must be produced when the 
last iteration has been completed. 
Hass' model is complex; the complexity comes from the generality of 
the model which covers many actual situations'. The model can handle a 
company operating in a perfectly competitive market, or imperfectly 
competitive market, and with technology and demand inter-dependencies. In 
other words, the model covers various circumstances which might face a 
company in the real business world. 
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Jennergren (1972, (49)) also suggested a decomposition alogrithm to 
solve quadratic programming problems at the divisional and the central 
management levels. He argued that constant transfer prices of corporate 
scarce resources determined by decomposition techniques (as in Baumol and 
Fabian's model, and Charnes, Clower and Kortanek's model) may lead to the 
divisions having many optimal solutions. Some of these solutions may not 
be consistent with overall corporate optimality (Jennergren, 1972, (50)). 
Therefore, he modified the basic decomposition alogrithm for the 
divisional sub-problems to ensure that sub-optimization by divisions is 
always consistent with the overall corporate optimality for the scarce 
resource allocation. 
Jennergren also suggested that when the central management obtains 
the optimal solution at the final iteration of the executive program, it 
announces a set of optimal non-constant transfer price schedules. 
According to these schedules, the prices of corporate resources increase 
by a non-constant margin whenever a division demands more of them. 
Providing each division-with its own transfer price schedule enables it 
to calculate its optimal production plan without interference. 
In fact Jennergren's model incorporates Samuels' approach, i. e. a 
transfer price schedule for each division, in the decomposition model. 
This increases the level of autonomy in two ways: 
a- The transmission of information between divisions and central 
management is decreased by using the decomposition technique. 
b- Central management does not determine the divisional production 
plans. 
2.2.2.4 Criticisms of the Decomposition Models 
It is obvious that the decomposition models are more complex than 
linear programming models. This complexity mainly comes from attempting 
to minimize the transmission of information and to increase the level of 
divisional autonomy. The decomposition technique does permit however, 
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divisional managers a higher level of decision-making autonomy than -the 
linear programming approach. However, at the end of the iterative 
procedure the final output decisions are dictated centrally in several of 
the suggested decomposition models. 
Godfrey (1971, (51) criticized the decomposition models because he 
believed that they solve the wrong problem. In his view the transmission 
of full information from division to central management is not a serious 
difficulty. The problem is the achievement of divisional autonomy while 
keeping the co-ordination between divisions which leads to an optimal 
corporate plan. 
To solve the above problem, he suggested that all divisions should 
submit full information to central management which then calculates the 
overall corporate plan on the basis of a linear or non-linear program. 
Then, a report is given to each division which involves three types of 
information (Godfrey, 1971, (52)). 
1- The amount of corporate resources allocated to the division. 
2- The minimum expected profit contribution from the division. 
3- A suggested operating plan. 
The divisional managers are free to apply the suggested plan, but they 
will be asked about the minimum expected profit. In other words, the 
expected profit contribution would be the criterion for measuring 
performance of the divisional managers. Godfrey recognized that his 
proposal could cause non-optimal corporate performance, but he claimed 
that this is the price of autonomy (Godfrey, 1971, (53)). 
Tomkins (1973, (54)) argued that Godfrey's proposal can be accepted 
if the departure from the production plan calculated by central 
management would not cause market difficulties for other divisions, or if 
the divisional inter-relationships are not too important or complex. It 
is noticed that Godfrey concentrated on autonomy while Tomkins paid more 
attention to overall optimization. Each of them has provided arguments to 
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support his view. 
In addition to the previous arguments, Naert and Janssen (1971, 
(55)) have shown that divisional managers, even if the decomposition 
algorithm is used, may maximize their divisional profit at the expense of 
corporate profit as a whole. This can happen via their replies to central 
management during the decomposition iterations. This argument is not a 
weakness in the decomposition technique as such, but is concerned with 
the human beings who operate it. 
2.2.2.5 Goal Decomposition Models 
A few writers have handled transfer prices under an assumption that 
the objective is not overall profit maximization. Goal decomposition 
(Salkin and Kornbluth, 1973, (56)) permits the modeller to change the 
focus of the model from attaining the best plan to achieving the most 
satisfactory plan. The significance of this technique is that in the 
modern business world the achievement of a set of goals (such as profit, 
sales, growth and market share) is a more meaningful measure of 
performance than profit maximization alone. 
A goal decomposition model was suggested for use in a decentralized 
company by Charnes, Clower and Kortanek (1967, (57)). They developed a 
decomposition alogrithm based on "pre-emptive goals" in a quadratic 
program form. Their basic idea was that decentralization by a price 
system alone (economists usually associate decentralization with a price 
system) is insufficient. To achieve effective decentralization, which was 
termed "coherent decentralization", a set of pre-emptive goals must be 
joined with decentralization. The suggested coherent decentralization 
system did not explicitly take into account transfer pricing. This model 
was considered by Abdel-Khalik and Lusk (1974, (58)) as 
"an extension of Baumol and Fabian analyses and a basis for the 
quadratic decomposition suggested by Hass. " 
Bailey and Boe (1976, (51)), also discussed the potential use of 
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goal decomposition programming in the management of the decentralized 
company. Their paper did not develop new ideas but attempted to provide a 
more realistic mathematical formulation of the decision-making 
environment. They presented a model which describes a three level 
organization : corporate management, divisional management and operations 
management. They referred to a three level multiple objective programming 
model attributed to Ruefli (1971, (60)) who calls it the Generalized Goal 
Decomposition Model. 
The main idea of the model was that corporate management determines 
the goals of the organization by using a linear programming model and the 
role of each division in meeting the corporate goals. Each division is 
thus supplied with operating goals. Divisional managers then use linear 
goal programming to determine how to use the resources provided to 
achieve the goals set by corporate management and how to meet their own 
goals other than those determined by corporate management. The model, 
also, calculates the level of activities, i. e. production, related to 
each operating management. The operating unit management is given the 
price of resources by divisional management. This information is used by 
operating management to minimize the cost of materials and other 
resources to be used in production. 
The link between the three models, in the iteration process, is the 
transfer prices. At each iteration, divisional management transmits the 
transfer prices (shadow prices) of corporate goals, which comes as a dual 
solution of its program, to corporate management. It, also, supplies the 
operating management with transfer prices for the scarce resources. Corp- 
orate management solves its linear program problem again to calculate a 
new value Tor the corporate goals, and transmits this information to 
divisional management. At the same time, operating management uses the 
transfer prices to review its production plan, and provides information 
on this to divisional management which, in turn, can start the second 
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iteration and so on. In other words, the solution of the complete problem 
depends on the determination of transfer prices/shadow prices for the 
various goals in each division. 
It is clear that the above model does not deal with the transfer 
prices of the transferred goods directly, but concentrates upon pricing 
goals as well as scarce resources in the decentralized structure. 
It seems that the arguments against using the decomposition 
technique in the decentralized company are also valid for the goal 
decomposition models. Although the goal decomposition models are complex 
they are more realistic from the point of view of corporate 
multi-objectives. 
2.2.2.6 Concluding Remarks 
Mathematical models have been developed to accomplish efficient 
allocation and pricing of scarce resources as well as pricing transferred 
goods in the multi-divisional decentralized company. The models become 
more complex as they try to achieve the above objectives whilst 
maintaining a high level of divisional autonomy. Godfrey (1971, (61)) 
expresses the view that: 
"There is a natural conflict between the concept of autonomous 
decision making in a decentralized organization and the usage of 
common, scarce, corporate resources. " 
In other words, a centralized co-ordinating mechanism is always necessary 
for these resources to be distributed among competing divisions and 
indeed none of the existing mathematical techniques can attain both 
overall corporate optimization of performance and complete divisional 
autonomy simultaneously. However a limited degree of divisional autonomy 
can be realized by the use of price schedules with either simple linear 
programming or the more complex decomposition programming. 
2.2.3 Accounting Approach 
In the accounting literature, different transfer price methods based 
on cost have been suggested, particularly in the absence of an external 
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market. The assumption behind these methods is that the true value of a 
transferred goods or service is reflected by costs incurred (Milburn, 
1977, (62)). 
Solomons (1965, (63)) suggested using a two part transfer price 
method. Under this method the transferee division should pay the 
transferor division a price equal to the standard variable cost plus a 
lump-sum periodic fee to cover either its fixed costs or its fixed cost 
plus a profit margin. The periodic fees, are part of the selling 
division's budgeted fixed cost. They are calculated in direct relation to 
the proportion of the selling division's capacity which the buying 
division will use during the planning period. This method is recommended 
by Solomons (1965, (64)) in the following circumstances: 
"There is no outside competitive market for the transferred 
products, transfers constitute a predominant part of the supplying 
division's business, and it can meet all probable requirements. " 
There are two justifications for Solomon's two part method. First, 
using a standard cost base cancels the selling division's inefficiencies 
which, if actual cost is used, appear in the form of an increased 
transfer price. Secondly, the two-part method permits flexibility in the 
development of a pricing policy for the end product. This means that the 
buying division can calculate the selling price of the end product below 
which no contribution to the firm's fixed costs are achieved. In this 
case, the buying division has a valuable competitive advantage in the end 
product market, particularly, if competitors divisionalized firms are 
using other forms of transfer price. 
Goetz (1967, (65)) recommended the use of incremental cost, i. e. the 
cost that changes as a result of a suggested decision, as a basis of 
transfer price. He argued that market price or average historical cost 
tend to be irrelevant, and impair goal congruence. He demonstrated by 
example that incremental costs as transfer prices lead to decisions that 
are consistent with the goals of the company. Goetz's work clearly 
30 
indicated that the incremental cost is relevant to internal decision 
making. 
Gordon (1970, (66)) suggested a standard cost-plus method for the 
decentralized administration of a socialist economy. This method is also 
applicable to a company in a capitalist economy. The price of the trans- 
ferred product (P(t)) in period (t) is given as: 
P(t) = C(t) + F(t) + Y(t)/X(t) 
where: C(t) is the standard variable cost per unit. 
F(t) is the standard fixed cost. 
Y(t) is the standard profit. 
X(t) is the standard output. 
The limitations inherent in the implementation of this model are 
discussed by Abdel-Khalik (1971, (67)). In addition, the model is subject 
to the general limitations of the full cost plus method which are 
summarized by Abdel-Khalik and Lusk (1974, (68)) as below: 
"1- The allocation of joint and fixed costs to products is necess- 
arily arbitrary.... 
2- Pricing at full-cost-plus implies willingness to incorporate in- 
efficiencies that may be passed on to the consumer -a function of 
consumer demand inelasticity.... 
3- The method assumes that opportunity cost is not different from 
average cost-plus or, alternatively, opportunity costs are ignored. 
4- In the absence of opportunity cost concepts, the mark-up could be 
determined by the dictates of the central management.... 
5- Finally, an important critique of cost-plus is advanced by 
Shubik... " 
Shubik's (1964, (69)) view is that the relatively certain profit 
accruing to the manufacturing division provides a disincentive to 
technological progress and innovation. For instance, if there are two 
divisions : selling (manufacturing) and buying. The transfer price at 
cost-plus is defined as 
TP = (1 + j)C 
where: C is the full cost of producing a unit of transferred product 
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in the selling division. 
j is the mark-up on the selling division's cost. 
The profit of the selling division is thus 
PRS = Cjq 
Where: q is the quantity of transferred product (as well as the 
quantity of output of the final product). 
The profit of the buying division is given by 
PRB = (P-K-C (1 + j))q 
where: P is the price of the final product. 
K is the cost of processing and selling incurred by the buying 
division. 
Now, if the selling division achieves a technological improvement which 
cuts the cost of producing the intermediate product by half, then the 
profits of this division will also be cut by one half, i. e. 
PRS = (Cjq)/2 
and PRB = (P -K-C (1 + j))q 
Therefore, the selling division is penalized for making technological 
progress, while the whole benefit of this progress is given to the buying. 
division. This produces adverse motivational effects. 
Horngren (1972, (70)) suggested that, as a general rule, transfer 
price should be: 
"(a) the additional outlay costs incurred to the point of transfer 
(sometimes approximated by variable costs), plus (b) opportunity 
costs for the firm as a whole.... The term outlay cost in this 
context represents the cash outflows that are directly associated 
with the production and transfer of the goods or services.... 
Opportunity costs are defined here as the maximum contribution to 
profits foregone by the firm as a whole if the goods are transferred 
internally. " 
Horngren indicated that opportunity cost is market price less outlay 
cost if a perfect market exists for the transferred product. The 
opportunity cost may be zero, if no external market exists for the 
intermediate products or for the alternative products that might utilize 
the same facilities of the supplying division. It seems that the above 
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general rule is a form of cost-plus method where the plus ranges from 
zero to the foregone contribution by rejecting the next best alternative. 
Vendig (1973, (71)) suggested a "three-part transfer price" which 
includes three sets of costs : standard variable manufacturing cost, a 
lump-sum payment representing a portion of traceable budgeted fixed 
costs, and a charge for using the capital employed. 
2.2.3.1 General Comments 
It can be seen that the accounting approach deals with transfer 
pricing for two cases. (a) The rational transfer price for decision 
making, and (b) when no market price exists or the market is imperfectly 
competitive. In the first situation, the incremental cost or variable 
cost has been recommended. This will avoid the dysfunctional decision 
making which may arise from using market price, particularly, if there is 
surplus capacity in the supplying division. In the second situation, the 
main contribution of the accounting approach is to fill the gap in the 
economic approach where full cost-plus can be used to determine transfer 
price for a price maker company. 
2.2.4_ Behavioural Approach 
A behavioural theory' of the firm was proposed by Cyert and March 
(1963, (72)). The theory assumed that the organization is a coalition of 
interests and that the goals of such a coalition are determined by a 
bargaining process. Accordingly, they suggested that transfer price rules 
result primarily from a long-run bargaining process. Cyert and March 
(1963, (73)) observed that 
"renegotiation of transfer payments will be viewed as a primary act- 
ivity for solving subunit problems', especially where the subunit 
does not perceive the external environment as being susceptible to 
future exploitation. " 
They argued that the units that have been unsuccessful will be more 
active in seeking new transfer price rules than the other units. 
More recently, Watson and Baumler (1975, (74)) attempted a 
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behavioural interpretation of transfer pricing. They argued that transfer 
pricing, being a part of the management accounting system, can be used to 
enhance the organizational differentiation (decentralization) in some 
cases and to facilitate organizational integration in other cases. Watson 
and Baumler's view (1975, (75)) was that 
"an appropriate transfer pricing mechanism in this case seems to be 
negotiated pricing" 
Watson and Baumler (1975, (76)) supported their proposal by evidence from 
Lawrence and Lorsch who are quoted as finding 
"that the successful firms facing uncertain environments were able 
to resolve effectively interdepartmental conflict, and the most 
important means of resolving this conflict was confrontation, i. e., 
negotiation. " 
Watson and Baumler (1975, (77)) also argued that if in complex organiz- 
ation 
"the appropriate conflict resolution process is negotiation, then it 
appears the transfer price should be one arrived at through nego- 
tiation. " 
The negotiated transfer price method was initially suggested by Dean 
(1955, (78))) and Cook (1955, (79)) in the mid 1950's. Dean (1955, (8Q)) 
proposed that transfer price should be the 
"competitive prices negotiated in arm's length bargaining by 
division managers who are free to go outside the company if unhappy 
with prices paid by or to brother division managers. " 
This shows that-the basis of Dean's proposal is the availability of an 
outside market. Effectively his proposal suggests (Thomas, 1980, (81)) 
the need: 
"to create an internal market that simulated an already existing ex- 
ternal market for a transfer goods. " 
Cook (1955, (82)) suggested that negotiation should be the basis for 
pricing transferred goods in two situations. First, negotiation may be 
used to adjust the market price of the transferred goods to reflect the 
benefits of internal trade such as reduced freight, selling expenses, 
credit costs, and bad debt expenses. Secondly, he mentioned the use of 
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"free negotiation" in the absence of any real market. He admitted the 
existence of two disadvantages of negotiated transfer prices: (a) the 
amount of executive time it is likely to take, and (b) it may distort the 
profit centre's financial statements. In addition to the above 
disadvantages, Dopuch and Drake (1964, (83)) argued that a negotiated 
price is an unsatisfactory basis for the evaluation of divisional 
performance. Their reason is that this method will imply an evaluation of 
the power of the divisional manager in negotiation rather than the 
performance. 
In spite of the above drawbacks of this method, several writers such 
as Fremgen (1970, (84)) and Shaub (1978, (85)) support using negotiation 
as a basis to determine the transfer price. 
2.2.5 Other Approaches 
Several other methods have been proposed for the determination of 
transfer price. For example, Emmanuel (1976, (86)) modified Solomons' two 
part transfer price method to another one called "the market-oriented 
two- part tariff". Thomas (1980, (87)) summarized Emmanuel's modified 
method as follows: 
"At the time of transfer, a product cost equal to the standard vari- 
able cost of the selling division will be charged to the buying 
division. In addition, a period cost will be charged. This period 
cost will equal the net contribution which the selling division 
obtains from external sales of the same commodity in the same time 
period as the transfer took place.... the period cost is calculated 
"ex post" and is not known at the budget planning stage.... " 
Emmanuel (1977, (88)) aimed at avoiding the possible dysfunctional 
decision- making of using market price as a basis for transferred goods 
as well as to safeguard the autonomy of unit managers. 
A dual pricing method has been proposed by several writers such as 
Drebin (1959, (89)). This method involves using two transfer prices 
simultaneously. Drebin has suggested that transfer price for the buying 
division should be the-marginal cost of the selling division, and the 
transfer price for the selling division should be the selling price of 
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the end product minus profits and cost of completion. This method has 
been suggested in the absence of an external market for the transferred 
product. The main argument for this method is that the dual pricing would 
help to achieve more objectives than a single transfer price. 
2.3 Transfer Pricing Methods in the International Market 
The different transfer pricing methods mentioned in the domestic 
market can be applied for international transfers. In the case of the 
international market the divisions are companies located in different 
countries. This introduces new determinants (Plasschaert, 1979, (90)) to 
the transfer pricing problem such as: 
a- tax regulations : corporate income tax and customs duties. 
b- profit remittance. 
c- interest of third parties other than government. 
d- exchange risk. 
e- minimising corporate profit taxes. 
Mathematical programming models have been developed to take into account 
these additional issues. Several models have been suggested. Horst (1971, 
(91)) developed a profit maximization model for a firm selling in two 
national markets. One element of this model involved the determination of 
an optimal transfer price. He assumed that management would be free to 
select any value between market price and marginal cost as optimal 
transfer price. Horst (1971, (92)) justification of this choice was the 
following: 
"If customs and tax authorities on both sides were reasonably 
diligent, a firm would probably not try to declare the value of its 
exports to be less than their marginal cost of production or greater 
than their market price in the exporting country. But any value the 
firm wished to declare within these broad limits would probably go 
unchallenged. " 
Horst's conclusion was that a firm would select between the largest and 
the smallest possible transfer price, based on the relative differences 
in tariff and tax rates between the two countries. 
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Petty (1971, (93)) suggested a linear programming model for inter- 
national transfer pricing. He stated that the objective of the model was 
as follows (Petty, 1971, (94)) 
"The objective of the model was identified as (1) the maximization 
of the worldwide company's after tax income and (2) the full 
utilization of the entity's pool of funds, giving due recognition to 
the financial requirements of the various subentities and to the 
additional foreign environmental risks. " 
The determinants restricting the achievement of these objectives were 
noted to be (1) tax legislation, both domestically and overseas, (2) 
trade restrictions, (3) foreign currency limitations, and (4) the need to 
further favourable foreign relationship. 
A mathematical model was developed by Rutenberg (1970, (95)) for 
achieving the optimal (least cost) flow of liquid assets between nation 
segments (subsidiaries) generating surplus funds and those with funds 
deficiencies. Rutenberg used the transfer prices of goods and services as 
one of the policies to attain his objective. He noted limitations on the 
ability of management to manipulate prices of standard items of 
transferred goods. Nevertheless, he believed that it is still possible to 
manipulate the transfer price of new products and non-standard items. He 
suggested that there could be costs due to persuading subsidiaries to 
accept a transfer price which did not conform with their self-interests. 
These costs were assumed to be a function of the transfer price. 
A computer simulation model of a hypothetical international 
enterprise was developed by Schydlowsky as a part of a study of the 
financial policies of US multinational companies (Robbins and Stobaugh, 
1973, (96)). The hypothetical enterprise operated in an environment which 
included import duty and corporate tax rate, inflation rate, and exchange 
devaluation percentage rate for a four year period. Import duty and 
corporate tax rates were constant during the period of the model while 
rates of exchange, devaluation percentage and inflation were varied among 
countries and over time. The solution given by the model showed a set of 
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financial policies, including transfer prices, which would meet specified 
objectives. The model assumed that transfer prices would be varied within 
a range of t 20%. 
2.4 Summary 
Since the mid-1950's different transfer pricing methods have been 
suggested for internal transactions in divisionalised companies. These 
methods were classified into five approaches namely: economic, math- 
ematical, accounting, behavioural and other. The economic approach 
handles transfer pricing from the viewpoint of the classical economic 
theory of the firm, i. e. the firm is regarded as a profit maximizer as 
well as a price taker. This approach has tried to determine the optimal 
transfer prices which can lead to the firm attaining profit maximization 
and autonomy. The main shortcoming of this approach is that it normally 
deals with a very simple situation that is one product and two divisions. 
Mathematical approach deals with more complicated situations, i. e. 
multi-products and multi-divisions compete with each other for corporate 
scarce resources and/or transferred products. The main advantage of the 
simple mathematical approach is achievement of maximum overall profit of 
divisionalised companies and its main drawback' is destruction of 
divisional autonomy. Many writers have tried to develop mathematical 
models. Their efforts have been directed towards improving the algorithms 
in order to increase divisional autonomy. In doing this the algorithms 
become very complicated with a limited increase in the level of autonomy. 
It is believed that achieving the two objectives simultaneously is 
difficult. A company should choose between these two alternatives 
according to its preference. 
The accounting approach handles transfer pricing when the firm is a 
price maker or no external market exists for the internal trade. The main 
weakness of this approach is that in some situations it impairs goal 
congruence and/or allocation of corporate scarce resources. 
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The behavioural (negotiation) approach promotes the motivational 
aspects of decentralization. The main advantage of this approach is 
accomplishing divisional autonomy and its major weakness is that it 
involves the managers in a time consuming process. 
All the above approaches are valid for both domestic and 
international transfers. Only mathematical models have been developed to 
take into account additional issues particular to the international 
market. 
As can be seen, transfer pricing methods range from very simple ones 
(such as current market price of same product in open market) to the very 
complicated methods (such as quadratic and goal decomposition models). An 
investigation of the relationship between the transfer pricing methods 
and both the objectives of transfer pricing and the conditions affecting 
the company will be discussed in Chapter 3. 
39 
References 
1- Hirshleifer, J., "On the Economics of Transfer Pricing, " Journal of 
Business, 1956, Vol. 29, pp. 172-184. 
2- Gould, J. R., "Internal Pricing in Firms - When There Are Costs of 
Using an Outside Market", Journal of Business, January 1964, pp. 61- 
67. 
3- Ronen, J. and McKinney, G., "Transfer Pricing for Divisional Autonomy", 
Journal of Accounting Research, Spring 1970, Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 99-112. 
4- Hirshleifer, J., Op. Cit. 
5- Ibid. 
6- Hirshleifer, J., "Economics of the Divisionalised Firm", Journal of 
Business, April 1957, pp. 96-108. 
7- Cook, P. W., "Decentralization and the Transfer Pricing Problem", The 
Journal of Business, April 1955, Vol. 7 XXVII, No. 2, pp. 87-94. 
8- Gould, J. R., Op. Cit., pp. 61-67. 
9- Cook, P. W., Op. Cit., p. 89. 
10- Ronen, J. and McKinney, G., Op. Cit. pp. 99-112 
11- Tomkins, C., "Financial Planning in Divisionalised Companies", Account- 
ancy Age Books, Haymarket Publishing Ltd., 1973, p. 67. 
12- Abdel-Khalik, A. R. and Lusk, E. J., "Transfer Pricing -A Synthesis", 
Accounting Review, January 1974, Vol. 49, pp. 8-23. 
13- Tomkins, C., Op. Cit. p. 64. 
14- Ibid, pp. 56-58. 
15- Ibid, p. 59. 
16- Ibid, p. 62. 
17- Kanodia, C., "Risk Sharing and Transfer Price Systems Under Uncert- 
ainty", Journal of Accounting Research, Spring 1979, Vol. 17, No. 
1, pp. 74-98. 
18- Ibid, p. 74. 
19- Whinston, A., "Price Guides in Decentralised Organisation", in Cooper, 
W. W., Leavitt, H., and Shelly, M. W., eds. "New Perspectives in Organ- 
isation Research, Wiley, 1964, pp. 405-448. 
20- Taha, Hamdy A., "Operation Research, An Introduction", Second Edition, 
Collier MacMillan London 1973. 
21- Solomons, D., "Divisional Performance Measurement and Control", Richard 
D. Irwin, Inc., Homewood, Illinois, 1965, p. 187. 
40 
22- Samuels, J. M., "Opportunity Costing : An Application of Mathematical 
Programming", Journal of Accounting Research, Autumn 1965, pp. 182-191. 
23- Hart, H., "Overhead Costs Analysis and Control", London, 1973, pp. 
142-147. 
24- Samuels, J. M., "Penalties and Subsidies in Internal Pricing Policies", 
Journal of Business Finance, Autumn 1969, pp. 31-38. 
25- Manes, Rene P., "Birch Paper Company Revisited: An Exercise in Transfer 
Pricing", The Accounting Review, July 1970,565-572. 
26- Dopuch, N. and Drake, D. F., "Accounting Implications of a Mathematical 
Programming Approach to the Transfer Price Problem", Journal of Account- 
ing Research, Spring 1964, pp. 12-16. 
27- Solomons, D., Op. Cit, p. 188. 
28- Tomkins, C., Op. Cit, p. 72. 
29- Manes, Rene P., Op. Cit, p. 319. 
30- Samuels, J. H. "Opportunity Costing", Op. Cit, pp. 35-38. 
31- Tomkins, C., Op. Cit, p. 77. 
32- Solomons, D., Op. Cit, p. 193. 
33- Abdel-Khalik, A. Rashad, and Lusk, Edward, J., "Transfer Pricing - 
A Synthesis", The Accounting Review, Vol. 49, January 1974, p. 16. 
34- Tomkins, C., Op. Cit, p. 80. 
35- Bernhard, Richard H., "Some Problems in Applying Mathematical Pro- 
gramming to Opportunity Costing", Journal of Accounting Research, 
Spring 1968, pp. 143-148. 
36- Manes, Rene P., Op. Cit, p. 319. 
37- Centre for Business Research, "Transfer Pricing", Management Control 
Project, Report No. 3, Manchester Business School, 1973, p. 14. 
38- Dopuch, N., and Drake, D. F., Op. Cit, pp. 20-21. 
39- Manes, Rene P., Op. Cit, p. 319. 
40- Solomons, D., Op, Cit, p. 194. 
41- Abdel-Khalik, A. R., and Lusk, S., Op. Cit, p. 16. 
42- Dantzig, G. B., and Wolfe, F., "Decomposition Principles for linear 
Programs", Operation Research Vol. 8, February 1960, pp. 101-111. 
43- Baumol, W. J., and Fabian, T., "Decomposition Pricing for Decentralis- 
ation and External Economics", Management Science, September 1964, 
pp. 1-32. 
44- Whinston, A., Op, Cit, pp. 405-448. 
41 
45- Baumol, W. J., and Fabian, Op. Cit, p. 2. 
46- Ibid, pp. 16-17. 
47- Onsi, Mohamed, "A Transfer Pricing System based on Opportunity Cost", 
The Accounting Review, July 1970, pp. 535-43. 
48- Hass, Jerome E., "Transfer Pricing in a Decentralized Firm", Manage- 
ment Science, Vol. 14, No. 6, February 1968, pp. B-310 : B-331. 
49- Jennergren, Peter, "Decentralization on the Basis of Price Schedules 
in Linear Decomposable Resource-Allocation Problems", Journal of Fin- 
ancial and Quantitive Analysis, January 1972, pp. 1407-1417. 
50- Ibid, p. 1409. 
51- Godfrey, James T., "Short-Run Planning in a Decentralized Firm", The 
Accounting Review, April 1971, pp. 286-297. 
52- Ibid, p. 290. 
53- Ibid, p. 294. 
54- Tomkins, C., Op. Cit, p. 102. 
55- N4ert, Philippe A. and Janssen, Christain T. L., "On Sub-optimization 
in Decomposition Approaches to Transfer Pricing". Journal of Indus- 
trial Economics, July 1971, pp. 220-230. 
56- Salkin, G. and Kornbluth, J., "Linear Programming in Financial Planning", 
Accountancy Age Books, Haymarket Publishing Ltd., London, 1973, chap- 
ter 7, pp. 163-187. 
57- Charnes, A., Clower, R. W., and Kortanek, K. O., "Effective Control 
Through Coherent Decentralization With Pre-emptive Goals, Econometrica, 
Vol. 35, No. 2, April 1967, pp. 294-320. 
58- Abdel-Khalik, A. R., and Lusk, Op. Cit, p. 18. 
59-. Bailey, Andrew D. and Boe, Warren J., "Goal and Resource Transfers 
in the Multigoal Organization" The Accounting Review, Vol. LI, No. 3, 
July 1976, pp. 559-573. 
60- Ruefli, T., "A Generalized Goal Decomposition Model", Management Sci- 
ences, Vol. 17, No. 9, April 1971. 
61- Godfrey, James T., Op. Cit, p. 293. 
62- Milburn, J. A., "International Transfer Pricing in a Financial Accounting 
Context", Unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, Illinois University, 1977, p. 
70. 
63- Solomons, D., Op. Cit, pp. 200-203. 
64- Ibid, p. 201. 
65- Goetz, Billy E., "Transfer Prices : An Exercise in Relevancy and Goal 
Congruence", The Accounting Review, July 1967, pp. 435-440. 
66- Gordon, M., "Pricing For a Socialist Economy", The Accounting Review, 
July 1970, pp. 427-443. 
42 
67- Abdel-Khalik, A. M., "On Gordon's Model of Transfer Pricing System", 
The Accounting Review, October 1972, pp. 783-788. 
68- Abdel-Khalik, A. M., and Lusk, E., Op. Cit, p. 21. 
69- Shubik, M., "Incentives, Decentralization Control : The Assignment 
of Joint Costs and Internal Pricing", Management Controls : New Dir- 
ections in Basic Research, C. Bonini, et al., eds. McGraw Hill 1964, 
p. 221-2. 
70- Horngren, C. T., "Cost Accounting A Managerial Emphasis", Third Edition, 
Prentice/Hall International, Inc., 1972, pp. 733-34. 
71- Vendig, R. E. "A Three-Part Transfer Price", Management Accounting 
55, September 1973, pp. 33-36. 
72- Cyert, R. M. and March, J. G., "Behavioural Theory of the Firm", Prentice- 
Hall, Inc., 1963, pp. 725-726. 
73- Ibid, p. 726. 
74- Watson, David J. H., and Baumler, John V., "Transfer Pricing :A Be- 
havioural Context", The Accounting Review, July 1975, pp. 466-474. 
75- Ibid, p. 473. 
76- Ibid, p. 471. 
77- Ibid, p. 472. 
78- Dean, J., "Decentralization and Intracompany Pricing", Harvard Business 
Review, July-August 1955, Vol. 33, No. 4, pp. 65-74. 
79- Cook, P. W., Op, Cit. 
80- Dean, J., Op. Cit, p. 68. 
81- Thomas, Arthur L., "A Behavioural Analysis of Joint-Cost Allocation 
and Transfer Pricing", Stipes Publishing Company, 1980, p. 197. 
82- Cook, P. W., Op. Cit, pp. 89 and 93. 
83- Dopuch, N. and Drake, D. F., Op. Cit, p. 13. 
84- Fremgen, J. M., "Transfer Pricing and Management Goal", Management 
Accounting, 52, December 1970, pp. 25-31. 
85- Shaub, H. J., "Transfer Pricing in a Decentralized Organization", 
Management Accounting 59, April 1978, pp. 33-36,42. 
86- Emmanuel, C. R., "Transfer Pricing in the Corporate Environment", Un- 
published Ph. D. Thesis, Lancaster University, 1976. 
87- Thomas, Arthur L. Op. Cit, p. 210. 
88- Emmanuel, C. R., "Transfer Pricing :A Diagnosis and Possible Solution 
to Dysfunctional Decision-Making in the Divisionalised Company", Man- 
agement International, 41/1977, Vol. 17, pp 45-59. 
89- Drebin, A. R., "A Proposal for Dual Pricing of Intra-Company Trans- fers", N. A. A. Bulletin 40, February 1959, pp. 51-55. 
43 
90- Plasschaert, Sylvain, R. F., "Transfer Pricing and Multinational Corp- 
orations : An Overview of Concepts, Mechanisms and Regulations", Saxons 
House, 1979, pp. 47-91. 
91- Horst, T., "The Theory of the Multinational Firm, Optimal Behavioural 
Under Different Tariff and Tax Rates", Journal of Political Economy, 
September-October 1971, pp. 1059-1072. 
92- Ibid, p. 1061. 
93- Petty, J. W., "An Optimal Transfer-Pricing System For the Multinational 
Firm :A Linear-Programming Approach" Unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, Uni- 
versity of Texas at Texas, 1977. 
94- Ibid, p. 87. 
95- Rutenberg, D. P., "Manoeuvering Liquid Assets in a Multinational Com- 
pany, Formulation and Deterministic Solution Procedure", Management 
Science, June 1970, pp. B671-B683. 
96- Robbins, Sidney M. and Stobaugh, Robert B., "Money in the Multinational 
Enterprise :A Study of Financial Policy", New York : Basic Book, 
Inc., 1973, pp. 18-20, and 201-213. 
CHAPTER 3 
Relationships among Transfer Pricing 
Objectives, Conditions, and Methods in the 
Literature 
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3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter the main objectives of transfer pricing are 
discussed as well as the methods that have been suggested for each 
objective to be achieved. Also presented are the conditions required for 
each transfer pricing method to apply as proposed in the literature. 
Finally, the interrelationships among transfer pricing objectives, 
methods and conditions are investigated. 
3.2 Transfer Pricing Objectives and Transfer Pricing Methods 
In the context of profit centre decentralization, transfer pricing 
objectives vary from one company to another. The different transfer 
pricing methods discussed in the previous chapter have been suggested to 
accomplish one or more of the transfer pricing objectives (Bireman, 1959, 
(1)), (Ronen and McKinney, 1970, (2)), (Horngren, 1977, (3)) as follows: 
1- to achieve goal congruence, through which transfer prices 
motivate divisional managers to seek their own self-interest 
in such a way that benefits the company as a whole. 
2- to maintain the autonomy of the divisions while serving as a 
stimulus to divisional managers to improve their efficiency. 
3- to allow central management to evaluate as accurately as 
possible the divisions' performance in terms of their 
individual contribution to company profit. 
4- to guide managers towards rational decisions that will lead to 
the economic acquisition and allocation of resources such as 
make or buy decisions, pricing policy for the end product, and 
capital budgeting decisions. 
5- to facilitate the preparation of financial statements, i. e. 
the income statement of the company and the financial position 
of the company. 
6- to minimize the impact of tariffs and domestic income taxes. 
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A transfer pricing method which is relevant for one of the above 
primary objectives might, however, be in conflict with another objective. 
Bierman (1959, (4)), argued that various transfer pricing methods are 
relevant and the choice of the method to be used can be made only after 
the objective is determined. The best transfer pricing methods for 
different objectives as suggested by Bierman (1959, (5)) are: 
"Use 
Measuring Performance 
Decision Making 
Method of Pricing 
-Market price (negotiated price 
if market price is unavailable). 
Marginal costs, 
Variable costs (as a substitute 
for marginal costs), and differ- 
ential costs. 
General Financial 
Accounting (reports 
prepared in accordance 
with generally accepted 
accounting principles). 
-Full cost of product (excluding 
intracompany profits). " 
Ronen and McKinney (1970, (6)) argued that the optimal transfer 
price should achieve goal congruence, autonomy, and divisional 
performance simultaneously. Other writers, such as Dean (1955, (7)) and 
Solomons (1965, (8)) have suggested a transfer pricing method to be used 
for accomplishing one or more of the above objectives under certain 
conditions. 
3.3 Conditions Required for Specific Transfer Pricing Methods 
There is no general agreement in the literature about the 
conditions required for a specific transfer pricing method. Sometimes, 
certain conditions have been mentioned explicitly and sometimes not. In 
the latter case, the conditions implied by the writers were derived from 
their general comments. The conditions will be classified here according 
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to the general basis of transfer prices into four groups: 
a- conditions for market-based transfer prices. 
b- conditions for negotiation-based transfer prices. 
c- conditions for cost-based transfer prices. 
d- conditions for mathematical programming-based transfer prices. 
3.3.1 Conditions for Market-Based Transfer Prices 
The concept accepted in the literature is that the transfer price 
should reflect the opportunity cost, i. e. profits foregone by the company 
as a whole if the goods are transferred internally. The opportunity cost 
is represented by the market price when an external market exists (Dopuch 
and Drake, 1964 (9)). The market price has been considered the best price 
for internal trade to fulfil the requirements of a profit centre when the 
conditions under which the internal trade operates are similar to the 
characteristics of the external market. But to what extent the external 
market represents a real alternative to the company is a subjective 
judgement (Emmanuel, (1976, (10)). 
Several investigators have tried to state under which conditions 
market prices are valid or not valid as transfer prices. Many writers 
agree that market prices are valid as transfer prices if the external 
market for transferred products is perfectly competitive, but this type 
of market is rare. On the other hand, Dean (1955, (11)) argued that 
market prices are not valid criteria for transfer prices if the external 
market is inactive. For example, he indicated that the quantities traded 
in the market may be much smaller than those involved in the internal 
transactions. In this situation, the use of nominal price quotations as 
indicators of the market prices may be misleading because these 
quotations are related to the individual company situation rather than to 
the overall market situation. This means that the market may not offer a 
real alternative for the intracompany seller or buyer. It is noticed that 
this argument has been reported as one of the main problems associated 
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with using the market prices as transfer prices in the empirical study 
undertaken (Chapter 5). 
Also, market price statistics may be an inaccurate statement of the 
true market price because they may represent prices for products of a 
different quality, quantity, and location from that of internal 
transactions. 
Cook's view (1955, (12)) is that no valid outside price is 
obtainable in some situations. For example, he argued that 
"This situation where a real market alternative does not exist is 
quite comrron with branded products or with ordinary transfers 
between a production and a sales department. In this case, the 
market price guide is no longer a reliable indicator of whether 
transfers are in the company's interest or not; the transfer price 
must reflect the revenue which could be earned by selling to the 
market". 
Gould (1964, (13)) indicated that market price is inapplicable 
where there is a difference between the transferor's net selling price 
and the transferee's net buying price. This could happen if an 
integrated company is situated some distance from a market where an 
intermediate product is sold under perfectly competitive conditions, and 
both divisions, i. e. selling and buying, are in the same location. The 
selling division would receive from sales in the external market the 
market price less transport costs, while the buying division would pay 
for purchases at market price plus transport costs. Gould's view is 
relevant as long as both divisions, selling and buying, are in the same 
location, but with different locations the transportation costs do not 
affect the transfer prices. Advertising, sales promotion costs, credit 
terms, and bad-debt expenses are more significant. 
It has been argued that in some cases market-based transfer prices 
do not achieve goal congruence even when the external and the transferred 
product are identical and the external market is perfectly competitive. 
An example is given by Horngren (1977, (14)) to illustrate that autonomy 
at the divisional level does not lead to the optimal profit for the 
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company as a whole, i. e. if one division has idle capacity and divisional 
managers have freedom to trade with the external market. Therefore, if 
market-based transfer prices are to be used the benefits which result 
from decentralization should ideally be greater than the costs arising 
from divisional managers' decisions being based on maximising the profit 
of their divisions instead of the overall profit of the company. 
Emmanuel (1976, (15)) pointed out that 
"the failure of market-oriented transfer prices to consistently 
secure goal congruence has led to certain writers advocating that 
the units should not be allowed to use the external markets". 
Market-based transfer prices take various forms namely: current 
market prices, the market prices of similar goods or services, sales 
minus and negotiated market prices. Each of these forms of transfer 
prices is recommended, under certain conditions, in order to fulfil 
profit centre requirements. Sometimes, the literature describes more 
detailed conditions by classifying the external market not only by the 
numbers of competitors and their comparative situations but also by other 
considerations such as: whether the goods traded in the external market 
are branded, have different quality or design compared with those goods 
transferred internally (Dearden, 1960, (16)). Generally, the conditions 
suggested by different writers for using a specific form of market-based 
transfer price are not uniform. The conditions associated with the first 
three forms of market-based transfer prices (i. e. current market price, 
the market prices of similar goods or services, and sales minus) are 
discussed in the following sub-sections, but the conditions as to the 
negotiated market price* will be discussed with negotiation-based 
transfer prices (Section 3.3.2). 
3.3.1.1 Current Market Price 
For current market price, Cook (1955, (17)), N. A. A. (1956, 
(18)), 
*This approach has been followed to maintain, as far as possible, 
the 
classification selected for the four groups of transfer pricing methods 
used throughout the thesis. 
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and Solomons (1965, (19)) agree that an active external market should 
exist for the transferred goods or services. Cook, and Solomons also 
agree that the divisions should have access to the external market. But 
the N. A. A. ignored this condition, and recommended using this method even 
when the divisions do not have access to the external market. 
Another condition put forward by Cook is that the divisions cannot 
affect the market price. The existence of an active external market 
suggests implicitly that divisions are less likely to affect the market 
price. The ignoring of access to an external market by N. A. A. may be 
interpreted as implying that the use of the current market price for 
transferred products is sufficient to create a profit centre and to 
fulfil its requirements. 
3.3.1.2 Market Prices of Similar Products 
Both Cook (1955, (20)), and the N. A. A. (1956, (21)) agree that to 
use the market prices of similar goods or services for internal 
transfers, an active external market should exist. This applies in three 
cases: 
(a) unbranded similar goods or, (b) goods or services which are not 
totally different in quality, design, specification, amounts traded, from 
the goods or services transferred internally or, (c) full cost 
information about the similar goods or services from a competitor must be 
available. 
In addition Cook proposed that the divisions should have access to 
the external market. As stated N. A. A. ignored this condition when the 
benefits of integration are required or the company believes that its 
product is superior in design. The last condition suggested by Cook is 
that the divisional managers are responsible for adjusting the market 
price for internal transfers. 
3.3.1.3 Sales Minus 
Dean (1955, (22)), and Shillinglaw (1972, (23)) agree on two 
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conditions for the use of the sales minus method. First, no real market 
exists for the intermediate product. Secondly, a market exists for the 
final product. A conflict is seen, however, between the conditions 
proposed by Dean and by Shillinglaw, namely who sets the transfer price. 
Dean's view is that the divisional managers should determine the sales 
commission or discount. By contrast, Shillinglaw's view is that corporate 
management should set the mark-up on transferred goods, list prices of 
final product, and the output level. 
3.3.2 Negotiation-Based Transfer Prices 
Negotiation-based transfer prices have been proposed to fulfil the 
requirements of a profit centre. Four sets of conditions of negotiated 
prices are recognized. Two of those lead to the use of market price as 
the basis of the negotiation and the other two to the use of cost as the 
basis of the negotiation. 
3.3.2.1 Negotiated Market Price 
Both Dean and Shillinglaw suggested market price as a basis of 
negotiation. Dean's conditions (1955, (24)) are given below: 
1- a competitive external market for the internally transferred 
goods or services must exist, or for similar goods/services. 
2- The divisional managers should have access to full data on 
alternative sources and markets and to public and private 
information about market prices. 
3- The divisions should be completely free to deal externally. 
4- The transfer prices should be determined by negotiation 
between the divisional managers. 
The conditions that have been proposed by Shillinglaw (1972, (25)) 
are: 
1- Some form of outside market must exist for the intermediate 
goods or services. 
2- Any available market information should be communicated to the 
negotiators. 
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3- Both parties must be free to deal outside the company. 
4- Corporate management must indicate its support of the 
principle of negotiation. 
It is clear that the first three conditions suggested by both Dean 
and Shillinglaw are identical. Shillinglaw's fourth condition indicates 
clearly that corporate management should support the negotiation 
principle. 
3.3.2.2 Negotiated Cost Price 
Proposals made by Cook and Solomons are quite different from the 
above conditions. Cook (1955, (26)) suggested three conditions should 
apply for the adoption of negotiated prices. First, no real market exists 
to test or use as a reference point. Secondly, the transfers are 
relatively few in number and quantity. Lastly, the divisional managers 
are sophisticated and equipped with good accounting information relating 
to their operations. 
Two conditions were proposed by Solomons. (1965, (27)). The first is 
that the number and quantity of internal transfers are neither important 
nor potentially important. The second condition is that there should be 
no outside competitive market. 
The above two sets of conditions imply that the basis of 
negotiation is cost. Both Cook and Solomons state clearly that the amount 
of transferred products should be small. The question does however-arise 
as to whether it is worth spending time in negotiation in the case of a 
small quantity of transferred products, given that a major problem of 
negotiation is the time consumed. 
3.3.3 Conditions for Cost-Based Transfer Prices 
When the primary objective of a transfer pricing system is to 
allocate resources optimally and if an external market does not exist, or 
if the market is imperfectly competitive, market price is not regarded as 
a sound basis for determining transfer price. In this case, 
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actual/standard cost-based transfer prices have been suggested by several 
writers such as Solomons (1965, (28)), (Gorden, 1970, (29)). The required 
conditions for adopting a specific form of cost-based transfer pricing 
are given below. 
3.3.3.1 Marginal or Variable Cost 
Marginal cost and variable cost have been proposed as alternative 
transfer pricing methods. The following conditions for using marginal 
cost have been proposed by Hirshleifer (1956, (30) ; 1957, (31)): 
1- No external market exists, or an external market (competitive 
or imperfectly competitive) exists but the company decides to 
ignore it, or discriminates against it. 
2- Only one good/service is transferred. 
3- Demand and technological independence is assumed. 
4- Marginal cost and revenue data are available. 
5- Corporate management should act as an information centre, or 
arbitrator and is involved in the determination of transfer 
prices. 
6- Corporate management secures any, benefits of integration. 
Variable cost has been proposed as a substitute for marginal cost 
because of its practicality. Solomons (1965, (32)) recommended the use of 
the standard variable cost as a transfer price under the following condi- 
tions: 
1- No outside competitive market exists for the transferred products. 
2- Transfers constitute a predominant part of the supplying division's 
business. 
3- The supplying division can meet all probable requirements. 
3.3.3.2 Direct Cost 
Dean (1955, (33)) suggested two conditions for using actual or 
standard direct cost as bases for transfer prices. First, either no 
external market for the transferred products exists or an external market 
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for the transferred products exists but corporate management decides to 
ignore it. Secondly, corporate management, or divisional managers and 
corporate management, determine the transfer prices. 
3.3.3.3 Full Cost 
The N. A. A. (1956, (34)) prescribed three conditions for using an 
actual or standard full cost method. First, a competitive external market 
for the intermediate products does not exist. Secondly, corporate 
management sets the output levels for the units and the proportion of 
their output to be sold internally and the proportion to be sold 
externally; or the division must fulfil internal needs before selling or 
buying externally. Finally, corporate management and divisional managers 
in conjunction set the transfer prices. 
3.3.3.4 Full Cost Plus 
The following conditions for using full cost plus have been 
suggested by Dean (1955, (35)): 
1- (a) A competitive external market for the intermediate 
products does not exist. Or, 
(b) Some form of external market exists but the company 
decides to ignore it. 
2- Corporate management is involved in day-to-day decision-making 
including the output levels of the divisions. 
3- Corporate management secures any benefits of integration. 
The main drawback of cost-based transfer prices is that most forms, 
except full cost plus, lead to the supplying division being a cost centre 
not a profit centre, simply because these methods do not show a profit 
for the supplying division. Also, cost-based transfer prices will not 
lead to optimal allocation of resources if there is more than one 
division competing for the scarce resources. 
3.3.4 Conditions for Mathematical Programming-Based Transfer Prices 
Mathematical programming-based transfer prices have been proposed 
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for cases of technological and demand dependence and when two or more 
divisions are competing for the scarce resources. When divisions are 
actively discouraged from trading with the external market and the 
optimal output level is determined by top management, transfer prices can 
be established by the use of mathematical programming. Four forms of 
mathematical method (as discussed in detail in Chapter 2, section 2.3) 
are considered here namely: linear programming, linear decomposition, 
quadratic decomposition, and goal decomposition programming. 
3.3.4.1 Linear Programming 
Solomons (1965, (36)) suggested the following conditions for using 
linear programming: 
1- No external market exists. 
2- Transfers take place in significant amounts. 
3- The supplying division does not have the capacity necessary to 
meet all requirements. 
4- Full data about the divisions is transmitted to corporate 
management. 
5- Transfer prices are set by corporate management. 
3.3.4.2 Linear Decomposition Programming 
There are four conditions for using linear decomposition 
programming (Baucool and Fabian, 1964, (37)). First, demand and 
technological independence are assumed. Secondly, corporate management 
wishes to minimize. the amount of information transmitted from divisions. 
Thirdly, the output level is mainly set by divisions but corporate 
management retains overall control of the process. Lastly, corporate 
management sets transfer prices. 
3.3.4.3 Quadratic Decomposition Programming 
The following are the conditions for using the quadratic 
decomposition methods (Hass, 1968, (38)): 
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1- (a) An external market for transferred products does not 
exist. Or, 
(b) An external market for transferred products exists but 
the company' decides to ignore it or discriminate against it. 
2- Demand and technological dependencies exist. 
3- It is required to transmit the minimal amount of information 
from divisions to corporate management. 
4- The production level and transfer prices are mainly determined 
by divisional managers, but control of the process is 
maintained by corporate management. 
3.3.4.4 Goal Decomposition Programming 
For using goal decomposition programming, there are four condition's 
(Charnes, Clower and Kortanek, 1967, (39)). First, no external market 
exists, or an external market exists but the company decides to ignore 
it. Secondly, the company aims at achieving multiple objectives. Thirdly, 
corporate mangement requires as small an amount of information about the 
divisions as possible. Lastly, the output level and the transfer prices 
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are mainly determined by divisions but corporate management retain 
control of the process. 
Mathematical programming - based transfer prices lead to optimal 
allocation of resources and maximization of the company profits as -ä 
whole but whether they achieve divisional autonomy is open to doubt. In 
these methods, corporate management still interferes to a variable degree 
in setting transfer prices. 
3.4 Concluding Remarks 
Disagreement among the writers on transfer pricing objectives, 
conditions and method relationships is evident. Different conditions have 
been suggested for applying a specific transfer pricing method to achieve 
one objective. For example, Dean (1955, (40)) and Shillinglaw (1972, (41)) 
suggested negotiation as a basis for transfer pricing when there is an 
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outside market, while Solomons (1965, (42)), and Cook (1955, (43)) 
recommended this method when the external market does not exist. All 
these writers aimed implicitly or explicitly at achieving autonomy. 
It will also be noticed that different methods have been suggested 
under the same conditions. For instance, Dean's (1955, (44)) requirements 
for applying either direct cost or full cost plus are similar. But the 
former method was suggested for the purpose of short-run operating 
decisions such as pricing and product policy and the latter for attaining 
divisional performance measurement objective. Also, there are 
similarities between the requirements for the sales minus method and 
those of the marginal cost method. The former has been proposed to 
measure divisional performance (Shillinglaw, 1972, (45)), and the latter 
for goal congruence purposes (Hirshleifer, 1956, (46)). Thus, it seems 
that the relationship between the, transfer pricing objectives and methods 
is stronger than the relationship between the conditions and the transfer 
pricing methods. 
Different methods have also been suggested for achieving the same 
objective but under different conditions. This seems logical because the 
circumstances of the company cannot be ignored. For example to measure 
divisional performance both current market price and full cost plus have 
been recommended. The former method has been suggested (Cook, 1955, (47)) 
when a perfectly competitive market exists, and the latter when an 
outside market does not exist (Dean, 1955, (48)). To achieve goal 
congruence, current market price has been recommended 
(Hirshleifer, 1965, (49)) but with idle capacity in the supplying division 
variable cost is proposed by Horngren (1977, (50)). 
The decision to adopt a specific transfer pricing method should be 
based on the objectives of transfer pricing and the conditions under 
which the company operates. The conditions reviewed in the last section 
for the operation of each of the different transfer pricing methods can 
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be classified into four categories: 
a) Internal policies: such as responsibility for setting transfer 
prices and freedom to trade in external markets. 
b) Production conditions: such as technological dependence between 
divisions and the number of products involved in internal 
transfers. 
c) Accounting information availability: such as information about 
variable cost, and direct cost. 
d) Market conditions: which include the existence or absence of a 
market for the transferred products, and the type of market. 
The interrelationships among transfer pricing objectives, 
conditions, and methods are not easy to isolate and are illustrated in 
Figure 3.1. 
The objectives of transfer pricing directly affect the transfer 
pricing method to be used as well as the internal policies such as 
freedom to trade and the responsibility for setting transfer prices. For 
instance when the objective of transfer pricing is divisional autonomy, 
the method recommended is market price and the divisional managers should 
be free to deal with the external market and set transfer prices. 
However, this requires the existence of an external market otherwise a 
non market based method will be used. This demonstrates that in some 
cases the conditions may directly affect the selection of transfer 
pricing methods. 
Also there are other environmental variable influencing both the 
transfer pricing objectives and methods. Among these are a) -legal 
restrictions imposed by government such as tax regulations, b) economic 
variables such as the rate of inflation. These environmental variables 
may affect the transfer pricing objectives as in the case of a company 
aiming at minimizing domestic income taxes. 
In this study, transfer pricing determinants is the term given to 
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Figure 3.1 The Relationships Among Transfer Pricing Objectives, 
Conditions, and Methods. 
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each of the objectives or the conditions or the environmental variables 
involved in transfer pricing. 
3.5 Implication for the Study 
The complexity of the relationship between transfer pricing 
determinants and the transfer pricing methods suggested that a further 
empirical study is desirable. The aim of the study is to evaluate both 
how the practitioners manage the problem of selecting a transfer pricing 
method and to discover a way to predict the transfer pricing method that 
will be used by a given company. Therefore, it was decided to collect 
empirical data to evaluate the relationship between transfer pricing 
determinants and transfer pricing methods used. The survey undertaken in 
this study and the analysis of the collected data will be given in 
Chapters 5 to S. 
Before the empirical data were collected, a review of previous 
empirical studies of transfer pricing practices in both the UK and the US 
was carried out. The aims of this review were to discover more of the 
transfer pricing determinants, to study to what extent the relationship 
between transfer pricing determinants and method has been investigated 
previously, and to explore research points still remaining to be covered. 
This review will be presented in Chapter 4. 
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CHAPTER 4 
An Evaluation of Previous Empirical Studies 
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4.1 Introduction 
Transfer pricing practices have been investigated through several 
studies in the UK and many studies in the US. In the former, the surveys 
concentrated mainly on transfer pricing in the domestic market. In the 
US, empirical studies have examined transfer pricing either for the 
domestic market or for the international market, and recent studies have 
covered both markets. The focus of attention of the surveys varied from 
one study to another. The common aspects covered in these studies were 
transfer pricing methods used, the main objectives of transfer pricing 
and environmental determinants of transfer pricing methods. 
This chapter reviews previous empirical studies in the UK in 
chronological order of publication. It also gives a brief review of the 
main surveys in the US. Following the reviews an appraisal is made of the 
findings reported. From the picture which emerges it becomes possible to 
identify areas in which further studies need to be undertaken. Some of 
the most important of these aspects are studied in this thesis. 
4.2 Empirical Studies in the UK 
Seven empirical studies namely: Livesey (1967, (1)), Piper (1969, 
(21)), British Institute of Management (Rook, 1971, (3)), Tomkins (1973, 
(4)), Centre for Business Research (1973, (5)), Emmanuel (1976, (6)), and 
UK Branches of the Institute of Cost and Management Accountants (Finnie, 
1978, (7)) have examined transfer pricing in UK companies. The number of 
companies participating in these studies ranged from 34 to 193. Some of 
the studies were carried out by individuals and others by research 
institutes. The methods used for collecting the data were questionnaire 
and pilot interviews in the Livesey and Emmanuel surveys, and 
questionnaire only for the rest of the empirical studies. All the studies 
concentrated on transfer pricing for the domestic market. A review of 
these seven studies is given below. 
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4.2.1 Livesey's Study (1967) 
A questionnaire about inter-divisional pricing policy was sent by 
Livesey to 400 companies in the Manchester area. From 232 useable replies 
received, 100 companies (i. e. 43%) had inter-divisional pricing. Livesey 
was mainly interested in how the prices of transferred goods within the 
organization were determined. The survey also aimed at finding out to 
what extent the divisions were free to buy or sell outside the company. 
A noticeable variety of bases were adopted in the setting of 
transfer prices. Table 4.1 shows the method applied according to the 
categories mentioned in the questionnaire. It can be seen that cost-based 
transfer prices were used by the majority of companies (70%). 
Livesey found that the majority of the companies that used full 
cost plus method (28 companies out of 30 companies) added an arbitrary 
fixed percentage to full cost as a mark up. He had hoped to find more 
companies adding an amount which reflected the value of capital employed 
but concluded that, in practice, it was not easy to allocate the capital 
among the different divisions. 
No attempt was made in the questionnaire to obtain answers to 
questions regarding "Freedom to Trade". From interviewing 20 companies, 
Livesey noticed that the term "Freedom to Trade" had a different 
interpretation from one company to another. In some cases it was claimed 
that divisional management has the maximum freedom to trade where central 
management intervenes in the trade decision. In other words, the meaning 
of freedom and autonomy was not clear in the mind of the management. 
Livesey (1967, (8)) reported that the most important objectives of 
transfer pricing appeared to be: 
a) To maximize the company's profits over a given period of time 
(relatively short). This is essentially related to the optimum 
utilization of the existing physical assets of the company. 
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b) To optimize the allocation of the company's financial resources 
in the long-run. 
c) To facilitate control by central management. 
d) To encourage a co-operative attitude among the divisional 
managers. 
e) To foster among the managers of the divisions a commercial 
attitude, i. e. one which focuses on the earning of profits. 
This study indicated that these objectives 'were not compatible; it 
being quite possible that a transfer pricing policy which helped in 
attaining some of these objectives might do so at the expense of others. 
Livesey argued that before policy concerning transfer pricing is 
determined, a view must be taken of the relative importance of the above 
objectives. The important conclusion given by Livesey was that the 
relationship between the different methods of transfer pricing and the 
objectives hoped to be achieved by transfer pricing is given more thought 
in some companies than in others. Although, Livesey qualitatively 
evaluated the relationship between transfer pricing methods and transfer 
pricing objectives, a quantitative evaluation of this relationship would 
have been valuable. The investigation of this relationship and its 
evaluation are among the aims of the current study as mentioned in 
Chapter 3 and as will be seen in Chapters 5,6, and 8. 
4.2.2 Piper's Study (1969) 
The aim of the survey was to study the bases used for pricing 
internal trade between the operating units of an organisation, especially 
where these units were considered as autonomous profit centres. Sixty six 
companies were approached by questionnaires and fifty-five replied. 
Thirty-four companies (62%) reported the existence of transfer pricing. 
Table 4.2 shows the answers concerned with the transfer pricing 
method used. Twenty-nine companies (85% of the respondents) applied 
market-based transfer prices, i. e. transfer prices were either market 
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Table 4.1 Transfer Pricing Methods reported in Livesey's Study 
Basis No. of Companies % 
Full cost 37 34 
Full cost plus 30 27 
Direct or variable cost 10 9 
Negotiation 16 14.5 
Market price 17 15.5 
Any others -- 
Total * 110 100 
The total number of answers exceeds 100 because some of the 100 companies 
adopted more than one method. 
Table 4.2 Transfer Pricing Methods in Piper's Study 
Transfer Prices Frequency % 
1. Market - based 29 85 
2. Cost - based 13 
3. Others 4 12 
Total 34 100 
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price or market price adjusted for freight, quantity discount, or other 
variables. It was reported that a large number of firms allowed their 
divisions to negotiate transfer prices as would be expected where 
autonomy is encouraged. It was found that negotiation usually led to the 
adjustment of established market prices to account for the savings from 
internal trading. It is noticed that this finding supports Gould's view 
(1964, (9)) that market price is not always the optimal transfer price, 
and that the latter should reflect the savings of internal trade. 
Piper was interested to see how theory, particularly mathematical 
programming techniques, was applied in practice. He found no evidence 
that mathematical programming techniques were used even by the largest 
companies. He also noticed that no one tried to apply different transfer 
prices for different company objectives. It is noticed that this finding 
casts doubts about the practicality of Bierman's suggestions (1959, (10)) 
of using different transfer prices for different objectives. 
An interesting conclusion that can be drawn from this study, is 
that adopting a market price basis for pricing of transferred goods when 
there is an imperfectly competitive market for the end product, might 
decrease the overall profits of the company. In one case it was mentioned 
that the supplying division was not ready to accept a price lower than 
the home market price. Central management found that it could increase 
overseas business by selling the products at a price less than the normal 
home price. Therefore, head office intervened and fixed the prices of the 
transferred goods between all contributing divisions. None of the 
divisions liked these prices because of the apparently low returns. At 
the end of the year, it was found that substantial benefits had been 
realized as a result of the additional business. This shows the 
significance of transfer pricing as a means of increasing the market 
share of the end product. It also indicates the importance of the market 
share of the end product as one of the main determinants of transfer 
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pricing in practice. 
4.2.3 British Institute of Management Study, B. I. M., (1971) 
The findings of the B. I. M. survey were based on 193 companies which 
replied positively to a postal questionnaire sent out by Rook. The total 
number of respondents was 293, indicating that 66% of them had a system 
of transfer pricing. The main purposes of the survey were to assess the 
following: 
a- the ratio of inter-unit trading to the total turnover. 
b- the level of autonomy as a whole. 
c- the level of decentralization in decisions relating to 
purchases from, or sales to, outside markets. 
d- the degree of decentralization in setting transfer pricing 
policy. 
e- the methods employed in fixing transfer prices. 
Four main facts emerged from this study. In more than half of the 
companies the inter-unit sales accounted for less than 10% of the total 
annual sales, and the inter-unit sales ranged from 10 to 25% in most of 
the remaining companies. Secondly, it was found that the degree of 
autonomy regarding buying or selling outside varied widely. The degree of 
decentralization depended to a large extent on both the size and the 
structure of the company. The increase in company size led to an increase 
in the degree of autonomy. Thirdly, although some companies reported a 
high degree of decentralization, decisions concerned with selling to, or 
buying from, outside and the setting of transfer prices were in the hands 
of central management. This means that the interpretation of the term 
"decentralised to a high degree" must be questioned. Lastly, a variety of 
transfer pricing methods were used in the companies. 
Figure 4.1 is based on information contained within this study and 
shows the diversity of transfer pricing methods found. It will be noticed 
that the marginal cost method was not used by any company surveyed,. 
although the number of companies participating in this survey is the 
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largest number in all empirical studies in UK. In practice, it would seem 
that an autonomous profit centre is not ready to sell at marginal cost 
because this will lead to a poor apparent performance. Mathematical 
techniques were, also, not applied by any company in setting transfer 
prices. 
4.2.4 Tomkins' Study (1973) 
Tomkins' empirical study of transfer pricing policies was part of a 
larger investigation of management practices in divisionalised companies. 
The basis of the sample was the top 200 companies (groups) recorded in 
'The Times 1000'. A questionnaire was used to collect the data. 66 
companies co-operated in this study, but the information concerning 
transfer pricing policies was given by 44 companies. The findings of this 
study agree with the results of the previous empirical studies in that a 
great variety of transfer price methods were used in practice as is shown 
in Table 4.3. 
It was a surprise to Tomkins to find that none of international 
companies covered in his survey reported any constraints imposed on them 
by tax authorities concerned with transfers across national boundaries. 
Also none of them recorded the need to set transfer prices in order to 
maximize total group profit. It is noticed that this finding disagrees 
with the inclusion of these two determinants among the main transfer 
pricing determinants in the literature. Tomkins also found that there was 
no clear relationship between the volume of transferred goods and the 
transfer pricing method employed. This suggests that this determinant is 
of low importance in influencing transfer pricing policy. 
To obtain an idea of the importance of determining a 'correct' 
transfer price, Tomkins asked the companies about the ratio of 
inter-divisional transfers to the total value of their transactions. He 
found that this ratio was less than 10% of turnover in 69% of the 
respondents. It is obvious that a high ratio of the internal trading to 
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Table 4.3 Transfer Pricing Methods in Tomkins' Study 
Transfer Pricing Method Sub-Total Total 
No. % No. % 
1. Cost basis 20 30 
- Direct cost 3 4.5 
- Direct cost plus mark up 69 
- Average total cost 3 4.5 
- Total cost plus profit mark up 8 12 
2. Market price basis 31 46 
- Current market price 22 33 
- Market price less special discount 9 13 
3. Negotiated 14 21 
4. Other basis 23 
Total 67 100 
* More than one method was used by some companies 
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total transactions requires more rigorous setting of transfer prices to 
avoid bad decisions based on the use of incorrect transfer pricing 
method. 
4.2.5 Centre for Business Research Study, C. B. R., (1973) 
The C. B. R. survey was carried out by questionnaire. The number of 
respondents was 44; some of them gave incomplete answers and for some 
questions there were multiple answers. The focus of attention in this 
investigation was to assess the problems of managing interdependence 
among the main operating units and the extent to which these problems 
were handled by a transfer pricing system. This study also aimed at 
finding out the ratio of the internal trade of goods and services, 
between the main operating units, to external trade, as well as the 
methods of pricing the internal flows either domestic or international. 
Actually, this survey covered not only the transfer pricing system 
attached to the flows of products but also the transfer pricing system 
used for the transactions between the central service departments and the 
main operating units. It will be noticed that in this respect this survey 
was more comprehensive than the previous empirical studies. 
The ratio of internal transfers to external trade was used as a 
measure of the degree of interdependence between the main operating 
units. Companies were classified at three levels of interdependence: low 
(ratio less than 10%), medium (10-25%), and high (greater than 25%). The 
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average level of interdependence found in this survey was medium. It is 
noticed that this study did not sub-classify the companies in each of the 
three levels of interdependence according to their type of structure, 
namely, vertically integrated, horizontally integrated and conglomerate. 
This sub-classification would perhaps have lead to different average 
levels of interdependence for each type of organizational structure. 
The objectives of transfer pricing systems were presented in the 
order of their perceived importance as follows (C. B. R., 1973, (11)): 
Objectives Importance (scale 0-4) 
1- to foster awareness of profit implications 
of decisions. 3.0 
2- to determine the contribution of each main 
operating unit to total company performance. 3.0 
3- to help in long run resource allocation 
in the company. 2.3 
4- to help in the measurement of managerial 
performance. 2.0 
5- to accomplish short term co-ordination of main 
operating units. 1.5 
The survey also showed that the most important objective of the transfer 
pricing systems varied according to the level of interdependence. 
Companies with a low degree of interdependence held objective (1) to be 
more significant than (2); companies with a high degree of 
interdependence considered objective (2) to be more important than (1). 
The C. B. R. study indicated that 20% of firms allowed their managers 
complete freedom of external relationship, and none of the companies con- 
strained trade between the operating units. It is noticed that the latter 
finding would be expected because the survey dealt with the trade between 
the main operating units rather than the trade within the units. It was 
also -found that the degree of freedom of the managers of the main 
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operating units in dealing with the external market was inversely related 
to the degree of interdependence. 
About 54% of the companies employed cost-based methods in setting 
transfer prices and 26% of the companies used market-based methods. Two 
companies declared that a computer package was employed to determine 
optimum transfer prices. These two companies used shadow prices in 
setting transfer prices; one company aimed at minimizing operating cost 
and the other had a transfer pricing system with a very short review 
cycle. This was the first time that an empirical study had clearly 
reported that mathematical models were used by companies in setting 
transfer prices. 
The methods used for international transfers were not explicitly 
given in the survey, but it was reported that the bases were different 
from those used for intra-national prices. The differences were due to 
customs requirements, tax laws, costs of transport and the profitability 
of both parties. 
It can be noticed from the results reported in the C. B. R. survey 
that it covered some aspects which had not been deeply investigated 
before such as: the transfer pricing system for the central service 
departments and the rankings of five objectives of a transfer pricing 
system. Although one of the study's purposes was to find out the nature 
of the practical managerial problems of the interdependence between the 
main operating units, the survey did not provide information on this 
subject. 
4.2.6 Emmanuel's Study (1976) 
One hundred and four companies were covered by Emmanuel's study. 
The participating companies were among the largest 600 companies in the 
UK as given by the Times 1000 1973-4. Data were mainly collected by 
questionnaire and pilot interviews. The focus of the research was 
domestic inter-unit trade. Emmanuel (1976, (12)) recorded that 
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"The aim of the study is to provide an initial explanation of 
transfer pricing objectives within a corporate environment. At a 
more detailed level of investigation, explanations are sought for 
why particular forms of transfer pricing are used. Finally, an 
attempt is made to determine the factors influencing the choice of 
transfer price employed and this includes a consideration of the 
units immediate operating environment as found in the literature. " 
The study showed that 44% of the companies involved used market 
based prices, namely: current market price, market price of similar 
commodity, adjusted market price and sales minus. Also, 44% of the 
companies used cost-based prices, namely : direct cost, full cost and 
full cost-plus. The rest of the companies used negotiated transfer 
prices. None of the companies used marginal cost or mathematical 
programming in setting transfer price. Emmanuel noticed that cost-based 
prices were less used if an external market exists. 
In Emmanuel's sample (1976, (13)) it was found that units' access 
to the external market was constrained and denied* in 54 out of 86 
companies responding to this question. Transfer pricing policy was, 
however, dictated by central management in only 18 companies. It is 
noticed that this finding means that 36 companies out of the 86 companies 
(42%) distinguish between a policy of freedom of internal trade and 
transfer pricing policy. The former policy in these companies is 
centrally handled, but the latter policy is a decentralized one. The 
separation between these two policies implies that a significant 
proportion of companies involved in this survey gave more attention to 
the overall profit of the company than to autonomy. 
The survey reported that 40% of the companies expressed 
dissatisfaction with their current transfer pricing method, and of the 
rest, 25% expressed satisfaction with the market-based transfer prices 
*Emmanuel's definition of these terms is that "constrained" means that 
corporate management approval is required before the unit manager can 
trade externally. "Denied" means the unit is never allowed to trade 
externally. 
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because the amounts of their internal trade were relatively small. There 
was no significant relationship between the transfer price method used 
and the response of dissatisfaction or satisfaction. Emmanuel also 
deduced that market-oriented transfer pricing can cause disfunctional 
decision-making in practice. This could in turn have a great effect on 
corporate profits and management control. It seems that this finding 
confirms the view that no one single transfer pricing method can achieve 
all the objectives of transfer pricing simultaneously. It seemed also 
that companies tried to select the transfer pricing method which was 
consistent with their views on the relative importance of transfer 
pricing determinants. 
4.2.7 Institute of Cost and Management Accountants' Study, I. C. M. A., 
1978. 
Forty two organisations replied to the questionnaire of the UK 
Branches of the Institute of Cost and Management Accountants (Finnie, 
1978, (14)). Thirty six organisations answered all the questions. The 
purpose of the survey was to identify the methods currently in use for 
establishing transfer prices. It concentrated on the determination of 
transfer prices of products and material within organizations rather than 
on the allocation of the charges of central services departments to 
operating units. The organizations covered in this study ranged from 
divisions of major multinational companies to small local companies. 
Ten organizations out of thirty six used standard cost plus mark-up 
as a transfer pricing method. Transfer prices were centrally established 
in 16 organizations. However, the survey did not state explicitly the 
transfer pricing method used in these latter organizations, but it is 
understood that cost-based methods were employed. In other words, it can 
be said that 72% of the organizations (26 out of 36) used cost-based 
transfer prices. Negotiation-based transfer prices were used in 10 
organizations (28%). 
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Table 4.4 summarizes the survey report. It shows the replies to the 
question of the objectives of transfer pricing systems. The objectives 
are given in the order of their frequency. It can be noticed from Table 
4.4 that the majority of respondents see transfer price as a means of 
control, which includes identifying unit contribution to total profit and 
measuring management performance (58%). Motivation had the second 
position (encouraging profit consciousness - 30%). The last two 
objectives had a very low priority (12%). 
Several disadvantages of transfer price systems were reported. The 
main one was the tendency to prefer unit profit over corporate profit 
(33%). The second disadvantage was the time spent in disagreement about 
transfer prices (24%). Another disadvantage was that the managers of 
units became too involved in obtaining income from each other instead of 
from customers. It is observed that this survey reported, for the 
first time in the UK, five determinants for international transfers. 
These determinants were: tax regulations (5 times reported), customs 
duties (3 times), currency fluctuation (3 times), EEC regulations (2 
times), and anti-dumping regulations (once). 
4.3 Empirical Studies in the US 
Several empirical studies have been undertaken for either domestic 
transfer3 or international transfers or both in the US. Most of the 
studies investigated transfer pricing methods used along with a 
discussion of different aspects of transfer pricing. A brief account of 
the main US surveys on transfer pricing is given. 
4.3.1 Transfer Pricing Practice in Domestic Markets 
Five studies in the US for domestic transfer pricing are briefly 
considered. Solomons' study (1965, (15)) covered 25 industrial companies 
in the US with the data being collected by interviews. The aim of the 
study was the investigation of the financial relationship between central 
and divisional management of the divisionalised company. Solomons 
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Table 4.4 The Relative Importance of the Objectives of Transfer Pricing 
Systems in the I. C. M. A. Survey. 
Objective Frequency % 
1. Identify unit contribution to total profit 15 33 
2. Encourage profit consciousness 14 31 
3. Measure management performance 11 24.5 
4. Maximize operating unit profitability 3 7 
5. Locate profits to minimize tax 2 4.5 
Total 45 100 
78 
discussed in'depth two aspects of transfer pricing, namely: performance 
evaluation of divisions and goal congruence. He also stated the decision 
rules for applying different transfer pricing methods under certain 
conditions (some of these rules were discussed in Chapter 3). Solomons 
reported that the most popular methods used by his sample were market 
price or market price less selling expenses. 
The National Conference Board Study (1967, (16)) was carried out by 
questionnaire and the findings were based on 190 US companies surveyed. 
It concentrated on the goods transferred among divisions of industrial 
companies in the domestic market. The focus of the survey was the 
investigation of transfer pricing methods used. The results showed that 
the use of more than one transfer pricing method by the same company was 
common. The study indicated that more than half of the companies 
participating applied market-based transfer prices alone or in 
combination with cost- based transfer prices. Two-thirds of the companies 
also used cost-based transfer prices either as the only basis of transfer 
pricing or in combination with market-based transfer prices. 
Mautz's study (1968, (17)) was in the field of financial reporting 
by diversified companies. A part of this study was concerned with 
transfer pricing methods. The information was collected by questionnaire. 
The study reported on the variety of transfer pricing methods used by the 
341 companies which replied to the questions on transfer pricing. 49% of 
these companies used only one method, 23% of companies used two transfer 
pricing methods, and the rest more than two. 
Larson's study (1974, (18)) covered 8 companies through interviews. 
It investigated the transfer pricing methods as well as the extent to 
which the divisions were free to trade with the external market. The 
results indicated that transfer pricing methods were largely arbitrary 
among these companies. The freedom to trade with the outside market was 
very, restricted. The buying division was allowed to buy from the outside 
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market only when the capacity of manufacturing divisions did not allow 
the demand to be met and after permission had been obtained from top 
management. 
The final study, by Okpechi, (1976, (19)) aimed at investigating 
the conflict of interest among divisional managers in the context of 
transfer pricing. The empirical findings were collected through 
questionnaires which were mailed to 200 companies in the state of Ohio. 
The overall response rate was 56% but the positive respondents were 67 
companies. The study showed that the variety of transfer pricing methods 
used was similar to the earlier empirical studies. Okpechi applied 
statistical techniques in his study. Canonical correlation analysis 
revealed that there were at least five significant ways in which transfer 
pricing conflict and interdependency are related. Using Discriminant 
Analysis companies were classified into greatly and moderately 
interdependent groups. In general terms, the study showed that there is a 
significant relationship between interdependency and transfer pricing 
conflict. Divisions that were greatly interdependent showed a higher 
level of conflict than those divisions that were moderately 
interdependent. Okpechi found that there are four main sources of 
conflict in transfer pricing, namely: differences among divisional goals, 
over-emphasis on individual manager performance, allocation of corporate 
resources and co-ordination of the material flows among divisions. The 
results show that confrontation, compromise, and arbitration, in that 
order, are the preferred modes of resolving conflict. 
4.3.2 Transfer Pricing Practice in International Markets 
Many empirical studies of international transfer pricing have been 
undertaken in the US covering different aspects of this subject. The main 
studies are reviewed briefly hereafter. 
The Business International Corporation study (1965, (20)) examined 
the practices of more'than 30 international companies in the US through 
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interviews. Transfer pricing methods were discussed as well as a number 
of determinants that influence international transfer pricing. These 
determinants include tax and customs duties considerations, interests of 
local joint venture partners, and anti-dumping. 
Shulman's study (1966, (21)) investigated international transfer 
pricing in 8 large manufacturing companies in the US through interview. 
The main environmental determinants such as import duties, income tax, 
economic restrictions imposed by host countries, and currency fluctuation 
were examined. The eight companies recognised the existence of these 
determinants but not all the companies took all the determinants. into 
account in transfer pricing. Shulman emphasized that a successful 
transfer pricing method in multinational companies should maintain a 
functional control system to measure, evaluate, and motivate divisional 
management. 
Bisat's study (1966, (22)) mainly aimed at evaluating the function 
of the public accountant related to the effects of inter-company 
transactions in international trade and pricing on the financial 
statements of multinational companies. The data was collected by 
questionnaire; fourteen chartered public accountants from large 
accounting firms in the US, Canada, and the Netherlands participated in 
this study. Inter-company transactions were estimated to account for 
about one-third of the Non-Communist world's international trade in 
merchandise. Bisat found that independent auditors exercise little 
influence on the valuation of inter-company trade. 
Greene and Duerrs' study (1970, (23)) covered 130 multinational 
companies by questionnaires. The study reported that transfer prices were 
usually cost-plus or negotiation-based. The results indicated that 
customs considerations and tax as well as the desires of local managers 
abroad have a great impact on corporate policy in international transfer 
pricing. 
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Arpan's study (1972, (24)) examined transfer pricing practice in 60 
US subsidiaries wholly owned by foreign companies. The population of the 
sample was 145 non-American firms. The information was mainly collected 
by questionnaire. The purpose of this study was to explore non-American 
systems of international intracorporate pricing and to compare them with 
those of American multinational firms in terms of orientation, variables 
considered, degree of system complexity, problems encountered and method 
used. The principal conclusions resulting from this study were as 
follows: 
1- All non-American parent companies retained absolute control 
over intracorporate pricing. Transfer prices were set by 
parent company financial executives, regardless of the 
nationality of the parent company. 
2- All multinational firms considered essentially the same 
external variables when they formulated their transfer prices. 
3- Non-American systems were generally more market oriented than 
American systems. 
4- Corporate size appears to exert a harmonizing influence on 
firm outlook and behaviour. 
The Business International Corporation's study (1973, (25)) 
discussed the problems involved in interdivisional transfers of 
intangible items such as, technology, services, trademarks and patents. 
This study indicated that pricing of intangible items is one of the most 
politically sensitive questions faced by multinational companies. It 
offered the following criteria for establishing transfer prices on 
intangibles: - 
a) transfer prices are based on market value or they are 
essentially arbitrary, and b) the key external constraint on 
pricing intangibles is taxes. 
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Lastly, Milburn's study (1977, (26)) was concerned with the 
measurement of transfer transactions between controlled affiliates of 
international companies. The focus of the research was the external user 
of affiliate financial data in Canada and the United States. The 
interests of third parties were affected by international transfer 
pricing. Milburn used a questionnaire survey and interviews to collect 
the information from 33 partners of major accounting firms in Canada and 
the United States who had had international transfer pricing experience. 
The assumption underlying the approach of this study was that accountants 
must understand the pricing process in order to be able to develop 
information which can be useful to external users of affiliate financial 
data. The study concluded that international transfer pricing is an 
economic decision, rather than purely an accounting decision. The pricing 
outcome is the result of international company management's pricing 
preferences in interaction with those of opposing national interests. 
4.3.3 Domestic and International Transfer Pricing Practices 
All the previous studies concentrated on examining transfer pricing 
practices, either in domestic or international markets. Two recent 
empirical studies, Tang (1979, (27)), and Wu and Sharp (1979, (28)), 
handled transfer pricing in both domestic and international markets 
simultaneously. 
4.3.3.1 Tang's Study (1979) 
This study examined the similarities and differences of transfer 
pricing between large industrial companies in the United States and 
Japan. 300 large US companies and 369 large Japanese companies were 
approached by questionnaire. Responses from 145 US companies and 102 
Japanese companies were used for the analyses. 
92% of the American firms reported the existence of some form of 
transfer pricing, compared with 73% of the Japanese firms. For domestic 
transfers, American firms commonly used market price, full production 
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cost plus, negotiated price, and standard full production cost. In 
Japanese firms, the previous four methods as well as market price less 
selling expenses were widely used. For international transfers full 
production cost plus was the most common method used by both American and 
Japanese companies. No significant differences between the cost or 
non-cost orientations of the transfer prices used by the US firms and 
Japanese firms were revealed. 
The respondents were asked to rate the importance of 20 
environmental determinants which are usually considered by multinational 
companies in formulating their international transfer pricing policies. A 
list of these 20 determinants is taken from a Table by Tang (1979, (29) 
and are given below: 
111- Overall profit to the company. 
2- Restrictions imposed by foreign countries on repatriation of 
profits or dividends. 
3- The competitive position of subsidiaries in foreign countries. 
4- Differentials in income tax rates and income tax legislation 
among countries. 
5- Performance evaluation of foreign subsidiaries. 
6- Rate of customs duties and customs legislation where the 
company has operations. 
7- Import restrictions imposed by foreign countries. 
8- Restrictions imposed by foreign countries on the amount of 
royalty or management fees that can be charged against foreign 
subsidiaries. 
9- The need to maintain adequate cash flows in foreign 
subsidiaries. 
10- Rules and requirements of financial reporting for foreign sub- 
sidiaries. 
11- Maintaining good relationships with host governments. 
12- Devaluation and revaluation in countries where the company has 
operations. 
13- Rates of inflation in foreign countries. 
14- Volume of interdivisional transfers. 
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15- Anti-dumping legislation of foreign countries. 
16- The need of subsidiaries in foreign countries to seek local 
funds. 
17- The interests of local partners of foreign subsidiaries. 
18- Domestic government requirements on direct foreign 
investments. 
19- Risk of expropriation in foreign countries where the company 
has operations. 
20- Antitrust legislation of foreign countries. " 
An analysis of the ratings of these variables by the two national 
groups indicated that both groups are in broad agreement on the relative 
importance of the 20 variables. However, there are significant 
differences between the absolute importance placed upon 15 of the 20 
variables by the two national groups. "Overall profit to the company" was 
given the highest mean rating by both the American and Japanese firms. 
The key objectives of transfer pricing systems in both American and 
Japanese firms were revealed to be similar. Maximizing consolidated 
profit and divisional performances are the two most important objectives 
recorded by the respondents in the two groups. 
Determination of transfer pricing policies was primarily a 
centralized function handled by the parent companies (about 75% of the 
American respondents, and about 65% of the Japanese respondents). In most 
American firms, disagreements were settled by financial executives from 
the parent companies whereas most Japanese firms resolved their 
disagreements through negotiation. 
Tang's study showed that the use of the marginal cost method was 
rather limited. Linear programming and decomposition methods were not 
mentioned by any of the respondent firms. 
4.3.3.2 Wu and Sharp's Study (1979) 
This study aimed at identifying the similarities and differences 
between domestic and international transfer pricing practices according 
to the following three aspects: 
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1- The dominant transfer pricing systems when market prices are 
available or are not available. 
2- The dominant arbitration methods to settle transfer price 
disputes. 
3- The motivational criteria that account for the dominance of 
some transfer pricing systems. 
Questionnaires were sent out to 500 of the largest US companies, 
but the number of companies responding was only 61. The respondents were 
asked to rate the importance of nine transfer pricing methods, ten 
arbitration methods to settle transfer pricing disputes, and fourteen 
motivation criteria. The latter are listed (Wu and Sharp, 1979, (30)) 
below: 
"1- Maximize a firm's overall profits. 
2- Not detrimental to the intracompany units' autonomy. 
3- Facilitate performance evaluation of intracompany units (implies 
fairness to the intracompany units involved). 
4- Facilitate the preparation of financial statements. 
5- Seek an optimal price that may allow the selling unit and the 
buying unit to maximize their individual profits. 
6- Comply with the US tax regulations and IRS rulings. 
7- Comply with the foreign tax and tariff regulations. 
8- Comply with governmental restrictions in the US. 
9- Comply with the foreign government restrictions. 
10- Own an intracompany unit by a certain percentage. The p ercentage 
ownership affects your selection of a transfer price. 
11- Maximize utilization of idle production capacity. 
12- Facilitate arms-length transactions. 
13- Share planned costs and benefits. 
14- Comply with generally accepted accounting standards or principles. " 
Sev eral null hypotheses were posed relating to the transfer pricing 
aspects investigated. Kendall's coefficient of concordance, W, and 
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Kendall's correlation coefficient, Tau, were used to test the hypotheses. 
The results of the study included: 
1- The economic environment for international transferred goods 
is much more complex than that for domestic transfers. 
2- The unpopularity of transfer prices based on linear programming 
or decomposition models. 
3- Market prices of transferred products, when available, is the 
predominant transfer pricing system adopted by firms. 
4- When market prices are not available, full product cost plus 
a profit margin is the predominant transfer pricing system. 
5- When there is a transfer price dispute, the most favoured way 
of settling'the dispute is through negotiation at the local 
level. When the dispute cannot be settled at the local level, 
top management will arbitrate. 
6- The motivation criteria that underlie the transfer pricing systems 
vary significantly between the domestic transfers and the inter- 
national transfers. 
4.4 Concluding Remarks 
The review of the previous empirical studies suggests the following 
conclusions: 
1- Most of the UK studies did not go beyond reporting and 
classifying the data. The majority of these surveys reported 
results on aspects such as transfer pricing objectives, 
transfer pricing methods, the ratio of internal trading to 
turnover and the degree of decentralization. Howetrer, possible 
relationships among these aspects were not fully investigated 
or statistically established. 
Only Emmanuel's study included analysis and discussion in 
addition to reporting and classifying. He used Chi-square to 
test certain hypotheses such as a hypothesised correlation 
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between corporate strategy and transfer pricing objectives. 
Several empirical studies in the US on the other hand have 
shown that statistical techniques such as Kendall's 
coefficient of concordance, W, and Kendall's correlation 
coefficient, Tau, may be effectively used to draw conclusions 
about transfer pricing practice. These techniques and 
Chi-square will be used to test certain hypotheses which are 
posed in this study in Chapter 5 and 6. 
2- All surveys confirmed that a wide variety of transfer pricing 
methods are in use in practice. The methods of marginal cost, 
linear programming, and decomposition are least employed. This 
does not match the attention devoted to these methods in the 
literature, as shown in Chapter 2. It appears that despite the 
improvements made to the mathematical methods they are still 
considered impractical by the majority of practitioners. One 
cannot assume that incompatibility between the centralized 
nature of mathematical methods and divisional autonomy is the 
sole reason for the non-adoption of these methods. The surveys 
have indicated that although in a noticeable proportion (about 
34%) of the companies the transfer pricing policy is entirely 
a centralized policy, central management did not use 
mathematical programming methods. It seems that complexity of 
the methods and the relatively low importance of profit 
maximization through allocation of scarce resources especially 
during a recession are more likely reasons underlying the un- 
popularity of mathematical techniques. 
3- It would be of interest if the surveys had shown the 
proportion of companies using non-market-based transfer prices 
when an external market exist as did Emmanuel (1976, (31)). 
This would have provided a new basis of comparison between 
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domestic and international transfers or between UK practice 
and other nationalities. 
4- Conflicts in findings can be noticed. For example the C. B. R. 
survey shows that there is consistency between the degree of 
decentralization in fixing transfer prices and the degree of 
freedom of market choice. Emmanuel's results on the other hand 
indicate that decentralization in setting transfer prices was 
not always accompanied by freedom of trade. There are also 
indications, as shown by Livesey's study, and the B. I. M. 
study, that in practice, central management may consider the 
decision to sell to or buy from outside and transfer pricing 
decisions as parts of the central policies, while claiming a 
high degree of decentralization. 
5- The UK surveys are characterized by the lack of information on 
international transfer pricing with the exception of three 
studies, namely C. B. R., Tomkins, and Finnie, which briefly 
, commented on international transfer pricing practice. More 
information on transfer pricing in the international market is 
required to gain an understanding of transfer pricing practice 
in this market and to contrast it with that of the domestic 
one. This would also enable a comparison to be made between 
international transfer pricing practice in the UK and that in 
other countries. The filling of this gap in transfer pricing 
practice in UK companies will be covered in part by this study 
as will be seen in the following chapters. 
6- A multiplicity of transfer pricing determinants (i. e. 
objectives and environmental issues) have been considered in 
the UK and US surveys. Some of these determinants appear to be 
related indicating that the determinants may be reduced to a 
set of independent fundamental factors. No attempt has been 
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made in the previous surveys to study the correlation between 
these determinants in order to disclose the fundamental 
factors which underlie transfer pricing in practice. This 
study will explore this aspect in Chapter 7. 
7- Empirical data indicate that there is a wide variety of 
transfer pricing objectives and an equally wide variety of 
transfer pricing methods. Companies tend to adopt a transfer 
pricing method which is most relevant to their objectives and 
in the meantime is consistent with their internal and external 
conditions. Livesey has found that the relationship between 
transfer pricing objectives and transfer pricing methods has 
been considered far more in some companies than in others. On 
the other hand, Emmanuel's (1976, (32)) empirical evidence 
suggested to him that the conditions proposed in the 
literature for specific transfer pricing methods to apply are 
not sufficient to distinguish among the methods. 
Prior to Emmanuel's work the relationships among each of the 
companies' conditions and the transfer pricing objectives and 
the transfer pricing method had not been studied empirically 
(Emmanuel, 1976 (33)). Emmanuel's study suggests the common 
conditions found in the literature are insufficient to 
identify an appropriate transfer pricing method. 
One can argue that the testing procedure used by Emmanuel was 
insufficiently powerful to distinguish among the transfer 
pricing methods based on the conditions, and it seems that a 
statistical technique such as Discriminant Analysis may 
provide better results. Secondly, an attempt should be made to 
evaluate the relationship between the transfer pricing methods 
and the transfer pricing determinants (objectives and 
environment issues). Such a relationship might be useful in 
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explaining why certain forms of transfer pricing are used and in 
improving the choice of the relevant transfer pricing method. This 
research point will be covered in Chapter 8. 
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CHAPTER 5 
The Survey Undertaken 
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5.1 Introduction 
A survey of transfer pricing practice in UK companies was undertaken 
during 1980. A clear distinction between transfer pricing in the domestic 
market and transfer pricing in the international market was made in order 
to compare and contrast the main features of both domestic and 
international transfers. This chapter reports the findings of the survey 
as well as presenting the preliminary analysis of the results. 
First, the survey objectives, the data collection method, the ques- 
tionnaire structure, the method of sample selection and response are 
commented upon. Secondly, a preliminary analysis of the data collected in 
the survey is given. The aim of this analysis is to explore the current 
state of transfer pricing practice. This includes the following aspects 
of transfer pricing: 
1- Managing transfer pricing : This aspect covers two elements, 
(a) responsibility for setting and reviewing transfer prices, 
and (b) the frequency of transfer price review. 
2- The extent to which transfer pricing methods are currently 
used in both the domestic and the international markets. 
3- Problems apparent in current transfer pricing practice. 
The results obtained are compared with the results of previous empirical 
studies in the UK and US for both the domestic and the international 
markets. 
5.2 Survey Objectives 
The main objective of the current survey is to explore the 
inter-relationships among the transfer pricing determinants themselves, 
and between them and the transfer pricing method for both domestic and 
international transfers in UK companies. The detailed objectives of this 
survey are four. The first one is to investigate the current state of 
transfer pricing practice. This objective examines the following: 
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a- The extent to which transfer pricing policy is a centralized or 
decentralized policy through knowing the responsibility for 
setting and reviewing transfer prices. 
b- To what extent each transfer pricing method is currently used 
in the business world. 
c- The problems apparent in transfer pricing practice. 
The second objective is to identify the order of importance of the 
major determinants of transfer pricing policy. It is also to derive 
statistical conclusions about how the order of importance (rankings) of 
the transfer pricing determinants varies across markets (domestic and 
international), across industries and across transfer pricing methods. 
The third objective is to discover the underlying inter-relation- 
ships among the various transfer pricing determinants. This will produce 
a dimensionally reduced set of independent basic factors which may 
replace all the transfer pricing determinants. 
The last objective is to evaluate quantitatively the relationship 
between the transfer pricing determinants and the transfer pricing method 
employed, and to produce a prediction formula which suggests an 
appropriate transfer pricing method for a company depending on the 
weights it gives to the transfer pricing determinants. 
5.3 Data Collection Methods 
The empirical data required could have been collected by several 
alternative means, i. e. personal interview, telephone interview and mail 
interview. The last method, the mailed questionnaire, was selected to 
obtain the information desired because it facilitates, at relatively low 
cost, access to companies in different locations on the scale required by 
the research. 
The questionnaire contained three types of questions: descriptive, 
item lists and quantitative judgements. The selection of quantitative 
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judgement scores was a difficult task because of the variety of the 
objectives which were involved. A nominal interval scale was adopted. 
This scale can be converted to an ordinal (ranking) scale to determine 
the order of importance of the transfer pricing determinants. It also 
permits one to make meaningful statements about the differences among the 
transfer pricing determinants. The interval scale is the type of scale 
required for the multivariate techniques (namely: Factor Analysis, and 
Discriminant Analysis) which will be used to achieve the rest of this 
study's objectives. 
5.4 Questionnaire Structure 
The questionnaire was designed in such a way as to make a clear 
distinction between the domestic and international practices of UK 
companies. It consisted of three parts. The first part requested the 
following general information about the companies participating in the 
survey: a) name of company, address and the name of the person 
responsible for completing the survey; (b) number of divisions operating 
in domestic and overseas markets; c) type of industry; and d) the 
existence of internal trading between the divisions. 
The second part contained two questions. The first one asked about 
the responsibility for setting and reviewing transfer prices, and the 
second question was concerned with the frequency with which transfer 
prices are reviewed. 
The third part of the questionnaire contained three sections. The 
first section requested details of the transfer pricing method currently 
used by the company, and the problems apparent in current transfer 
pricing practice. The second section was designed to discover the extent 
to which mathematical programming methods are currently used for 
determining transfer pricing or for co-ordinating divisional activities. 
The third section in this part asked respondents to weight the importance 
of twenty determinants which might be considered when companies formulate 
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their transfer pricing policy. These twenty determinants were selected 
after reviewing both the literature and the previous empirical studies in 
the UK and the US for both the domestic and the international markets. 
Two types of determinants were included: a) those concerned with the key 
objectives of transfer pricing, and b) those of an environmental nature. 
The weighting of the determinants was based on a six point scale ranging 
from 0 (does not apply) to 5 (very important). 
The above structure of the questionnaire enabled the data required 
by the study's objectives to be obtained. This permits different 
statistical approaches ranging from a simple technique such as 
contingency tables and a Chi-square test to more advanced techniques such 
as Factor Analysis and a Multi-Discriminant Analysis. 
5.5 Sample Selection and Response 
Two hundred and fifty UK companies were approached by postal 
questionnaire The sample was selected as follows: 
a) 150 multinational companies were drawn randomly from the top 
1000 companies in the UK as listed by the Times 1000,1979-80 
(1980, (1)). 
b) 50 of the largest companies in the Yorkshire and Manchester 
area were selected from Kompass (1980, (2)). 
c) 50 subsidiaries of the largest companies in England, Wales, and 
Scotland were also chosen from Kompass (1980). 
The sample was selected in this way to give an overall representation of 
UK companies and to provide potential access to local companies for 
detailed investigation. 
In 1980, copies of the questionnaire were sent out to the selected 
companies along with a covering letter. The letters were addressed to the 
Financial Director, Controller, Managing Director or Company Secretary. 
Reply paid envelopes were provided. After a month, a follow up letter, 
another copy of the questionnaire, a covering letter and a reply paid 
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envelope were sent out to the non-respondents (Appendix A). 
The response to the survey was as follows: 
Total sample 250 
less: Non respondents 69 
181 
less: Number of companies with no 
transfer pricing 49 
132 
less: Number of companies not 
prepared to disclose inform- 
ation 86 
Number of completed questionnaires 46 
The companies who completed the questionnaire are : 31 multinational 
companies from the top 1000 companies, 6 of the largest companies in the 
Yorkshire and Manchester area, and 9 subsidiaries. A fairly low response 
for such a sensitive subject was to be expected. The number of companies 
willing to complete a questionnaire was, however, encouraging and 
compares favourably with the response to previous surveys, as shown in 
Table 5.1. This table presents the size of the sample, the response rate, 
and the main objectives of earlier surveys in the UK compared with the 
present one. 
5.6 General Observations 
The classification of the 46 companies participating in this survey 
according to the British Standard Industrial Classification Code is given 
in Table 5.2. Some companies gave information for both domestic and 
international markets, and others provided information related to only 
one market. The number of completed questionnaires for the domestic 
market was 42, whilst the number for the international market was 34. 
The number of companies which have inter-trading between divisions 
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Table 5.2 The Classification of Companies Participating by 
Industry Group 
Industry Group (Standard Industrial Classification) No. of 
Companies 
- Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 
-Food, Drink, Tobacco 
-Coal & Petroleum Products 
-Chemical & Allied Industries 
-Mechanical Engineering 
-Instrument Engineering 
-Electrical Engineering 
-Vehicles 
-Metal Goods not elsewhere specified 
-Textiles 
-Bricks, Pottery, Glass, Cement 
-Timber, Furniture etc. 
-Other Manufacturing Industries 
Construction 
-More than one industry 
1 
2 
2 
4 
6 
2 
1 
2 
4 
2 
2 
1 
3 
2 
12 
Total 46 
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was 132 out of 181, i. e. 73% of the respondents. This indicates the 
importance of transfer pricing in UK companies. 
5.7 Managing Transfer Pricing Policy 
Two elements of the management of transfer pricing policy are 
considered here as follows: 
(a) Responsibility for Setting and Reviewing Transfer Prices. 
Table 5.3 indicates the role of management in setting and reviewing 
domestic and international transfer prices. It can be seen that in 
general, there is little difference between domestic and international 
markets in the proportion of each level of management which sets and 
reviews transfer prices. Most companies indicated that their divisional 
managers are responsible for setting transfer prices in both the domestic 
and the international market (57% and 44% respectively). But corporate 
management and divisional managers in consultation were most involved in 
the review of transfer prices. 
As can be seen from Table 5.3 the degree of centralization 
(responsibilities 2 and 3) in setting and reviewing international 
transfer prices in the UK companies was found to be 56% and 68% 
respectively. In relation to the setting of international transfer prices 
the results are lower than those reported by Tang (1979, (3)) in US 
companies (75.0%) and in Japanese companies (64.9%). 
(b) The Frequency of Transfer Price Review. 
Table 5.4 summarizes the frequency of review of transfer prices in 
domestic and international markets. It will be noticed that there is 
considerable variation in the frequency with which transfer prices are 
reviewed by management in both domestic and international markets. The 
highest percentage of companies (40.4% and 35.7% for domestic and 
international transfers respectively) review transfer prices with each 
transaction, or with every change in market price of the transferred 
product, or with every change of costs (referred to as "review as 
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Table 5.3 Responsibility for Setting and Reviewing Transfer Pricing for 
Domestic and International Markets. 
Activity Sets 
% Reviews % 
Responsibility D I D I 
_ 
1. Divisional managers 57 44 37 29 
2. Corporate management 12 18 14 21 
3. Corporate management and divisional 
managers in consultation 31 38 40 47 
4. Corporate management in the case 
of dispute only. 0 0 2 0 
5. No response 0 0 7 3 
Total 1 100 1 100 
D= Domestic 
I= International 
100 1 100 
Table 5.4 Frequency Review of Transfer Prices in Domestic and 
International Markets 
Frequency of Review D%I% 
- Monthly 5.8 2.4 
- Quarterly 11.5 11.9 
- Every six months 11.5 11.9 
- Yearly 25.0 31.0 
- Review as required 40.4 35.7 
- No response 5.8 7.1 
Total 100 100 
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required" in Table 5.4). The yearly review period was next in order of 
popularity - namely 25% of companies in the domestic market and 31% in 
the international market. 
Generally, the review period ranges from one month to one year in 
both domestic and international transfers. The findings concerned with 
the review frequency of domestic transfers are different from those 
reported by the Centre for Business Research (1973, (4)). The latter 
survey recorded that the review period ranged from monthly (one company) 
to never (six companies), and the. most popular review frequency was one 
year (16 companies out of 37 companies). 
5.8 Transfer Pricing Methods: Some Comparisons 
A summary of the methods used in setting prices for domestic and 
international transfers is presented in Table 5.5. The results show that 
there is a difference in the percentage of transfer pricing methods for 
domestic and international transfers. 
In practice it will be seen that market price - based methods are 
most frequently used for domestic transfers whereas for international 
transfers this group is used less than cost - based methods. Overall it 
would seem that current market price and full manufacturing cost plus are 
the most widely used methods. There is however a considerable range of 
methods and it will be noted that mathematical methods - namely linear 
programming - appear to be used infrequently. 
A comparative analysis between the findings of this study and other 
earlier surveys in UK restricted to domestic transfer pricing methods is 
presented in Table 5.6. It will be noticed that there are considerable 
differences between the different studies. The percentage of companies 
using transfer pricing methods based respectively on cost, market price, 
and negotiation varies between 3 and 72%; 0 and 85%; 0 and 28%. Although 
the BIM survey did not show negotiation explicitly as one of the transfer 
pricing methods used, analysis of both cost-based and market price-based 
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Table 5.5 Transfer Pricing Methods for Domestic and International Transfers 
Transfer Pricing Method Domestic 
International 
7 
-Market price - based methods: 
-Current market price 25.5 16.7 
-Adjusted market price (market 
price less discount) 10.6 5.5 
-Market price for similar products 2.1 
2.8 
-Sales - minus 2.1 
5.5 
-Sub-total for market price - 
based Methgds 40.4 30.6 
-Cost-based methods: 
, -Variable 
cost plus 2.1 0 
-Direct cost plus 4.2 
5.5 
-Full manufacturing cost 6.4 
8.3 
-Full manufacturing cost plus 
12.8 19.4 
-Standard cost 2.1 
0 
-Standard cost plus 
2.1 5.5 
Sub-total for cost - based methods 29.8 
38.9 
-Negotiation - based (arms' length) methods: 
-Negotiated market price 
12.8 16.7 
-negotiated discount of market price 6.4 
2.8 
-other (not clear) 4.2 
0 
Sub-total for negotiation - based 
Methods 23.5 19.5 
-Other - based methods: 
-Linear programming 4.2 
5.5 
-Other 2.1 5.5 
Sub-total for other - based methods 6.3 11.0 
Total all methods 100 100 
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methods indicated that negotiation was used implicitly in determining 
transfer prices. The results of all surveys including the present study 
show that the most common transfer pricing method (46.9%) is the cost 
approach, followed by market prices (41.3%) and much less frequently 
negotiation (9.8%). 
Very limited use of mathematical programming techniques for 
determining transfer prices is noted. Tomkins' study (1973, (12)) 
indicated that three companies used mathematical programming techniques 
in order to co-ordinate activities between divisions or to set transfer 
prices, but these are not included in Table 5.6. In one instance the 
technique was used for transport co-ordination, but in the other 
instances no further details were given. The data collected in the 
current survey showed that nine companies used mathematical programming 
techniques for production planning co-ordination in addition to the two 
companies which use the method specifically for determining transfer 
prices. 
5.8.1 Comparison Based on Contingency Tables 
Table 5.7 shows the frequency of use of the different transfer 
pricing methods in the domestic and the international markets. To examine 
to what-extent the differences in frequency are significant, between the 
domestic and international transfers, the following null hypotheses (Ho) 
was tested: 
'The frequency of use of different transfer pricing methods does not 
vary between domestic and international markets. ' 
The appropriate test of significance in this case is Chi-square, X2, 
with 3 degrees of freedom. The observed value of X2 was found to be 
1.732. The 5% significance level of X2 with 3 degrees of freedom is 
7.38. Thus the null hypothesis is not rejected at a significance level of 
0.05, and it is concluded that the frequencies of using the various 
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Table 5.7 Bases of Transfer Prices for Domestic and International Markets 
Market Bases of Transfer Prices 
Market Price Cost Negotiation Other Total 
Domestic 19 14 11 3 47 
International 11 14 7 4 36 
Total 30 28 18 7 83 
Observed 2 X value = 1.732 
Theoretical X2 value at 0.05 significance level = 7.38 with df 3 
Decision : Acceptance of null hypothesis. 
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transfer pricing methods in domestic and international markets are not 
significantly different. 
Tang attempted to empirically test the following conclusion stated 
in Arpan's study (1972, (13)). 
"US systems of international intracorporate pricing are distinctly 
more cost oriented and more complex than non-US systems. " 
Therefore, he stated two null hypotheses (one for the domestic market and 
one for the international market) related to the above conclusion. The 
results of the test (Tang, 1979, (14)) showed that there was no 
significant difference between the use of cost-based methods and 
non-cost-based methods in US and Japanese companies. In other words, the 
effect of nationality on the use of cost-based or non-cost-based methods 
for both domestic and international transfers among US and Japanese 
companies is not significant. 
To compare Tang's results with the findings obtained in this study, 
the contingency Table 5.8 is given for domestic transfers. This table 
shows the percentage of companies using cost-based and non-cost-based 
transfer pricing methods obtained from Tang's study in the US and Japan, 
and those obtained in the current survey for the UK. Table 5.8 indicates 
an observed value of X2 = 9.63 which implies a statistically significant 
difference at the 0.01 level, between the orientation of transfer pricing 
methods in the UK on the one hand and in the US and Japan on the other 
hand. The comparison suggests that a smaller percentage of companies in 
the UK domestic market use cost based transfer pricing methods than in 
the US or Japan. 
A similar comparison is made for the international market in Table 
5.9. The computed X2 is 15.9, and with a theoretical value of X2 = 9.21 
at the 0.01 significance level with 2 degrees of freedom. This indicates 
a significant difference in the orientation of international transfer 
pricing methods in US, Japan and the UK. The percentage of companies 
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Table 5.8 The Use of Cost-Based and Non-Cost-Based Transfer Prices Among Respondent 
Companies for the Domestic Market in the US, Japan and the UK (Current Study) 
Domestic Transfer Pricing - 
basis 
US 
% 
Japan 
% 
UK 
% 
Total 
% 
Cost-based 50.4 46.2 29.8 126.4 
Non-cost-based 49.6 53.8 70.2 173.6 
Total 100 100 100 300 
Observed X2 value = 9.63 
Theoretical X2 at 0.01 significance level = 9.21 with df 2 
Table 5.9: The Use of. Cost-Based and Non-Cost-Based Transfer Prices Among 
Respondent Companies 
and the UK (Current 
for the 
Study). 
International Market in the US, Japan, 
International Transfer US Japan UK Total 
Pricing Based methods 9 % % % 
Cost based 64.6 41.3 38.9 144.8 
Non-cost based 35.4 58.7 61.1 155.2 
Total 100 100 100 300 
Observed X2 value 15.9 
Theoretical X2 value at 0.01 significance level = 9.21 with df 2 
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which use cost-based transfer pricing methods is largest in the US and 
lowest in UK. This result tends to support Arpan's conclusion; that is US 
systems of international intracorporate pricing are more cost-based than 
non-US systems, as represented by transfer pricing practice in UK 
companies. 
Further analysis of data obtained from the survey is presented in 
Chapters 6,7, and 8. 
5.9 Practical Problems in Transfer Pricing 
About three-quarters of the companies reported problems in domestic 
and international transfer pricing. An assessment of the information 
obtained suggested two broad groups of problem: 
-problems common to domestic and international transfers 
-problems related to international transfers only 
The common problems may be sub-divided into three categories: 
a) Those arising from the use of market price methods. In this respect 
two problems were mentioned frequently: 
(i) The difficulty of acquiring information about true market 
price. This problem was repeatedly reported in the replies (30% 
of companies which used a market price); a typical company 
comment was "The difficulty of ensuring that like is always 
being compared with like. In addition external suppliers become 
reluctant to quote when they believe, whether rightly or 
wrongly, that there is little chance of them getting the 
order". 
(ii) Market share of the end product. 30% of the companies expressed 
the view that the adoption of market price as a basis might 
deny the opportunity of increasing total sales/profits through 
a reduction in the price to the final customer. 
b) Problems arising from the use of cost-based methods. In this type of 
transfer pricing two problems are apparent: 
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(i) Difficulty in determining the true profitability of each 
division and the company as a whole. A number of companies 
(20%) reported difficulties when applying a mark-up. As one of 
them said "True profitability is masked between sub-divisions. 
Overall profitability is not easily evident. Each division adds 
its own profit on the products purchased from sub-divisions, 
i. e. mark-up on mark-up. " 
(ii) Lack of incentive to reduce the cost. The use of cost-based 
methods appears to diminish the motivation to reduce the cost 
of production. This was reported by 20% of the companies. 
c) Problems arising from using negotiation (arms' length) methods. As 
mentioned above, the most common problem is gaining accurate information 
about the market price as a base for negotiation. This problem was 
reported by four out of seven companies who applied negotiation methods. 
Another two companies stressed that the difficulty of establishing a fair 
arms' length basis causes disputes between the divisions which have to be 
resolved by corporate management. 
The second group of problems confined to international transactions 
can be summarized as follows: 
a) Conflict between UK and foreign tax requirements. 
Replies from some companies indicated difficulty in est- 
ablishing transfer prices which satisfy overseas and UK 
requirements. 
b) Conflict between the interest of the divisions and local 
shareholders and that of the company as a whole. This may arise 
in situations in which "fairness" is differently assessed by 
the company on the one hand and local interest on the other. 
5.10 Conclusions 
The results of the survey suggest the following conclusions: 
III 
1. The role of management in setting and reviewing transfer pricing is 
similar in both domestic and international transfers. But the involvement 
of UK corporate management in international transfer pricing is higher 
than in domestic transfer pricing. 
2. No significant difference was found in the pattern of review 
frequencies between domestic and international transfers. In both 
instances there is a wide range of review periods. 
3. Current market price is observed to be the most popular pricing 
method for domestic transfers, while full manufacturing cost plus is the 
most common one for international transfers. The data show that the 
economic approach which is built on market price is encountered more in 
domestic transfer pricing, while the cost accounting approach is used 
more in international pricing. However, there is no statistically signi- 
ficant difference between the frequency of use of the various bases of 
transfer prices in the domestic and international markets. 
4. The results of this survey have shown that UK companies are less 
inclined to use cost-based transfer pricing methods in both domestic and 
international markets than US and Japanese companies. 
5. The use of mathematical programming to determine transfer prices is 
still restricted to a small proportion of companies. 
6. There appear to be five problems which are common to both domestic 
and international transfer pricing namely: 
a) the difficulty of acquiring information about true market price 
b) risk of the loss of market share of the end product 
c) difficulty in determining the true -profitability of each 
division and the company as a whole 
d) lack of incentive to reduce cost 
e) the difficulty of establishing a fair base for negotiation. 
There are two further problems which are confined to international 
transfer pricing namely: 
112 
a) conflict between UK and foreign tax requirements 
b) conflict between the interest of the divisions and local 
shareholders and that of the company as a whole. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Ranking of Transfer Pricing Determinants 
and the Testing of some Hypotheses 
114 
6.1 Introduction 
The determinants* of transfer pricing have been discussed by several 
writers, such as Shulman (1966, (1)), Wu and Sharp (1979, (2)). Shulman's 
study was helpful in identifying the key issues that affect international 
transfer pricing practice in US companies. These issues include tax and 
customs considerations, antidumping legislation, and interests of local 
joint venture partners. Wu and Sharp investigated fourteen transfer 
pricing criteria in US companies for domestic and international transfers 
and drew conclusions about them on the basis of statistical analysis. 
Previous empirical studies in the UK (CBR, 1973, (3)), (Finnie, 1978, 
(4)) have dealt with the relative importance of five determinants for the 
domestic market. 
A more comprehensive picture of the order of importance of most of 
the possible transfer pricing determinants for both domestic and 
international markets in UK companies is established in this chapter. The 
rating given to the transfer pricing determinants by the respondent 
companies is converted to a ranking. The overall ranking of the transfer 
pricing determinants for both domestic and international markets is then 
investigated in the light of literature including a comparison with some 
US results published on the rankings of some determinants of transfer 
pricing. 
Also in this chapter the correlation between the order of importance 
of the transfer pricing determinants with the type of market, type of 
industry and transfer pricing method are evaluated statistically. Three 
sets of tests are carried out on the transfer pricing determinants to 
examine the following: 
*Transfer pricing determinants were discussed in Chapters 2,3 an d 4. 
1 115 
A. The impact of the type of market (i. e. domestic or inter- 
national) on the order of importance of the transfer pricing 
determinants. 
B. The degree to which the order of importance of the transfer 
pricing determinants varies from one industry to another. 
C. The extent to which the order of importance of the transfer 
pricing determinants changes with the transfer pricing basis. 
The statistical tests used are the Kendall correlation coefficient Tau or 
the Kendall coefficient of concordance W (Kendall, 1948, (5)). Finally, 
the conclusions derived from the analysis are given. 
6.2 Ranking of Transfer Pricing Determinants 
Companies were asked to rate 
policy based on a6 point scale ai 
does not not below 
apply important moderately 
important 
012 
twenty deters 
S follows: 
moderately 
important 
3 
ninants of transfer pricing 
above very 
moderately important 
important 
45 
The following equations (Eckenrode, 1965, (6)) were used to convert 
the rating of the determinants to ranking: 
m 
Wdi = Rdj /E Rdj (6.1) 
d=I 
nnm 
Wd r Wd. /EEW (6.2) 
j=1 ' j=1 d=1 dj 
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Where Wdj = weight computed for determinant d from the rating given by 
judge (i. e. company) j. 
Rdj = rating given by judge j to determinant d 
Wd = ranking of determinant d 
m= number of determinants 
n= number of companies 
This method of ranking was adopted because it was found by Eckenrode 
to be the most efficient for the number of determinants involved. 
To illustrate this method, assume, for simplicity, there are three 
determinants and four companies. The raw scores of the determinants given 
by the four companies are presented in Table 6.1a. 
Using equation 6.1, Table 6.1b is built. Each number in this table 
mn 
represents WI each total is EW, and each total column EW. The d'ý 
ni d=1 
dý j. 1 dý 
grand total represents EE Wd3 . Table 6.1c is established by using j=1d=1 nm 
equation 6.2. Each cell of this table represents W/EEW, and dý j-1 d=1 d3 
the total of each column represents Wd. 
The overall rankings of the transfer price determinants are given in 
Table 6.2. For domestic transfers, divisional autonomy is ranked as the 
most important issue. This is consistent with the emphasis given in both 
the economic and the accounting literature (Thomas, 1980, (7)). The next 
four determinants in order of significance are performance evaluation of 
divisions, maximization of divisional profits, overall company profit, 
and the preparation of financial statements. The results also confirm 
widely held views as to the most influential issues in transfer pricing 
policy (Sharav, 1974 0(8)). 
Nine of the determinants (numbers one, two, three, four, five, six, 
eight, eleven and thirteen ) are common between this study and Wu and 
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Table 6.1a Raw Scores of the Determinants 
eterminant 
Company 
1 2 3 Total 
A 0 5 2 7 
B 1 4 3 8 
C 3 5 2 10 
D 2 4 4 10 
Table 6.1b Weight Computed for Determinant d, (Wdj) 
determinant 
Company 
1 2 3 Total 
A 0 0.714 0.286 1 
B 0.125 0.5 0.375 1 
C 0.3 0.5 0.2 1 
D 0.2 0.4 0.4 1 
Total 0.625 2.114 1.261 4.000 
Table 6.1c : Ranking of Determinant d. (Wd) 
etermtnant ' 
Company 1 2 3 Total 
A 0 0.1785 0.0715 0.25 
B 0.0313 0.125 0.0937 0.25, 
C 0.075 0.125 0.05 0.25 
D 0.05 0.1 0.1 0.25 
Total 0.1563 0.5285 0.3152 1 
Ranking 3 1 2 
1 
The determinant with highest weight has the first rank and so on. 
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Table 6.2 Ranking the Determinants of Domestic and International 
Transfer Pricing Policy 
Overall Ranking Percenta ge Weight 
Pricing Determinants Domes- Inter- Domes- Inter- 
tic national tic national 
Group A: 
1. Overall profit of the company 4 2 11.64 9.09 
2. Maximizing the division profits 3 4 11.79 7.23 
3. Divisional autonomy 1 1 15.67 9.12 
4. Performance evaluation of divis- 
ions 2 3 12.69 7.35 
5. The preparation of financial 
statements 5 7 9.97 5.48 
Sub-total of percentage 
weight of Group A 61.76 38.27 
Group B: 
6. Utilization of idle production 
capacity 7 
7. Market share of the end product 6 
8. The relationship between transfer 
prices and the percentage 
ownership in the subsidiaries 12 
9. Tax commitment 11 
10. Volume of inter-division 
transfers 10 
11. Compliance with UK tax regulations 8 
12. Compliance with UK non-tax 
regulations 9 
Sub-total of percentage weight 
of Group B 
Group C: 
13. Compliance with foreign tax 
and tariff regulations 15 
14. Restrictions imposed by foreign 
countries on repatriation of 
profits or. dividends 14 
15. Restrictions imposed by foreign 
countries on the amount of 
royalty or management fees that 
can be charged against foreign 
subsidiaries 17 
16. Other restrictions iruposed by 
foreign countries not included 
in Nos. 14 and 15 20 
17. Maintenance of adequate cash 
flows in foreign subsidiaries 16 
18. The need of subsidiaries in 
foreign countries to seek local 
funds 18 
19. Rate of inflation in foreign 
countries 13 
20. Risk of expropriation in foreign 
countries 19 
Sub-total of percentage weight 
of Group C 
Total percentage weight 
9 6.56 4.86 
6 6.83 6.24 
19 3.23 2.04 
12 3.88 4.52 
16 4.18 3.53 
11 4.73 4.54 
14 4.21 3.74 
33.62 29.47 
5 . 73 6.57 
10 . 74 
4.66 
17 . 61 3.49 
20 . 12 1.63 
8 . 63 5.13 
15 . 40 3.67 
13 1.08 4.33 
18 . 29 2.78 
4.60 32.26 
100 100 
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Sharp's survey (1979, (9)) of US company practice. The latter* revealed 
that maximizing a company's overall profit was ranked first whereas in 
this study it is fourth. Performance evaluation of divisions was ranked 
second in the US survey as in this study. 
Compliance with non-tax regulation and with tax regulations were 
ranked as the third and fourth criteria in the US survey. The high 
ranking of these two criteria surprised Wu and Sharp (1979, (10)) since 
they are seldom mentioned in the literature. But in this survey, as 
indicated in Table 6.2 the two criteria have low rankings (nine and eight 
respectively). It seems that US companies give more attention to meeting 
governmental requirements whereas UK companies give higher priority to 
managerial objectives. 
Maximizing divisional profits, a division's autonomy, and facil- 
itating the preparation of financial statements are ranked sixth, seventh 
and elventh repectively in the US survey. These low rankings contradict 
what has been reported in the accounting literature and the findings of 
this study (where they are third, first, and fifth respectively). It 
would appear that the managements of UK companies prefer the achievement 
of a high degree of decentralization rather than the maximization of 
overall profits. They also show more concern with accounting standards in 
the preparation of financial statements. 
It is noticed that the volume of transferred goods has a low ranking 
(tenth). This result confirms Tomkins' results (1973, (11)) which 
indicated that 
"There was no obvious relationship between the volume of goods 
transferred internally and the method by which the transfer price 
as fixed". 
or international transfers, Table 6.2 shows that divisional 
autonomy and overall profit of the company are ranked as the first and 
second determinants. Performance evaluation of divisions is ranked third. 
* Wu and Sharp's research into domestic and international transfer 
pricing in US companies ranked fourteen criteria. 
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Maximizing divisional profits is also highly ranked at fourth. Compliance 
with foreign tax and tariff regulations is, as would be expected, ranked 
highly (fifth). 
The ranking of the determinants of international transfer pricing in 
UK companies is also different from that reported in the US study of Wu 
and Sharp. The latter shows that compliance with foreign tax and tariff 
regulations and complying with foreign governmental regulations were 
ranked as the first and fourth critical issues of international transfer 
pricing policy. This suggests that management in the United States takes 
more account of regulations prevailing in foreign countries. 
Group A of the determinants shown in Table 6.2, which includes the 
five most significant issues as reported in the literature, has similarly 
received in this study the highest percentage weight in both the domestic 
and international area. The percentage weight of this group is however 
higher for the domestic market than the international market (61.76% and 
38.27% repectively). Group B, which includes issues of lesser importance, 
have similar weights in both instances (33.62% and 29.47% respectively). 
Group C which included issues related mainly to international transfers 
is naturally rated more highly in this respect (32.26% for international 
and 4.60% for domestic). 
It may therefore be concluded that out of the twelve determinants of 
domestic transfer pricing policy, five (i. e. Group A) have the highest 
agreement among the respondents. On the other hand, all twenty 
determinants listed in Table 6.2 would seem to be relevant to 
international transfer pricing with each of the three groups being given 
almost the same weight. These findings indicate the complexity and 
f 
diversity of the issues when international transfers are involved. 
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6.3 Testing of Hypotheses 
The objective of the analyses carried out in this section is to 
examine the following questions by means of statistical tests for the 
purpose of comparison between domestic and international transfers. 
1. Does the type of market (i. e. domestic or international) affect 
the order of importance of the transfer pricing determinants? 
2. Does the order of importance of the transfer pricing determinants 
vary from one industry to another? 
3. Does the order of importance of the transfer pricing determinants 
relate to the basis of transfer prices used? 
The first and second questions have been investigated by Wu and 
Sharp (1979, (12)) for US companies. The third question is introduced to 
draw a statistical conclusion related to the relationship between the 
order of importance of the transfer pricing determinants and the transfer 
pricing method. Investigating this relationship is one of the main 
objectives of this study. 
The steps of the statistical procedure used to explore the issues 
were (Siegel, 1956, (13)): 
A- The raw score data were converted to rankings of the 
determinants in a form relevant to the objective of the test. 
B- An appropriate null hypothesis (Ho) was stated. 
C- The relevant statistical test for testing H0 was selected. For 
the analyses in this section Kendall's rank correlation 
coefficient Taut, and Kendall's coefficient of concordance (W) 
were employed. Tau expresses the degree of association between 
two sets of rankings of N variables. W expresses the degree of 
association among several (K) sets of rankings of N variables. 
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D- A significance level of 0.01 was specified which is the 
probability of rejecting Ho when it is true (Type I error). 
E- Knowing the sampling distribution of the statistical test under 
Ho, the rejection region was defined. 
F- The value of the test statistic was computed using the ranked 
data. If this value is in the region of rejection, Ho is 
rejected at the chosen level of significance. 
6.3.1 Null Hypothesis Concerning the Rankings and Market 
To assess the effect of the type of market, i. e. domestic and 
international, on the order of importance of transfer pricing deter- 
minants, the following null hypothesis (H0), was posed: 
"The rankings of the transfer pricing determinants for domestic and 
international market are not correlated. " 
The Kendall rank correlation coefficient T' was determined using the 
overall rankings of the twenty transfer pricing determinants given in 
Table 6.2 after the order of the determinants is rearranged in such a way 
the rankings of transfer pricing determinants for domestic market occur 
in the natural order as shown in Table 6.3. 
S (Siegel, 1956, (14)) 
N (N - 1) 
where S= actual score. 
N (N - 1) = maximum possible score. 
Since the sample distribution of T under a null hypothesis is known, the 
statistic is subject to a test of significance. The method for doing so 
is to calculate the statistic Z 
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T - uT 
z= 
CF T 
T 
72 
(2N+5) 
9 N(N - 1) 
(Siegel, 1956, (15)) 
where uT = The population mean =0 
aT = The standard deviation of population =1 
Z= Deviation of the observed value from UT when QT =1 
It was found that the value of T was 0.61. The corresponding value 
of Z associated with this value of t was 3.76. The probability of 
occurrence of Z, 3.76 under Ho was < 0.00011. Since p (Z) is less than 
the previously set level of significance of a=0.01, H01 must be 
rejected. This rejection means that the rankings of the determinants of 
domestic and international transfer pricing policy are significantly 
correlated, i. e. there are definite similarities in the rankings. This 
conclusion contrasts with the result given by Wu and Sharp (1979, (16)) 
who tested the same hypothesis and concluded that for US companies there 
was no similarity between the domestic and international rankings. There 
are two possible reasons for this difference. First, the number of 
determinants is different, fourteen for US companies and twenty for UK 
companies. Secondly, the management's view of the order of importance of 
transfer pricing determinants differs in UK companies than US companies. 
6.3.2 Null Hypotheses Related to the Rankings and Industry 
To assess whether the order of importance of the transfer pricing 
determinants varies from one industry to another for each of the domestic 
and international markets separately, null hypothesis (H02) was posed. 
For the domestic market, H02. p was 
the following 
"The rankings of the determinants for domestic transfer pricing 
policy by different type of industries are not correlated" 
Kendall's coefficient of concordance (W) is applied. W is computed using 
the following equation: 
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s (Siegel, 1956, (17)) 
W= 
1/12K2 (N3 - N) -K ET T 
where s= sum of squares of the observed deviations from 
E R. 
the mean of R that is, s= E(Ri. - -N1 )2 
K= number of sets of rankings. 
N= number of variables ranked. 
1/12 K2(N3 - N) = maximum possible sum of the squared deviations, 
i. e., the sum s which would occur with prefect agreement among K 
rankings. 
ET = the sum of the values of T for all the K rankings. T is 
T 
measured as following: 
E (t3 - t) 
12 
where t= number of observations in a group tied for a given rank. 
The test of significance for W is to calculate the statistic Chi-square 
as follows: 
X2= K (N - 1)W with df =N-1 (Siegel, 1956, (18)) 
For the domestic market, H02. A was tested based on the twelve 
determinants related to this market. Table 6.4 presents the ranking of 
the twelve transfer pricing determinants for the market by type of 
industry. The value of W was found to be 0.45. The observed value of X2= 
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84.04 is greater than the theoretical X2 value of 24.72 at a=0.01 with 
11df. Thus H02. A is rejected. 
This rejection leads to the conclusion that 
the rankings of transfer pricing determinants for domestic transfer by 
different industries are significantly correlated. 
For the international market, the following null hypothesis, HO2. B, 
was stated: 
"The rankings of the determinants for international transfer 
pricing policy by different type of industries are not correlated. " 
This hypothesis was tested based on the twenty transfer pricing 
determinants. Table 6.5 shows the rankings of these determinants by the 
type of industry. The value of W was 0.32. The value of observed X2 was 
found to be 92.45. This, value is greater than the theoretical X2 value 
36.19 at a=0.01 at df = 19. H02 is thus not accepted for the 
international market leading to the conclusion that the rankings of the 
determinants of transfer pricing for the international market by various 
industries are significantly correlated. The rejection of H02 for both 
domestic and international markets for UK companies leads to the general 
conclusion that there are substantial similarities in the order of 
importance of transfer pricing determinants whatever the type of 
industry. This agrees with the rejection of the same hypothesis for the 
US companies which had been tested by Wu and Sharp (1979, 
(19)). 
Therefore, it can argue that any conclusion concerned with the rankings 
of transfer pricing determinants could be generalised for all industries. 
6.3.3 Null Hypothesis Regarding the Rankings and Transfer Pricing Method 
To evaluate the relation between the bases of transfer prices and 
the order of importance of transfer pricing determinants, a null 
hypothesis (H03) was stated for each of the domestic and international 
markets separately. For domestic market, H03. A was 
the following 
Table 6.5 Ranking of International Transfer Pricing Determinants by Different Industries 
No. Industry 
1 2 
Code*of Transfer Pricing 
34567 
Determinants 
89 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
1 Agriculture, forestry 
fishing 20 5 5 5 16.5 12.5 16.5 16.5 12.5 10.9 5 5 5 5 5 5 10.5 16.5 16.5 165 
2 Coal & Petroleum 
products 6 3 1 11.5 8 15.5 15.5 19.5 2 11.5 4.5 7 4.5 10 17.5 19.5 13.5 13.5 9 17.5 
3 Chemicals & allied Ind. 5.5 15 15 5.5 5.5 15 5.5 15 15 15 15 15 1 8.5 8.5 15 2.5 2.5 15 15 
4 Metal Manufacture 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 4.5 9 
5 Mechanical engineering 6 2 3 18 4 10 16 11 9 7 13 5 17 18 20 14.5 14.9 12 19 
6 Instrument engineering 3 7 3 10.5 10.5 14.5 1 19 5 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5 3 19 19 6 14.5 17 16 
7 Electrical engineering 7 1.5 4.5 1.5 8 4.5 9.5 11.5 11.5 9.5 3 13 6 18 17 19.5 15.515.5 14 19.5 
8 Vehicles 10.5 18.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 18.5 18.5 18.5 3.5 16 3.5 15 3.5 8.5 8.5 10.5 13 13 7 13 
9 Metal goods not elsewhere 
specified 2 7 7 45 31 19.5 17.5 17.5 11 14.5 11 11 19.5 14.5 14.5145 9 7 
10. Textiles 15.5 2 2 26 6 15.5 15.5 10.5 15.5 10.5 16.5 15.5 10.5 10.5 19.5 6 6 6 10.5 
11. Bricks, pottery, glass 
cement 4 1.5 11 9.5 17 1.5 15.5 20 8 15.5 12 4 4 13.518.5 18.5 6 13.5 7 9.5 
12 Paper, printing & 
publishing 1.5 11.5 1.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 
13 Other manufacturing 
industries 2 7 1 5 14 6 12 16 15 10 3.5 8 3.5 10 10 1'7 13 19.5 18.5 20 
14 Construction 1.5 5 3 10.5 5 18 1.5 14 5 14 10.5 10.5 10.5 18 18 18 8 18 14 7 
15 Others 8.5 2 3 6 18 14 8.5 7 10 19 16 20 5 1 4 17 11 12 13 15 
* See Table 6.2 
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"The rankings of the determinants for domestic transfer pricing 
policy by the bases of transfer prices are not correlated. " 
Kendall's W was calculated, as before, in section 6.3.2. For the domestic 
market, W was calculated using the ranking of the twelve determinants and 
the transfer price bases given in Table 6.6. The value of W was found to 
be 0.86. The observed X2 was 37.87 which is greater than the theoretical 
X2 value, 24.72 at a.. = 0.01 with df = 11. Therefore, H03 is rejected. It 
can be concluded that the rankings of transfer pricing determinants for 
domestic transfers by transfer price basis are significantly correlated. 
For the international market, the following null hypothesis, H 03. B' 
was stated: 
"The ranking of the determinants for international-transfer pricing 
by the bases of transfer prices are not correlated. " 
To test this hypothesis, Table 6.7 is established. This table presents 
the rankings of the twenty transfer pricing determinants according to the 
bases of transfer prices employed. The observed values of W and X2 were 
found to be 0.65 and 49.56 respectively. The theoretical value of X2 is 
36.19 at a=0.01 with 19 df. Thus, H03 is also rejected for 
international transfers. This rejection leads to the conclusion that the 
rankings of transfer pricing determinants for international transfers by 
the bases of transfer prices are significantly correlated. 
Another important conclusion can be seen from the rejection of H03. 
This is that the order of importance of the transfer pricing 
determinants, based on raw scores given to all the determinants by 
companies participating in this survey, does not lead to a statistically 
significant relationship being established between transfer pricing 
methods and transfer pricing determinants. If such a relationship did 
exist, as it has always been suggested in the literature, the Kendall 
correlation test was not successful in confirming it. Perhaps, the 
companies using different bases of transfer prices agree on the ranking 
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of a number of determinants bigger than that on which they differ. In 
order to reveal the relationship between- transfer pricing method and the 
determinants of transfer pricing a more sophisticated technique is 
needed. For this purpose Multi-Discriminant Analysis will be applied in 
Chapter 8. 
A summary of the statistics and test of the three null hypotheses 
(H01, H02, and H03) based on the rankings of the transfer pricing 
determinants for domestic and international markets is given in Table 
6.8. 
6.4 Conclusions 
The analyses carried out in this chapter lead to the following con- 
clusions: 
1- The ranking of the main determinants of domestic transfer 
pricing policy in UK companies confirmed expectations based on 
the literature although differences with reported practice in 
the US were noted. The findings show that there are five 
criteria on which most respondents agree, namely: divisional 
autonomy, performance evaluation of divisions, maximizing 
divisional profit, overall profit of the company, and the 
preparation of financial statements. 
2- In contrast with the domestic market, a much wider range of 
determinants is important in the determination of transfer 
pricing in the international market. In this market, the 
determinants related to compliance with foreign tax and tariff 
regulations receive as much attention as the five determinants 
usually described in the literature. 
3- No statistically significant difference between the overall 
ranking of the determinants of transfer pricing in domestic 
and international markets was found. This result contrasts 
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Table 6.8 A Summary of the Hypothesis Tests 
Null Hypothesis 
Value 
H 
01 
(Market) 
H02(Industry) 
DI 
HO3 (Method) 
DI 
- Observed Kendall t 0.61 - - - - 
- Observed S 116 - - - - 
-a 0.1622 - - - - TT_ UT 
- Observed z 3.76 - - - - aT 
-P at observed (z) < 0.00011 - - - - 
- Observed Kendall W - 0.45 0.32 0.86 0.65 
- Observed s - 17016 43933 1952 6932.5 
- 1/12 K2 (N3- N) - 41327 149625 2288 10640 
-IT - 204 947 5 3 T 
- Observed X2 - 84.04 92.45 37.87 49.56 
- Theoretical X2at a=0.01 - 24.72 36.19 24.72 36.19 
-P at obseved (X2) - < 0.001 <0.001 <0.001 < 0.001 
- df - 11 19 11 19 
- Value of K 2 17 15 4 4 
- Value of N 20 12 20 12 20 
Decision Rejection Rejection Rejection Rejection Rejection: 
D' domestic 
I International 
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with the results reported in the US. The reason might be the 
difference in the number of determinants or differences in 
management views between UK companies and US companies. 
4- No evidence was found that the order of importance of the 
transfer pricing determinants varies from one industry to 
another in either domestic or international markets. 
5- The Kendall correlation test shows that the order of 
importance of transfer pricing determinants for both domestic 
and international markets does not significantly differ 
according to the transfer pricing method used. Thus, dis- 
tinctions among companies which use different transfer pricing 
based methods cannot be made on the basis of the order of 
importance of the transfer pricing determinants. Another 
analytical approach, namely Discriminant Analysis, will be 
applied in, order to study further the relationship between 
transfer pricing based method and transfer pricing deter- 
minants. This will be the subject of Chapter 8. 
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CHAPTER 7 
Factors Underlying the Determinants 
of Transfer Pricing 
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c- Measurement; the establishment of indices which can be used as 
new variables in later analysis. 
The first use is the most common one in practice, and indeed, Factor 
Analysis is mainly used in this study for this purpose. The basic idea is 
that the analyst is interested in examining the relationship within the 
original data set in terms of a smaller number of independent composite 
variables. This is achieved in such a way that most of the information in 
the original data set is preserved. The technique assumes that the under- 
lying basic variables are weighted combinations of the variables 
observed, and the data are interval-scaled. It also considers variables 
that show a lot of variability important. 
The final step in a Factor Analysis is the interpretation and the 
naming of the extracted factors. This process depends mainly on the 
analyst's experience and skills in interpretation. 
7.2.2 Factor Analysis Procedure 
Factor analysis procedure may be separated into three main steps, 
namely: preparation of the correlation matrix, extraction of initial 
factors and rotation to terminal factors. In each step, there are 
alternative methods which can be used. The selected method depends on the 
requirements of the analyst. 
7.2.2.1 Preparation of Correlation Matrix 
A Factor Analysis starts with a table of intercorrelations between 
the variables that are to be analysed. The elements of the correlation 
matrix are calculated from the individual scores of variables for the 
experimental population (Thurstone 1965, (2)). The procedure employed in 
this case is known in the literature as R factoring and is the most 
commonly used. (Kim & Nie, 1970, (3)). 
It is of interest to mention that the computation of the correlation 
matrix is performed on the standard score data, (standardized variable 
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scores are scores that have zero mean and unit standard deviation) rather 
than raw score data . In the' transformation process of raw scores to 
standard scores the correlation of any variable with the raw scores is 
the same as the correlation with the corresponding standard scores. This 
process does not alter either the degree of skewness or the correlation 
coefficients (Thurstone, 1974, (4)). 
7.2.2.2 Extraction of Initial Factors 
The process of data reduction may be done by : (a) Principal 
Component analysis, developed by Hotelling (1933, (5)); or (b) Classical 
Factor analysis, developed by Thurstone (1947, (6)). 
Principal Components analysis is more common because it leads to 
unique reproducible results. It describes a set of associated variables 
in terms of a new set of composite variables or principal components that 
are mutually uncorrelated (orthogonal) to each other (Green & Tull, 1978, 
(7)). The selection procedure for the principal components leads to the 
first principal component (factor) which represents the single best 
linear relationship exhibited in the original data. In other words, it 
explains as much of the total variance of the original data as possible. 
The second principal component is then derived to describe as much of the 
residual variance as possible under the condition that it is uncorrelated 
with the first one. The procedure is repeated until all the variance in 
the data is exhausted. 
The principal components model (Kim & Nie, 1970, (8)) takes the 
following form. 
Zi = aj1 F1 + aj2 F2 + .......... + ajn Fn (7.1) 
where: Z score of variable j in standardized form. 
Fi = factor i (uncorrelated with all other factors). 
aji = factor loading of variable j from factor i. 
Classical Factor analysis is concerned with describing covariation 
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between the variables in terms of a small number of common factors plus a 
term giving a unique factor for each variable. The basic model (Kim & 
Nie, 1970) (9)) is as follows: 
Zi = ajl F1 + aJ2 F2 + ....... + aim Fm + di U. (7.2) 
where: Z= Variable j in standardized form. 
Fi = common factor i. 
aji = factor loading of variable j, from common factor i. 
UU = unique factor for variable j. 
dj = factor loading of variable j on unique factor J. 
In this model, it is assumed that any correlation between two 
variables is due to the common factors only. Therefore, the numbers (i. e. 
communalities) which appear in the main diagonals of the correlation 
matrix in this model, are not unity as in the Principal Component model. 
This means that the common factors account for only a portion of the 
variation in a single variable, the residual variation is assumed to be 
attributable to the variable itself. 
Whatever the method used, to simplify the interpretation of the 
results, it is common practice to keep only the first few factors which 
provide a large percentage of the original variance. In other words, a 
number of the later factors are often ignored because they account for a 
low percentage of the original variance. 
7.2.2.3 Rotation to Terminal Factors 
The purpose of this step is the search for simple and interpretable 
factors through the rotation of the retained "extracted" factors. The 
reason is that the process of extraction of the initial factors - 
whatever the method used, i. e. the Principal Component or the Classical 
method - is useful in achieving data reduction, but it may not give the 
best results from an interpretative viewpoint. 
The interpretation would be more simple if the factor loadings of 
the retained factors were rearranged in such a way that each new variable 
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loadings tend to be either relatively small or relatively large in 
absolute magnitude compared with the original ones (Maxwell, 1977, (10)). 
For example, suppose the six original variable loadings, on the 
original Factors I and II are as shown in Figure 7.1. It can be seen that 
the value of the six variable loadings is rather high on factor I as well 
as factor II. The rotation of the axes I, II to the new axes 
I, II, which 
corresponds to a rotation of the corresponding factors will yield, for 
each variable, a high loading on one of the new axes and a low loading on 
the other. Figure 7.1 indicates that variables 1,3 and 4 load heavily 
and positively on axis I, while variables 2,5 and 6 load heavily 
negatively on axis II' Interpretation of the new loadings is easier when 
compared with the loadings on the original axes. 
Generally, there are two groups of computer-based procedures that 
can be used for rotating factor - loading matrices: (a) the orthogonal 
rotational method (orthogonal factors are uncorrelated); (b) the oblique 
rotational method (oblique factors may be correlated). The orthogonal 
varimax rotation method is used most often. The varimax method gives a 
new set of factor loadings for the factors which are extracted. The new 
axes account for as much of the common variance as the unrotated factors 
had but this variance is divided in a different way, to increase the 
differences between low and high loading (Crawford & Lomas, 1980 (11))- 
7.3 Results and Discussion 
Factor analysis of the data obtained in the survey was carried out 
using SPSS* (Version VII). It was applied to interval scaled scores 
acquired in the empirical study. Two main analyses were undertaken one 
for the score of the twelve determinants of domestic transfer pricing 
policy given by. 42 UK companies, and the second for the scores of the 
twenty determinants of international transfer pricing policy given by 34 
*SPSS is a Statistical Package for the Social Science available at the University of Manchester Regional Computer Centre. 
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Figure 7.1 Effect of Rotation of Axes 
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UK companies. A typical computer run of Factor Analysis is given in 
Appendix B. 
Principal-component analysis with iteration and rotations was used 
throughout this study. No attempt was made to find an optimum number of 
factors. Initially, factors required to explain about 70% of the variance 
in the original data were selected (this corresponded with the default 
option which meant that the factors extracted were restricted to those 
with eigenvalue greater than or equal to 1.0). An attempt was then made 
to interpret and name the factors. The number of factors was then 
systematically reduced in order to examine the extent to which they could 
be sensibly interpreted as basic variables each expressing a unique 
concept. The varimax method was used for rotation. 
The following information was printed: 
1- The correlation matrix. 
2- The inverse and determinant of the correlation matrix. 
3- Communalities, eigenvalues and proportion of total and common 
variance. 
4- Unrotated principal factor matrix. 
5- Varimax rotated factor matrix (rotated factor loading matrix) 
and transformation matrix. 
6- Matrix of factor - score coefficients. 
7- Plot of rotated factors loadings. 
7.3.1 Factors Underlying the Determinants of Domestic Transfer 
Pricing Policy 
A four factor analysis was undertaken, in which the four factors 
were found to account for a very large proportion, 69.5%, of the variance 
in the original data (Table 7.1). After iteration the first, second, 
third and fourth factors were found to account for 47.8%, 25.3%, 17.0% 
and 9.9% respectively (Table 7.2). The varimax rotated factor (factor 
loadings) matrix of the retained factors is shown in Table 7.3. Plots of 
141 
U) 
co 
e 
v 
00 
w 
U) 
co 
N 
E4 
U 
. r. { 
U) 
N 
E 
O 
A 
w 
0 
ca 
co 
p 
r-I 
t0 
00 
O 
C) 
. r4 
C) 
U 
G 
ca 
r4 
co 
d 
4 
E4 
G) 
.C ca 
E--+ 
E-+ 
U 
M o0 N v1 N N O M O N O O 
. . . . " . . . . . . O 'O O C' u1 N .q LI N O' 0 U M -4 %0 N CO 00 O' (' 0 0' O 
(0 
W 
0 
cM tr1 M M N O M M N N N O 
u O Cl ON .O LO Lt) -7 Cl N r+ M 1-4 
a) 
ttº ý7 Oý N Oý .7 O 't N N 0 L1 ºr1 %0 O . -+ 0' O O - 00 Cl r- r. '0 N O O -i -t P-4 N Olt LI G) Cl CO O N -7 N Cl . --4 -1 N d' N 00 O G' %D tN N in -t Cl 1-1 -4 
.,. 4 W Cl r+ -+ -+ O O O O O O O O 
1-4 
0 
4) 
V 
(0 u-I N Cl ýt 1 O N CO C' O N - 
142 
0 
0 
0 
U 
Co 
0 
00 
U 
rI 
a, 
w 
Co 
G 
N 
U 
U) 
a) 
E 
0 
A 
w 
0 
G 
0 
4-3 
Co 
1r 
0 
4-1 
H 
U 
U 
CO 
Co 
'd 
G 
CO 
K 
a) 
c0 
N 
O 
U 
(C 
W 
N 
N 
C) 
r-1 
.n N 
H 
-e r-4 0 m O N N O N -7 N N N O 
1.4 N Ui M O N . -t . -. -7 00 %O 10 O O (n 00 v) -7 to O Ol% Co in 00 O 
ji cn O - O N M N -t -4 N in 1-4 V " " " " N O N M O N -I N 
fL4 1 1 1 1 O O 0 O O O O OO 
-4 o 00 %O 'O* 1- f- IJO -T N P-4 N 
lt %D O 00 00 N 00 O M N 1-4 O U O r+ -2 O' -7 .D O% N 't N CO M 
41 CO r+ N -e .t "O 00 1-1 M -t IN Iý CO O -I O V N -7 . -i N 1- O M N N O O E 
O " N M O O 
L*. O O O O O O O O O O O U - ºN a' O O O O O O 
m N M ON N - N M O' '. O 9 
O N '. O I- 00 O O N O' r4 1"4 O' 
4 17 O, % vi %0 00 NID O M M 00 u"1 U1 4-4 O O 00 0 in -. %0 N O\ -7 N Lr) I- 0 
-3 M N %0 N N O - r-+ N 1-4 . -4 N 00 M O 0% 
Co O O O O O O 0 0 U N tr, N O\ 
w I 1 1 1 1 I 1 I ö o 0 O a - N r-+ 
P-4 L(4 O\ rN oo %0 O -7 -t C - %0 O Co M O0 Lt 00 M . -A - . -+ r+ 1i r--1 0 > O' O\ O N la N N M O' -7 '. O I- 1- -t 00 N O 00 O N CO O M O O' U1 1-4 %0 O O' 0% O' - in O 00 .t 00 r- 
4.3 N M M u1 M I- '. C N Ll1 %0 ND -t C) -i O -7 '. D " " " " " " " " " " 00 N 1- r4 '. O 
(0 O O 0 O O 0 O O O O O O r4 1' I 1 I 1 I 1 I I I I 1 W M r+ . -+ O 
A 
Co Q 
r1 8 ' s~ 
0 
Q) Lý 
al . --4 N M ý7 u1 ýO Iý 00 O\ O "4 N U N M -2 O O O O O O O O 0 r"+ "4 r"+ 
143 
Table 7.3 Varimax Rotated Factor Matrix of Domestic Transfer 
Pricing (Four Factor Solution) 
Determinant Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
01 0.02089 -0.08925 0.27793 0.50021 
02 -0.06792 0.45870 -0.18281 0.32642 
03 -0.12089 0.26004 0.03226 0.81285 
04 0.13816 0.26727 0.43809 0.36239 
05 -0.03123 -0.06202 0.87134 0.07372 
06 0.34765 0.57208 0.27415 0,27155 
07 0.18087 0.42055 0.49480 0.10446 
08 -0.12728 0.57212 0.02322 -0.05977 
09 0.35308 0.51671 0.03432 0.14479 
10 0.27120 0.70170 0.16127 0.07332 
11 0.96065 0.15805 0.10537 -0.05553 
12 0.84071 0.01620 0.01354 -0.06205 
Name of Determinants 
01 Overall profit of the company 
02 Maximizing the division profits 
03 Divisional autonomy 
04 Performance evaluation of divisions. 
05 The Preparation of financial statements. 
06 Utilization of idle production capacity. 
07 Market share of the end product. 
08 The relationship between transfer prices and the percentage 
ownership in the subsidiaries. 
09 Tax commitment. 
10 Volume of inter-divisional transfers 
11 Compliance with UK tax regulations. 
12 Compliance with UK non-tax regulations. 
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the rotated Factor I and Factor II are given here (Figure 7.2). 
The following interpretation of these four factors is based on the 
rule that the factor can be identified with the common element of the 
determinants which are highly loaded on it. A determinant is considered 
(arbitrarily) as highly loaded on a particular factor if its loading is 
numerically greater than 0.5. and as moderately loaded on a particular 
factor if its loading is greater than 0.25 and less than 0.5. Table 7.4 
presents a summary of four factor solution which is built on the data 
given in the varimax rotated factor matrix, Table 7.3. 
7.3.1.1 Factor I: Governmental Regulations 
In the first factor (Table 7.4), two determinants (compliance with 
UK tax regulations, and compliance with UK non-tax regulations) are 
highly loaded. This is an indicator that the companies differ most in 
their attention to the governmental regulations. Table 7.4 shows that 
there are three additional determinants (utilization of idle production 
capacity, tax commitment, and volume of inter-divisional transfers) which 
are only moderately loaded on this factor. Therefore, based on the 
convention of factor analysis interpretation Factor I is named 
Governmental Regulations. 
7.3.1.2 Factor II : Integration Benefits 
Four determinants (utilization of idle production capacity, the 
percentage of ownership in subsidiaries, tax commitment, and volume of 
inter-divisional transfers) are highly loaded on this factor (Table 7.4). 
Of these four determinants, volume of inter-divisional transfers is more 
highly loaded than the others. 
The relation between the volume of inter-divisional transfers and 
utilization of idle production capacity can be indicated by the following 
equations: 
Production = Internal sales + external sales + change of inventory. 
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Table 7.4 Underlying Factors of Domestic Transfer Pricing Policy 
(Four Factor Solution) 
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3 Divisional autonomy 
4 Performance evaluation of divisions 
5 The preparation of financial 
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6 Utilization of idle production 
capacity 
7 Market share of the end product 
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Production capacity utilization ratio = Production/Production Capacity. 
In the case of idle production capacity in the selling division, the 
increase in the volume of internal trade decreases the percentage of idle 
production capacity in this division. 
The tax commitment of a company is affected by both the percentage 
of ownership in subsidiaries and the volume of inter-divisional 
transfers. When a division is a department in a company, corporate income 
tax is paid only on the profit realized from external trade. In other 
words, all the company's profits which are from internal trade will 
cancel out. If a division is a subsidiary and the holding company owns 
less than 100% of share capital, adjustment for unrealized profit is 
required. Suppose that the holding company sold goods to a subsidiary and 
these goods remain unsold to outside customers at the end of the 
financial year. Assuming that the holding company owns 60% of the 
subsidiary, accountants would argue that since 40% of the subsidiary is 
owned by outside interests, 40% of the profit has been earned and that 
any adjustment for unrealized profit should be based on the 60% which is 
owned by the holding company, in accordance with the proprietary concept 
in financial accounting (Lewis & Firth, 1977, (12)). This clearly shows 
the link among the three determinants namely : tax commitment, the volume 
of inter-divisional transfers, and the percentage ownership in the 
subsidiaries. 
The market share of the end product is moderately loaded on Factor 
II. This determinant may represent a target for the company and decrease 
of the price of the end product will increase market share when demand is 
elastic. Transfer prices may be used effectively to, achieve this end. 
Increase of the market share of the end product will increase the volume 
of internal trade which will decrease the ratio of idle capacity 
utilization. This, -. in turn, decreases the total cost per unit, i. e. 
decreases the transfer price when they are based on cost. 
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Thus the above five determinants are inter-related and represent the 
advantages of integration suggesting that Factor II may be called 
'Integration Benefits'. 
It should also be mentioned that there are three further 
determinants which are moderately loaded on this factor, namely 
maximizing the divisional profit, divisional autonomy, and performance 
evaluation of divisions. These three determinants are in fact highly 
loaded in Factor IV which is interpreted as Decentralization later in 
section 7.3.1.4. All the determinants represent another aspect of 
integration effects. The existence of large companies, which are 
vertically or horizontally integrated often require the adoption of a 
decentralized policy as a way of managing the business. Hence, the factor 
analysis results confirm the link between integration and 
decentralization. 
7.3.1.3 Factor III : Financial Reporting 
In the third factor (Table 7.4), the preparation of financial state- 
ments is the only determinant which is highly loaded (0.87). Four 
determinants, are moderately loaded on this factor, overall profit of the 
company, performance evaluation of divisions, utilization of idle 
production capacity, and market share of end product. These four 
determinants all affect the financial statements of the company. The 
overall profit of a company is presented in the consolidated financial 
statements of the holding company. Performance evaluation of divisions is 
usually measured by the profit figure of each division. Total cost per 
unit of transferred product depends on the level of production capacity 
utilization and this is reflected in the cost statements of divisions as 
well as the consolidated financial reports. Finally, the market share of 
the end product affects the sales revenue figure shown in the income 
statement. It therefore seems reasonable to designate the third factor as 
'Financial Reporting'. 
149 
7.3.1.4 Factor IV : Decentralization 
'Decentralization' is the interpretation given to the last of the 
four factors. The divisional autonomy determinant is very highly loaded 
(0.81). Overall profit of the company is also highly loaded (0.50). Three 
determinants are moderately loaded (Table 7.4), two. of which (maximizing 
divisional profit and performance evaluation of divisions) are relatively 
close in magnitude to each other. The third determinant, utilization of 
idle production capacity, has a lower loading than the others. 
Divisional autonomy represents a means of achieving 
decentralization. Two determinants (overall profit of a company, and 
maximizing division profits) relate to a company's objectives of 
decentralization. The fourth determinant, performance evaluation of 
divisions, is a control mechanism used by corporate management to judge 
the divisions' results. This determinant is important from the viewpoint 
of corporate management, because of its influences on long-run investment 
decisions. 
The utilization of idle production capacity determinant is 
considered to be a constraint on the extent of decentralization. When 
divisional managers are. given absolute freedom to trade, they may prefer 
to trade externally rather than internally regardless of the benefit to 
the company as a whole. In the case of idle production capacity in the 
manufacturing divisions, a constraint on the degree of decentralization 
in the form of giving priority to internal trade is often considered 
necessary., This condition is required to enable a company to achieve 
benefits from integration. 
The inclusion of these five determinants in this factor suggests 
that decentralization can be portrayed from different angles: 
a- Appearance or-form as expressed by autonomy. 
b- Objectives which include overall profit of company and 
maximizing of divisional profit. 
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c- Constraints on the form of utilization of idle production cap- 
acity. 
d- Evaluation by measuring divisional performance. 
In conclusion the twelve determinants of domestic transfer pricing 
policy have been reduced to four basic factors, characterized by the 
following terms: 
I- Governmental Regulations. 
II- Integration Benefits. 
III- Financial Reporting. 
IV- Decentralization. 
7.3.1.5 Further Analysis 
A three factor solution was carried out to examine the effect of re- 
ducing the number of factors below four. In this solution Factor I, 
Factor II, Factor III account for 54.5%, 27.6%, 17.9% respectively in the 
total variance of the data. 
Table 7.5 presents a summary of the results of the three factor 
solution which is based on the correlations (loadings) given in the 
varimax rotated factor matrix, Table 7.6. The interpretation of each 
factor, is similar to that for the correspondingly numbered factor in the 
four factor solution. The determinants which are highly or moderately 
loaded on each factor are very close to the four factor solution but the 
loading of each determinant is slightly different. The reason is that the 
variance in the data is explained by three factors instead of four. 
It should be mentioned that the disappearance of decentralization 
does not mean that this factor is not important in domestic transfer 
pricing policy. Factor analysis generates factors in order of their 
contribution in explaining the total variance in the data. The 
disappearance of decentralization can be considered as an indication of 
the high degree of agreement among the companies about the relative 
importance of this factor. This observation complements the high ranking 
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Table 7.5 Underlying Factors of. Domestic Transfer Pricing Policy 
(Three Factor Solution) 
Factors 
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2 Maximizing the division profits 
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5 The preparation of financial 
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6 Utilization of production 0 O O 
capacity. 
7 Market share of the end product 0 O O 
8 % ownership in the subsidiaries O 
g Tax commitment 0 
10 Volume of inter-division transfers 0 
11 Compliance with UK tax regulation O 
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regulations 
+ve moderately loaded O 
+ve highly loaded 
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Table 7.6 Varimax 
(Three 
Rotated Factor Matrix for Domestic Market 
Factor Solution) 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Determinant 
01 -0.06196 0.06268 0.43449 
02 -0.08586 0.59774 -0.01818 
03 -0.18783 0.46968 0.34137 
04 0.14053 0.27302 0.61233 
05 0.03346 -0.17718 0.75248 
06 0.39015 0.55797 0.38987 
07 0.26106 0.30253 0.50736 
08 -0.00825 0.45993 0.02046 
09 0.39431 0.51086 0.09931 
10 0.36861 0.59926 0.19503 
11 0.97945 0.04857 0.06591 
12 0.81244 -0.05105 -0.02056 
Name of the Determinants 
01 Overall profit of the company 
02 Maximizing the division profits 
03 Divisional autonomy 
04 Performance evaluation of divisions 
05 The preparation of financial statements 
06 Utilization of idle production capacity 
07 Market share of the end product 
08 The relationship between transfer prices and the percentage ownership 
in the subsidiaries 
09 Tax commitment 
10 Volume of inter-divisional transfers 
11 Compliance with UK tax regulations 
12 Compliance with- UK non tax regulations 
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of the five determinants of this factor which was found in Chapter 6. It 
also leads to the conclusion that decentralization is the most important 
factor in domestic transfer pricing from both the ranking (high average 
score means high ranking) and consensual (low variance means greater 
consensus) points of view. 
A two factor solution was also carried out in which Factor I and 
Factor II were found to account for 66.5%, 33.5% respectively in the 
total variance of the data. A summary of the results of all analyses, 
i. e. four factors, three factors, two factors is given in Table 7.7. This 
summary was built on the factors loadings which are shown in each of 
Tables 7.3,7.6,7.8 respectively. 
A problem of interpretation arises with the two factor solution. The 
underlying relationships, particularly in Factor I are not clear, the 
highly loaded determinants on this factor are related to more than one 
set of inter-relationships. Therefore, a two factor solution cannot be 
recommended as the minimum level of underlying factors for domestic 
transfer pricing determinants. 
7.3.2 Factors Underlying the Determinants of International 
Transfer Pricing Policy 
Six factors were first extracted and rotated. They account for 74.4% 
of the variance in the data (Table 7.9). After iterations, Factor I, 
Factor II, Factor III, Factor IV, Factor V and Factor VI account for 
37.8%, 23.9%, 13.2%, 10.4%, 8.0% and 6.7% of the variance respectively 
(Table 7.10). The factor loadings matrix of the six factors after 
rotation by the varimax method is given in Table 7.11. The plot of the 
rotated Factor I and Factor II is presented in Figure 7.3 
The interpretation of the main factors underlying the determinants 
of international transfer pricing is more difficult than in the domestic 
case. This difficulty might be expected because the number of 
determinants is larger. To simplify the interpretation, the names of the 
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Table 7.7 A Summary of- each of the four, three and two factor solutions of. 
determinants of domestic transfer pricing policy. 
Determinants 
1 Overall profit of the company 
2 Maximizing the division profits 
3 Divisional autonomy 
4 Performance evaluation of divisions 
5 The preparation of financial 
statements 
6 Utilization of idle production 
capacity 
7 Market share of the end product 
8% ownership in the subsidiaries 
9 Tax commitment 
10 Volume of inter-division transfer 
11 Compliance with UK tax regulation 
12 Compliance with UK non-tax 
regulations 
Key 
+ ve moderately loaded 
(correlated) 
+ ve highly loaded 
(correlated) 
Factors are named: 
I Governmental regulations 
II Integration Benefits 
III Financial reporting 
IV Decentralization 
Factors 
I II III IV 
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A Q o Q © Q 
A m e 
Q 0 5 0 A Q o Q 
O A Q O A Q E 
© g o 
Q o o 0 0 0 
Q o ® a © L1 
m e 0 
2 ,i A 
4 factor solution 3 factor solution 
00 
0 0 
2 factor solutioi 
0 
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Table 7.8 Varimax Rotated Factor Matrix of Domestic Transfer Pricing 
(Two Factor Solution) 
Determinant Factor 1 Factor 2 
01 0.32847 -0.04724 
02 0.41626 -0.02596 
03 0.60314 -0.14468 
04 0.57590 0.17692 
05 0.29177 0.04859 
06 0.66458 0.43989 
07 0.53746 0.29392 
08 0.34847 0.03156 
09 0.41890 0.42441 
10 0.54534 0.41124 
11 0.00435 0.98681 
12 -0.11452 0.80688 
Name of the Determinants 
01 Overall profit of the company 
02 Maximizing the division profits 
03 Divisional autonomy 
04 Performance evaluation of divisions 
05 The preparation of financial statements 
06 Utilization of idle production capacity 
07 Market share of the end product 
08 The relationship between transfer prices and the percentage 
ownership in the subsidiaries. 
09 Tax commitment 
10 Volume of inter-divisional transfers. 
11 Compliance with UK tax regulations 
12 Compliance with UK non tax regulations. 
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Table 7.11 Varimax Rotated Factc: Matrix of International Transfer Pricing (Six Factor Solution) 
Determinant Factor I Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 Factor 6 
01 -0.26320 -0.11134 0.03071 0.53282 -0.10879 -0.36187 
02 -0.08127 0.12383 0.82594 -0.17436 0.01689 0.09102 
03 -0.40838 0.05374 0.51276 0.22500 0.22012 0.16238 
04 -0.27271 0.26842 0.33355 0.57622 0.19265 0.16728 
05 -0.04599 0.06155 0.17531 0.75484 -0.08603 -0.02725 
06 0.19353 0.06152 10.71508 0.27363 0.02647 0.14807 
07 -0.01654 -0.04341 -0.10021 0.70277 -0.06687 -0.00929 
08 0.20655 0.07538 0.19429 -0.03152 0.10783 0.69461 
09 0.23902 0.42302 0.28589 -0.07970 0.16811 0.31206 
10 0.07238 0.40107 10.30072 0.32457 0.01696 0.25744 
11 -0.02852 0.81841 0.15569 0.13819 0.10406 0.15171 
12 -0.02935 0.87554 0.10726 -0.10581 0.18959 -0.25938 
13 0.21371 0.78358 -0.09604 0.00773 0.20714 0.17084 
14 0.33484 0.22326 -0.07431 -0.03140 0.77777 0.08881 
15 0.17630 0.09502 0.14302 -0.15032 0.75023 0.36118 
16 0.16062 0.37188 0.15234 -0.02041 0.70553 -0.14421 
17 0.75319 0.22481 0.00362 -0.19554 0.13110 0.20671 
18 0.75596 0.12453 0.00869 -0.13029 0.24386 0.26351 
19 0.52436 0.09354 0.58427 0.40329 0.09653 -0.23935 
20 0.47592 -0.06443 0.03975 -0.00142 0.24491 0.03517 
Name of Determinants 
01 Overall profit of the company 13 Compliance with foreign tax and tariff regulations 
02 Maximizing the division profits 14 Restrictions imposed by foreign countries on 
repatriation of profits or dividends. 
03 Divisional autonomy 
15 Restrictions imposed by foreign countries 
04 Performance evaluation of divisions on the amount of royalty or management fees 
that can be charged against foreign subsidiaries 
05 The preparation of financial statements 
16 Other restrictions imposed by foreign countries not 
06 Utilization of idle production capacity included in Nos. 14 and 15 
07 Market share of the end product 17 Maintenance of adequate cash flows in foreign 
subsidiaries 
08 The relationship between transfer prices 
and the percentage ownership in the 18 The need of subsidiaries in foreign countries to seek 
subsidiaries local funds. 
09 Tax commitment 19 Rate of inflation in foreign countries. 
10 Volume of inter-division transfers. 20 Risk of expropriation in foreign countries. 
11 Compliance with UK tax regulations 
12 Compliance with UK non tax regulations 
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factors are based mainly on the determinants which have been highly 
loaded on them, following the convention usually applied in Factor 
Analysis. Table 7.12 gives a summary of the results of the six factor 
solution based on the varimax rotated factor matrix (factor loadings), 
Y 
Table 7.11. 
7.3.2.1 Factor I: Foreign Subsidiaries' Funds Requirements 
There are three determinants (maintenance of adequate cash flows in 
foreign subsidiaries, the need of subsidiaries in foreign countries to 
seek local funds, and rate of inflation in foreign countries) which are 
highly loaded on this factor. In addition, two determinants are 
moderately loaded namely, restrictions imposed by foreign countries on 
repatriation of profits on dividends, and risk of expropriation in 
foreign countries. The inter-relationship among the first four of these 
determinants represent a condition related to a common factor which may 
be designated 'Foreign Subsidiaries Funds Requirements'. 
It is also observed that the three determinants, overall profit of 
the company, divisional autonomy and performance evaluation of divisions 
are negatively moderately loaded on this factor whereas they are 
positively highly loaded on the Factor III expressed as Decentralization 
in section 7.3.2.3. 
7.3.2.2 Factor II : Governmental Regulations 
The second factor is named 'Governmental Regulations'. The reason is 
that all the three determinants which are highly loaded in this factor 
represent regulations which should be followed by companies to comply 
with both UK and foreign tax regulations, and other non-tax regulations. 
Also, one of the determinants which is moderately loaded (other 
restrictions imposed by foreign countries) has the same characteristics. 
7.3.2.3 Factor III : Decentralization 
The determinants which are highly or moderately loaded in this 
factor can be divided into three groups. Group one contains maximizing 
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Table 7.12 A Summary of Six Factor Solution for International Transfer Pricing Determinants 
Determinants Factors 
I II III IV V VI 
1 Overall profits of the company A Q A 
2 Maximizing the d vision profits 0 
3 Divisional autonomy A 
4 Performance evaluation of divisions A Q Q to 
5 The preparation of financial statements. 0 
6 Utilization of idle pruduction capacity 0 Q 
7 'Market share of the end product. 
:, % ownership in the subsidiaries 
9 Tax commitment Q Q d 
10 Volume of inter-division transfers Q Q Q .Q 
11 Compliance with UK tax regulation 
12 Compliance with UK non tax regulation Vii] Q 
13 Compliance with foreign tax & tariff regulations 
14 Restrictions imposed by foreign countries on 
repatriation of profits on dividends. Q 0. 
15 Restrictions imposed by foreign countries on 
the amount of royalty or management fees that 
can be, charged against, foreign subsidiaries. .Q. 
16 Other restrictions imposed by foreign countries 
not included in No. 14 & 15. Q . 
©' 
17 Maintenance of adequate cash flows in foreign 
subsidiaries 
18 The need of subsidiaries in foreign countries 
to seek local funds .J .Q 
19 Rate of inflation in foreign countries ® .0 _Q . 
20 Risk of expropriation in foreign countries Q 
b 
Factor designations 
I Foreign subsidiaries Funds requirements 
II Governmental regulations 
III Decentralization 
IV Financial reporting 
V Foreign Cash Transfer restrictions 
VI Ownership ratio effects 
,. 
Key 
+ve moderately loaded Q. 
+ve highly loaded 
-ve moderately loaded 
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divisional profit and divisional autonomy. Both determinants are *highly 
loaded on this factor. The second group contains utilization of 
production capacity, tax commitment and volume of inter-division' 
transfers, of which only the first determinant is highly loaded on this 
factor. Rate of inflation in foreign countries is highly loaded and 
constitutes the third group. 
The relationship between the determinants in each of the first and 
the second groups has been explained before in the analysis of the 
domestic transfer pricing. However, the relationship among the three 
groups are difficult to interpret. In view of the complexity of 
international transfer pricing, this factor is interpreted as 
Decentralization. Since both determinants of the first group are highly 
loaded on it and the total loading of this group is higher than that for 
the other groups (Table 7.11). 
7.3.2.4 Factor IV : Financial Reporting 
'Financial Reporting' is the name given to the fourth factor. It has 
the same interpretation as Factor III of domestic transfer pricing. Four 
determinants, overall profit of the company, performance evaluation of 
divisions, the preparation of financial statement, and the market share 
of end product are highly loaded on it. The determinant of the effect of 
rate of inflation in foreign countries, which is moderately loaded on 
this factor, affects indirectly the accounting figures shown in the 
financial reports. Also, the volume of inter-division transfers 
determinant is moderately loaded on this factor. The latter shows as a 
cost item (material cost) in the cost statement of the buying division on 
the one hand, and as a revenue item (sale revenue) in the income 
statement of the selling division on the other hand. 
7.3.2.5 Factor 'V : Foreign Cash Transfer Restrictions 
Only three determinants are highly loaded on factor five. These 
three determinants are restrictions imposed by foreign countries on 
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repatriation of profits and dividends, restrictions imposed by foreign 
countries on the amount of royalty or management fees that can be charged 
against foreign subsidiaries, and other restrictions imposed by foreign 
countries not included in the previous two determinants. 
It is obvious that these determinants stem from one common factor 
which is the restrictions imposed by foreign countries on the transfer of 
cash between one subsidiary and another, or between a subsidiary and the 
holding company. Accordingly, factor V is designated 'Foreign Cash 
Transfer Restrictions'. 
7.3.2.6 Factor VI : Ownership Ratio Effects 
The percentage of ownership in the subsidiaries is the only 
determinant which is highly loaded on Factor VI. An underlying 
relationship exists between this determinant and both the tax commitment 
determinant, and the volume of inter-division transfers determinant, 
which are moderately loaded on this factor as well. This relationship can 
be explained by the tax advantages which can be gained according to the 
percentage of ownership. For example when a holding company owns 75% of 
the ordinary share capital of a subsidiary, all the trades carried on by 
the group are treated as one trade under UK law (Income Tax Act, 1970, 
(13)) which reduces the tax commitment of the company. Also trading 
losses, under group relief (Income Tax Act 1970, (14)) can be transferred 
from one company to another. If the percentage ownership is 51% or more, 
allowance can be made to prevent double taxation on dividends received 
from foreign subsidiaries. Inter-divisional trade volume and the 
ownership ratio influence the figure used for the adjustment of the 
profit figure to prepare in the consolidated financial statements. 
There are two other determinants which are moderately loaded on this 
factor; restrictions imposed by foreign countries on the amount of 
royalty or management fees that can be charged against foreign 
subsidiaries, and the needs of subsidiaries in foreign countries to seek 
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local funds. Also, the compliance with non-tax regulations, determinant 
and overall profit of the company are negatively moderately loaded. The 
inter-relationship between the last four determinants and the former ones 
is not clear, but Factor VI is designated 'Ownership Ratio Effects'. 
In brief, twenty determinants of international transfer pricing 
policy has been reduced to six basic factors interpreted as follows: 
I- Foreign Subsidiaries' Funds Requirements. 
II- Governmental Regulations. 
III- Decentralization. 
IV- Financial Reporting. 
V- Foreign Cash Transfer Restrictions. 
VI- Ownership Ratio Effects. 
7.3.2.7 Further Analysis 
In addition to the six factor solution, further analyses were 
carried out to discover to what extent the number of factors can be 
reduced, and to what extent the interpretation of the extracted factors 
can remain the same. Table 7.13 presents a summary of the results of all 
analyses, i. e. involving six, five, four and three factors. These results 
are based on the factor loadings which are shown in each of Tables 7.11, 
7.14,7.15 and 7.16 respectively. 
From Table 7.13, it is clear that the interpretation of each of the 
common factors will be nearly the same in the six, five and four factor 
solutions. The reason is that the determinants which are highly or 
moderately loaded in each factor are relatively the same. But the weights 
of the determinants in each solution are slightly different. In a few 
instances, the loading of one or two determinants shifts from high to 
moderate or from moderate to low and vice versa. 
A problem of interpretation obviously arises with the three factor 
solution. The highly loaded determinants, in each factor, belong to 
different sets of inter-relationships. This leads to the conclusion that 
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Table 7.13 A Summary of Six Factor Solution and each of 5,4,3 factor solutions (Factors of International Transfer Pricing Policy) 
Determinants Factors 
I II 
1 Overall profits of the company 
2 Maximizing the division profits 
3 Divisional autonomy 
4 Performance evaluation of divisions 
5 The preparation of financial statements 
6 Utilization of production capacity 
7 Market share of the end product 
8% ownership in the subsidiaries 
9 Tax commitment 
10 Volume of inter-division transfers 
11 Compliance with UK tax regulations 
12 Compliance with UX non tax regulations 
13 Compliance with foreign tax & tariff regulations 
14 Restrictions imposed by foreign countries.. _ 
15 Restrictions imposed by foreign countries on 
the amount of royalty. - --- 
16 Other restrictions imposed by foreign countries 
not included in No. 14 & 15 
17 Maintenance of adequate cash flows in foreign 
subsidiaries 
18 The need of subsidiaries in foreign countries 
to seek local funds. 
19 Rate of inflation in foreign countries 
20 Risk of expropriation in foreign countries. 
Rey 6 factors solution 
O +ve moderately correlated (loaded) 
+ve highly correlated 
(loaded) 
-ve moderately correlated 
(loaded) 
-ve highly correlated (loaded) 
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Table 7.14 Varimax Rotated Factor Matrix of International Transfer Pricing 
(Five Factor Solution) 
Determinant Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 
01 -0.35479 -0.10862 -0.06684 0.58345 -0.0048 
02 -0.02927 0.10668 0.76279 -0.12636 -0.00251 
03 -0.35946 0.04608 0.59820 0.18002 0.22611 
04 -0.21154 0.26849 0.42164 0.51703 0.18117 
05 -0.05673 0.06945 0.17860 0.75662 -0.09248 
06 0.24294 0.03805 0.72833 0.29497 -0.00174 
07 -0.03376 -0.03837 -0.07802 0.68052 -0.04650 
08 0.33866 0.07927 0.36330 -0.13089 -0.13229 
09 0.31499 0.41313 0.35962 -0.10892 0.16925 
10 0.13078 0.39484 0.38558 0.27547 0.01728 
11 0.00659 0.83618 0.22186 0.09743 0 09601 
12 -0.05818 0.81058 0.04075 -0.04258 0.17239 
13 0.25522 0.79667 -0.03528 -0.02526 0.19973 
14 0.35141 0.22562 -0.06131 -0.02596 0.80775 
15 0.26787 0.10229 0.25303 -0.20434 0.74027 
16 0.14346 0.37931 0.09940 0.02192 0.63625 
17 0.79671 0.21024 0.00862 -0.17977 0.12188 
18 0.81547 0.11280 0.03561 -0.12762 0.23460 
19 0.39024 0.09510 0.39576 0.44881 0.06625 
20 0.47635 -0.06702 0.00737 0.03121 0.23101 
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Table 7.15 Varimax Rotated Factor 
Transfer Pricing (Four 
Matrix of International 
Factor Solution) 
Determinant Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
01 -0.38318 -0.10044 -0.03200 0.55992 
02 0.00661 0.07850 0.77941 -0.13720 
03 -0.21202 0.13520 0.60735 0.14970 
04 -0.12645 0.32368 0.44548 0.49747 
05 -0.09547 0.03769 0.18537 0.76510 
06 0.25381 -0.00271 0.71108 0.30012 
07 -0.06823 -0.04261 -0.07088 0.68114 
08 0.38813 0.08112 0.33254 -0.11445 
09 0.36037 0.40886 0.37343 0.28767 
10 0.12783 0.35631 0.37343 0.28767 
11 0.02474 0.79626 0.22729 0.11098 
12 -0.02330 0.82749 0.06010 -0.04321 
13 0.28028 0.78998 -0.04365 -0.00430 
14 0.56616 0.42477 -0.01978 -0.06930 
15 0.50860 0.30820 0.23883 -0.21101 
16 0.35266 0.53225 0.12768 -0.01018 
17 0.76104 0.17420 -0.04689 -0.14432 
18 0.85120 0.11555 -0.02455 -0.09715 
19 0.39275 0.06919 0.37743 0.45533 
20 0.53757 -. 0: 03010 -0.01622 0.03554 
Table 7.16 Varimax Rotated Factor Matrix of International 
Transfer Pricing (Three Factor Solution) 
Determinant Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
01 -0.50492 0.33523 -0.12662 
02 0.17535 0.42465 0.11481 
03 -0.10717 0.53226 0.13564 
04 -0.15271 0.68957 0.29334 
05 -0.23791 0.62840 -0.01252 
06 0.30226 0.73270 -0.02004 
07 -0.23794 0.37920 -0.08635 
08 170: 46737 0.18152 0.07660 
09 0.44084 0.20785 0.40556 
10 0.12896 0.49734 0.33192 
11 0.05179 0.27693 0.79000 
12 0.00715 0.04232 0.84229 
13 0.27169 0.00704 0.76159 
14 0.55904 -0.02939 0.39948 
15 0.59469 0.05831 0.30207 
16 0.37287 0.11737 0.51792 
17 0.74342 -0.10682 0.15660 
18 '0.81213 -0.05618 0.09280 
19 0.32486 0.59395 0.03125 
20 0.49176 0.02586 -0.05183 
168 
the minimum number of underlying factors for international transfer 
pricing, which can be sensibly differentiated, is four. But five factor 
and six factor solutions are still acceptable. 
7.3.3 Order of Important of the Factors 
The preceding analyses in this chapter is the known common 
exploratory use of the factor analysis results. It is proposed in this 
study to make use of the results to obtain measures of consensus and 
differences among the respondent companies about the importance of the 
derived factors. 
The order of importance of the factors of transfer pricing can be 
estimated by the use of the factor score coefficient matrix (Factor-esti- 
mate matrix) shown in Tables 7.17 and 7.18 for domestic and international 
market respectively. The coefficients of this matrix, bij, are regression 
weights to calculate the factor score, Fi, of factor i from the 
determinants' scores Z, thus 
Fi =b ii Z1 + b12 Z2 + ....... + bin Zn 
(7.3) 
in which n is the number of the determinants. 
Applying the above equation with the Z value of each determinant 
being set equal to the average score obtained from the survey, yields the 
average scores of the factors. The higher the average score of a factor 
the higher its importance with regard to transfer pricing. 
Table 7.19 shows the factors arranged in order of importance for 
both domestic and international markets. The table also shows the 
relative level of agreement between the respondent companies on the 
importance of each factor. The latter is taken as being inversely 
proportional to the percentage variance explained by the factor. 
For domestic transfer pricing, it is noticed that the 
Decentralization and the Financial Reporting Factors take first and 
second place respectively for both order of importance (high average 
score) and degree of agreement (low variance). The Governmental 
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Table 7.17 Factor Score Coefficients of Domestic Transfer Pricing 
(Four Factor Solution) 
Determinant Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
01 0.02761 -0.10154 0.03848 0.17686 
02 -0.04936 0.14499 -0.05699 0.06651 
03 0.04410 -0.03735 -0.11186 0.73589 
04 -0.03279 0.06035 0.07048 0.06685 
05 -0.05800 -0.16927 0.77267 -0.03273 
06 0.10323 0.17064 0.20316 0.09421 
07 -0.07352 0.15952 0.09441 -0.04353 
08 -0.00522 0.23097 0.03390 -0.10001 
09 -0.00323 0.17264 -0.08309 0.00699- 
10 -0.16214 0.41805 -0.03665 -0.17328 
11 0.97849 -0.12566 -0.02557 0.03792 
12 0.05600 -0.08577 -0.00202 0.02129 
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Table 7.19 The Order of Importance of the Factors 
Market Order of Degree 0 Agreement 
Importance Factor % of Rankings 
variance 
Domestic 1 highest Decentralization 9.9 1 highest 
2 Financial Reporting 17.0 2 
3 Governmental Regulations 47.8 4 lostest 
4 lowest Integration Benefits 25.3 3 
Inter- 
national 1 highest Governmental Regulations 23.9 5 
2 Decentralization 13.2 4 
3 Financial Reporting 10.4 3 
4 Ownership Ratio Effects 6.7 1highest 
5 Foreign Cash Transfer 
restrictions 8.0 2 
6 lowest Foreign subsidiaries 
funds requirements 37.8 6 lowest 
The percentage variance of each factor is taken from Table 7.2 for the 
four factor solution of domestic transfer pricing, and Table 7.10 for 
the six factor solution of international transfer pricing. 
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Regulations Factor is the third in importance and has the lowest degree 
of agreement. The Integration Benefits Factor is the lowest place in 
order of importance and third in degree of agreement. 
For international transfer pricing, the Governmental Regulations 
Factor has the highest importance. This leads to the conclusion that 
companies try to satisfy governmental requirements placed on the transfer 
pricing before they satisfy their internal requirements. This is opposite 
in order of importance compared with domestic transfer pricing factors. 
The Financial Reporting Factor has the third place in both order of 
importance and degree of agreement. Fourth place of importance is taken 
by Ownership Ratio Effects Factor while this factor takes first place in 
degree of agreement. The Foreign Cash Transfer Restrictions Factor has 
fifth position in order of importance and second in degree of agreement. 
The lowest place in both order of importance and degree of agreement is 
occupied by the Foreign Subsidiaries' Funds Requirements Factor. 
7.4 An Evaluation of the Results 
The number of determinants of transfer pricing are known to be 
numerous. However, previous descriptive or empirical work on domestic 
transfer pricing has concentrated on only a few determinants which in the 
opinion of' the researcher responsible for them are dominant. The number 
of determinants that were usually considered in previous investigations 
was between three and five. (Ronen & McKinney, 1970 (15); C. B. R., 1973, 
(16); Finnie, 1978, (17)). For international transfer pricing, the number 
of determinants, studied by investigators such as : Arpan, 1972, (18); 
Shulman, 1969, (19); Wu and Sharp, 1979, (20); Tang, 1979, (21), differ 
from one study to another, for instance 14 determinants in Wu and Sharp's 
study and 20 determinants in Tang's study. 
Since the determinants of transfer pricing are numerous 
classification into a smaller number of factors was undertaken for 
simplification and a better understanding of the relations between the 
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determinants and transfer pricing policies. Examples of previous 
classifications of domestic and international transfer pricing 
determinants are shown in Tables 7.20 and 7.21. These classifications 
were arbitrary and based on subjective views. For this reason previous 
classifications were found to be different and the need for a clearer and 
a more comprehensive classification which is objectively derived was 
apparent. 
The classification obtained in this chapter, Table 7.22, for 
domestic transfer pricing and Table 7.23 for international transfer 
pricing, is based on an established statistical technique (Factor 
Analysis) with which the underlying relationships between a number of 
principal factors and the detailed determinants were discovered. The 
factors were then designated by the help of the common characteristics of 
the detailed determinants which correlated highly with each factor. 
It should also be mentioned that previous empirical studies have 
dealt with the order of importance of the detailed determinants for 
either domestic transfer pricing or international transfer pricing. 
However, this has never been extended to the classified determinants 
(factors). The factor analysis results of this study allowed an 
estimation of the order of importance of the factors (classified 
determinants) to be made as shown in Table 7.19. 
Moreover, the results of this study show not only the order of 
importance of the factors (classified determinants) in terms of their 
average scores but also it gives an estimate of the degree of agreement 
between the respondents on the order of importance of the factors (Table 
7.19 and Table 7.20). 
7.5 Potential Uses of the Results 
The factors found in this study and the subsequent classification of 
the detailed determinants of transfer pricing may be considered as a 
unified classification because of its objectivity and comprehensiveness. 
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Table 7.2 0 An Example of Classified Determinants for the Domestic Transfer 
Pricing Market. 
Source and N. A. A. (1956, (22)) 
Number 
Type of 'Cl ifi i 1 2 3 ass on cat 
Headings Management Financial Compliance with 
(factors) objectives reporting tax and other 
considerations legal require- 
ments 
Detailed 1. Measuring 1. To simplify 1. Taxation 
determinants managerial the preparation 
performance of consolidated 2. Other legal 
in decentral- financial requirements 
ized organ- reports 
ization. 
2. Appraisal 
of integration 
3. Pricing 
products to 
outside 
consumers 
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Table 7.21 An Example of Classified Determinants for the International 
Transfer Pricing Market 
Source & Milburn (1977, (23) ) 
numbers 
Type of 
Classification 1 2 3 
Headings Defensive Administrative Manipulative 
(factors) motivators 'k motivators motivators 
Detailed 
determinants 1. Minimize costs 1. Measures of 
connected with performance 1. Maximizing 
the preferences consolidated 
of third party. international 
(Milburn named entity income. 
this motivator 
as "long term 
goodwill with 2. Minimizing 
all national income taxes and 
authorities") other government 
charges 
3. Securing 
competitive 
advantages 
4. Minimizing 
risk. 
5. Minimizing 
financing costs 
6. Coping with 
government 
restrictions. 
* Milburn used the term "motivators" instead of determinants. 
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Table 7.22 The Suggested Classification of the Factors and the Determinants 
of Domestic Transfer Pricing. 
Factors Factors 
Ij II 
Governmental Integration 
I Effects 
III 
Financial 
Reporting 
IV 
Decentral- 
ization 
Determinants ].. Compliance ].. Utilization 1. The 1.0verall 
(highly with UK tax of production preparation profit of 
loaded) regulations capacity of financial the company 
statements 
2. Compliance 2. Percentage 2. Divisional 
with UK non- ownership autonomy 
tax in the subsid- 
regulations iaries 
3. Tax comm- 
itment 
4. Volume of 
inter- 
division 
transfers 
S ar 
3x 
Determinants 
share eo of the 
division 
(moderately 
end product profit loaded)* 
4. Performance 
evaluation 
The moderately loaded determinants, which shown in this table are the only 
determinants which are not highly loaded on any factor. 
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Table 7.23 The Suggested Classification of the Factors and the Determinants of International 
Transfer Pricing 
I II III IV V VI 
Foreign Governmental Decentra- Financial Foreign Ownership 
Factors subsidiaries regulations lization reporting cash ratio 
funds transfer effects 
restrict- 
ions 
Determinants 1. Mainten- 1. Compliance 1. Maximising 1. The 1. Restr- 1. Per- 
(highly ance of with UK tax the div- prepara- ctions centage 
loaded) adequate regulations ision tion of imposed owner- 
cash flows profit financial by for- ship in 
in foreign state, eign the 
subsid- ments countries subsid- 
iaries on repat- iaries 
riation 
of profit 
or 
dividends 
2. The need 2. Compliance 2. Divisional 2. Overall 2. Restr- 
of subsid- with UK [ion autonomy profits ictions 
iaries in tax regul- of the imposed 
-foreign ations Company by 
countries foreign 
to seek countries 
local on the 
funds amount of 
royalty 
3. Rate of 3. Compliance. 3. Utiliz- 3. Perfor- or 
inflation with foreign ationof mance manage- 
in foreign tax & tariff production evalua- ment 
fees 
countries regulations capacity tion of divn if 
that can 
divisions be charged 
against 
foreign 
subsidies 
4. Rate of 4. Market 3. Other 
inflation share of restrict- 
in end ions 
foreign product imposed 
countries by foreign 
countries 
not-included 
in the 
above 
two 
determ- 
inants 
Determinants 2. Tax 
(moderately commit- 
loaded #) ment 
3. Volume 
of inter 
division 
transfer 
* The moderately loaded determinants, which shown in this table are the only 
determinants which are not highly loaded on any factor. 
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The proposed classification is based on derived factors, each of which is 
fundamentally related to the determinants grouped under it. The identifi- 
cation of each factor relied upon the common feature of the determinants 
which are highly correlated with the factor. Such correlation is unlikely 
to occur by chance or by sample error. Further, it was found that 
rational inter-relationships exist between the determinants of each 
factor. Therefore it could be argued that the proposed classification is 
fundamental and general. 
The observed order of importance of the derived factors is based on 
the values of the average scores. Thus, it is dependent on the collected 
data, as are the regression coefficients between the factors and the 
determinants. However, if the assumption that the sample chosen for the 
study is representative of the UK companies is acceptable, then future 
investigations could use the regression coefficients (factor score 
coefficients, factor loading) obtained in this study to transform factor 
score data to determinant score data and vice versa. 
The results of the factor analysis carried out in this chapter might 
be useful for future work on transfer pricing in two respects. First, it 
is possible to deal with a small number of factors rather than a large 
number of determinants. This may increase the number of respondents in 
empirical studies. Secondly, the importance of individual determinants, 
if required, may be assessed from factor score data using equation 7.1. 
7.6 Summary and Conclusions 
The twelve determinants of domestic transfer pricing policy were 
reduced by Factor Analysis to four basic factors characterised by the 
terms: 
I- Governmental Regulations. 
II- Integration Benefits. 
III- Financial Reporting. 
IV- Decentralization. 
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It was possible to reduce them to three factors but it was 
impossible to reduce them further. 
The twenty determinants of international transfer pricing policy 
were reduced, firstly, to six main factors explained by the following 
names: 
I- Foreign Subsidiaries' Funds Requirements. 
II- Governmental Regulations. 
III- Decentralization. 
IV- Financial Reporting. 
V- Foreign Cash Transfers Restrictions. 
VI- Ownership Ratio Effects. 
Further reductions in the number of factors were carried out. The 
interpretation of the basic factors in the five, and the four, factor 
solutions are nearly the same as in the six factor solution. The three 
factor solution proved impossible to interpret as each factor does not 
express one basic inter-relationship. The minimum number of factors may 
be accepted, in this case, appears to be four. 
It is suggested in this study that the results of the Factor 
Analysis could be used to measure consensus and differences among the 
respondent on the relative importance of the derived factors. This is 
made by substitution of the average scores given by the respondent 
companies to the determinants into the linear relationship between the 
factor scores and the determinants scores. In this way, the average 
scores that would have been given to the factors can be calculated. The 
factors can then be put in order of their importance (as seen by the 
respondent companies) according to their calculated average scores. 
In addition, the degree of agreement among the respondent companies 
on the importance of a factor can be assessed as inversely proportional 
to the percentage variance explained by this factor. This was carried out 
on the four factor solution of the domestic market as well as for the six 
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factor solution of the international market. 
Briefly, it was found that UK companies show a high degree of 
agreement that decentralization is the most important factor in domestic 
transfers. In international transfers, the governmental regulations 
factor comes, on average, first in importance, however the agreement on 
this is very low. It should be mentioned that some earlier empirical 
studies have been able to arrange certain common objectives of transfer 
pricing in their order of importance. But none of these studies have 
shown to what extent the respondents differ among themselves on that 
order. 
Finally, the discovery of the correlations between the determinants 
and the factors of transfer pricing allows grouping of the determinants 
under the individual factors which are highly correlated with them. This 
represents a more fundamental and comprehensive classification of the 
determinants which could be considered as a unified classification for 
future studies of transfer pricing. 
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CHAPTER 8 
Discriminant Analysis 
of the 
Relationship between Transfer 
Pricing Determinants and Methods. 
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8.1 Introduction 
The relationship between the various methods of transfer prices on 
the one hand and the objectives intended to be achieved by a transfer 
pricing system on the other hand have been discussed before in several 
descriptive (Bierman, 1959, (1); Horngren, 1972, (2)) and empirical 
(Livesey, 1967, (3); Rook, 1971, (4)) investigations. Alexander (1979, 
(5)), in reviewing Livesey's empirical work stated that 
"Livesey is prepared to conclude that as long as the transfer 
pricing method employed is related to the organization's 
objectives, then the transfer pricing system is doing all that is 
required of it. " 
In spite of the importance of the relationship between transfer pricing 
method and the objectives of transfer pricing previous works did not give 
it as much attention as the connection between the transfer pricing 
method and market conditions (e. g. Solomons, 1965, (6)). This is probably 
due to the complexity of the transfer pricing method-objectives 
relationship especially in conditions where companies have unequally 
weighted multi- objectives. 
An attempt is made in this chapter to discriminate between the four 
groups of transfer pricing methods namely: market price, cost, 
negotiation, and other methods, according to the transfer pricing 
objectives and other environmental issues (i. e. transfer pricing 
determinants). Discrimination is attempted on the data collected in this 
study from UK companies operating in domestic and international markets. 
The aim of the discrimination is to evaluate the relationship between the 
transfer pricing method and transfer pricing determinants. This 
evaluation enables the prediction of transfer pricing method for new 
cases according to the company's perception of the relative importance of 
the transfer pricing determinants. 
An appropriate statistical technique for studying the relationship 
between transfer pricing methods and transfer pricing determinants is 
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Multi-Discriminant Analysis. This technique has been used to discover the 
characteristics that discriminate the individuals of one group from 
another, so that given a set of characteristics for a new case, the group 
to which this case should be assigned can be predicted (Lawson, 1980, 
(7)). Discriminant Analysis has been applied before in the field of 
financial analysis, specifically, in the prediction of the corporate 
bankruptcy (Altman, 1968, (8)). The results obtained by the use of this 
technique in the area of corporate failure encourage its use in other 
areas of finance and accounting. 
This chapter outlines the discriminant analysis approach and 
presents the results of the analysis for both the domestic and 
international markets. The results obtained are discussed and evaluated 
in the light of the literature. The use of classification functions for 
prediction of the appropriate transfer pricing-based method is 
investigated. 
8.2 Discriminant Analysis 
Tomkins (1973, (9)) has broadly classified transfer pricing methods 
into four groups namely: market price, cost, negotiation and other bases. 
The importance of a transfer pricing determinant varies from one company 
to another. Hence, the determinants may be considered as discriminating 
variables that can be used to classify a company into one group or 
another. Therefore, Multi-Discriminant Analysis was used in order to 
statistically. distinguish among the four groups of transfer pricing 
methods. 
8.2.1 The Mathematical Basis of Discriminant Analysis 
The aim of the mathematical procedure of Discriminant Analysis is 
to weight and combine the discriminating variables into Discriminant 
Functions in such a way to differentiate the groups as much as possible 
using the Discriminant Functions. This is achieved by constructing a 
number of linear . combinations of the discriminating variables 
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(determinants) of the form 
D. dil Z1 + dig Z2 + .............. + dip Zp 
(8.1) 
where D. is the score on discriminant function i, the d's are the 
weighting coefficients and the Z's are the standardized scores of the p 
discriminant variables (determinants). The weighting coefficients are 
derived in such a way as to maximize the separation among the groups. 
Many different techniques are available for this purpose but the one 
usually used and applied here is that originally given by Fisher (Mardia, 
1979, (10)). 
To give a visual picture of discriminant analysis, assume for 
simplicity, there are two groups 1 and 2 with N observations in each 
group on two variables X1 and X2. Figure 8.1a shows the plots of these 
observations on the two axes X1 and X2. The relationship between X1 and 
X2 can be expressed by one function, D, which is a linear combination of 
X1 and X2. 
D= d1 X1+d2X2 
C1 and C2 represent the centroids of group 1 and 2 respectively, and y- 
s is the overlap between the two groups. 
The discriminant function 
D 
can be constructed using different d1 
and d2 as in Figure 8.1b. C1 and C2 represent the centroid of group 1 
and 2 respectively on D, and y" -s shows the overlap between the two 
groups. It is noticed, that the distance between the centroid of group 1 
and 2 in Figure 8.1a (C -C) is bigger 8. lb (Cl - 12 than that 
in Figure 1 
i C2). Also, the overlap in Figure 8.1b is bigger than that in Figure 8.1a. 
It is obvious that discriminant function D makes a better discrimination 
than D. Fisher's method leads to a discriminant function which maximizes 
the distance between the group centroid and minimizes the overlap between 
the groups. 
The SPSS implementation of discriminant analysis (Klecka, 1975, 
(11)) allows two different methods of applying Fisher's technique to be 
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used, i. e. the direct method and the stepwise method. In the direct 
method, the discriminant functions are derived directly from the entire 
set of discriminant variables regardless of the discriminating power of 
each of these variables. In the stepwise method the variables are 
sequentially selected for entry into the analysis on the basis of their 
discriminating power. This can produce discriminant functions which 
include only a reduced set of variables and which are almost as good as, 
and sometimes better than the full set of variables. Selection criteria 
of the variables and the mechanism of the stepwise method are described 
elsewhere (Klecka, 1975, (12)). 
The stepwise method in which variables are selected to minimize 
Wilks' Lambda was adopted in this study. Wilks Lambda is an inverse 
measure of group discrimination, and minimizing Wilks Lambda is 
equivalent to maximizing the overall multivariate F ratio for the test of 
the differences among the group centroids. This method was chosen because 
it takes into consideration the differences among all the centroids and 
the cohesion within the groups. Effectively this method maximizes the 
ratio of a measure of among the group means differences to a measure of 
within the groups variability (Tatsuoka, 1971, (13)). 
The maximum number of discriminant functions is the smaller of the 
number of groups minus one and the number of variables. In the 
discriminant analysis of the four groups of transfer pricing methods 
carried out in this study, therefore, three discriminant functions were 
used. The functions are derived in their order of importance as a 
discriminating dimension. The contribution of a discriminant function may 
be judged by the ratio of the eigenvalue associated with this function to 
the total sum of eigenvalues of all possible functions using all the 
discriminating variables. Also, the necessity for an additional 
discriminant function can be assessed by a test for the statistical 
significance of the discriminating information not already accounted for 
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by the earlier functions. The remaining discriminating information may be 
measured by Wilks' Lambda - the larger Lambda is, the less is the 
information remaining. Lambda can be transformed into a Chi-square 
statistic for an easy test of its significance level (Klecka, 1975, 
(14)). 
8.2.2 The uses of Discriminant Analysis 
The main research objectives of Discriminant Analysis are Analysis 
and Classification. The analysis aspects include interpretation of the 
discriminant functions by the inspection of the weighting coefficients of 
these functions and designating them by the common features of the 
variables which contribute most to each function. The analysis also 
includes the study of the spatial relationship between the groups which 
is made evident from the plot of the cases on the discriminant axes. This 
provides for a clear visual interpretation of the separation of the group 
centroids, the scatter of the cases around the centroid of each group and 
the degree of overlap of the groups. 
This study, however, focusses more on the classification and 
prediction aspects of discriminant analysis. Classification of a company 
to one of the four groups of transfer pricing methods can be achieved 
using the discriminant functions and the score of the centroid of each 
group on these functions. The discriminant functions are used to 
calculate the discriminant scores of each company from its scores on the 
transfer pricing determinants. Then the distance between the point 
representing the company on the discriminant functions and the centroid 
of each group is calculated. The company is assigned to the group with 
the nearest centroid. 
Easier classification may be attained by using classification 
functions of the following form (Klecka, 1975, (15)) which are the output 
of the stepwise discriminant analysis. 
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C1 Cil V1 + C12 V2 +............ + C Vp +C (8.2) 
in which C. is the classification score for group i, Cij's are the 
classification coefficients with Ci0 as a constant, and the V's being the 
raw scores on the transfer pricing determinants (discriminant variables). 
There is one such equation for each group. The classification score of a 
company on the function of a group (transfer price basis) is in fact a 
measure of the probability of membership of the company in this 
particular group. A company is assigned to the group with the highest 
classification score. The derived relationships of the pre-classified 
groups of companies can be used to predict a group for a new company. In 
other words, knowing the score of a company on the transfer pricing 
determinants one can predict the transfer pricing method group according 
to the importance attached by the company to these determinants. 
8.2.3 Evaluating the Discriminant Functions 
After the discriminant functions and the classification functions 
have been derived, an evaluation of their performance is always required. 
In this connection, this study tries to answer three questions: 
i) Is there a real need for the discriminant functions to 
distinguish between the four groups of transfer pricing 
methods? In other words, could the distinction among the 
groups be made using raw score on the determinants without the 
need for discriminant analysis? 
ii) How will the discriminant functions have improved the correct 
classification of the respondent companies over the correct 
classification that might occur by chance, i. e. are the 
between- group differences statistically significant? 
iii) How will the derived classification functions perform in 
classifying /predicting future cases? 
8.3 Results and Discussion 
Multi-Discriminant Analysis of the data collected in the survey was 
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carried out using SPSS-Version VII. The scores of the transfer pricing 
determinants were classified into four groups, namely; 1,2,3, and 4, for 
the domestic market, and similarly and separately for the international 
market. Each group corresponds to one of the basis of transfer pricing 
methods (i. e. group 1 for market price, group 2 for cost, group 3 for 
negotiation, and group 4 for' 'other'). Two main analyses were made; one 
for domestic transfer pricing and the other for international transfer 
pricing. A typical computer run of Discriminant Analysis is given in App- 
endix C. 
A stepwise method based on Wilks criterion, as outlined earlier, 
was used throughout the analyses. Three discriminant functions were 
obtained in each analysis. The Options card requested the following 
output: 
1- Discriminant function coefficients. 
2- Discriminant scores and classification information. 
3- A single plot of companies (cases) on discriminant functions I 
and II. 
4- Classification function coefficients. 
5- Classification results. 
8.3.1 Discriminating Determinants of Transfer Pricing Methods for the 
Domestic Market 
The analysis was carried out on the data of 41 companies which 
completed the sections on transfer pricing determinants and methods for 
the domestic market. The score data on the nominal interval scale (0-5) 
of the twelve determinants of the domestic transfer pricing were the 
primary input data to the discriminant program. The results of the 
stepwise procedure are summarized in Table 8.1. This table shows the 
order in which the determinants were selected to enter the analysis. 
The information given in Table 8.1 is plotted in Figure 8.2. This 
figure shows the variation in Wilks' lambda and its significance during 
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the stepwise procedure. It can be seen that Wilks' lambda decreases, i. e. 
the discrimination among the group increases as more determinants entered 
the analysis. It is also clear that the rate of decrease of Lambda in the 
initial stages of the analysis is higher than that in the later stages of 
this analysis. This is to be expected as the stepwise procedure selects 
the determinants to enter the analysis in the order of their contribution 
to the discrimination. The significance of the obtained discrimination at 
the end of each step, which is the probability of this discrimination 
occurring by chance, plays an important role in selecting the cut-off 
point. An empirical rule in discriminant analysis (Lachenbruch, 1975, 
(16)) is that the determinants may be entered into the analysis until the 
level of significance reaches 0.05 and no determinant should be included 
after that point. Comparing the above rule with the results obtained, it 
is noticed that the significance level decreases to a minimum at 0.024 
when determinants 2,4,5,6 and 10 were included in the analysis. The 
inclusion of more determinants increases the probability of the 
discrimination occurring by chance, which gradually reaches 0.368 when 
all the determinants are considered. The above results lead to the 
conclusion that the cut-off point is reached after five determinants are 
included in the analysis. 
The coefficients of the standardized discriminant functions 
resulting from the analysis when all the determinants used are given in 
Table 8.2. 
These coefficients may be interpreted in the same way as the inter- 
pretation of factor loadings in Factor Analysis. The value of each 
coefficient represents the importance of the associated determinant to 
the discriminant function with the sign of the coefficient illustrating 
whether the determinant is making a negative or a positive contribution. 
Determinant No. 10' (Volume of inter-division transfers) is clearly the 
most important determinant in the first discriminant function. 
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Determinant No. 6, (Utilization of idle production capacity) is obviously 
the most important determinant in the second discriminant function 
although in this case its sign is negative. For the third function, 
determinant No. 5 (Preparation of financial statements) is the most 
important determinant and again has a negative sign. 
The coefficient of the corresponding unstandardized discriminant 
functions (i. e. not corrected for group means and standard deviations) 
are given below in Table 8.3. 
The three discriminant functions were derived in the order of the 
proportion of discrimination each of them can account for. The first 
function accounts for 47.5% of the total discrimination, and the second 
and the third functions for 42.0% and 10.5% of the total discrimination 
respectively. The unexplained variation in the original data if only the 
first function is used is 0.519 (Wilks Lambda) with a probability of 
occurring by chance of 0.523, even if the groups only differ along one 
dimension. If only the two first functions are used it is 0.8596 (Wilks' 
Lambda) with a 0.902 probability of occurring by chance, even if the 
groups only differ along two dimensions. Obviously, this is a very high 
probability,, nevertheless the third function was included in the analysis 
since it accounts for a high percentage (10.5%) of the total 
discrimination (see Table 8.4). 
The scores of the 41 companies on the three discriminant functions 
were computed and the results plotted (Figure 8.3) on the two dimensional 
space of functions I and II (which account for about 90% of 
discrimination). The centroid and the boundaries which encircle most of 
the cases of each group are also shown in this figure. It is noticed that 
group 1 (market price methods) and group 3 (negotiation-methods) have the 
closest group centroids and the largest amount of overlap. This is an 
indication of, the similarity between the objectives and other 
considerations required from a transfer pricing system based on either 
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Table 8.2 Standardized Discriminant Function Coefficients 
for Domestic Market 
Determinant Function 1 Function 2 Function 3 
01 . 49187 . 38449 . 12850 
'02 -. 52349 . 01891 -. 13443 
03 -. 44257 . 24254 . 12714 
04 -. 49535 . 20434 -. 38969 
05 . 17501 -. 49729 -. 77065 
06 . 28769 -1.29093 . 55525 
07 -. 28216 -. 29228 . 19656 
08 -. 24692 -. 04037 . 31366 
09 . 04549 . 61981 . 05457 
10 1.11933 . 67079 - . 37528 
11 . 17144 . 02146 . 28178 
12 
-. 
59608 -. 08942 -. 51693 
Table 8.3 Unstandardized Discriminant Function Coefficients for Domestic Market 
Determinant Function 1 Function 2 
Function 3 
01 . 255878 . 200018 . 668490E-01 
02 -. 274422 E-02 01 - f 
-: 
274685 . 143301 1 0 
_. 
7 
087E 
05 . 948790E-01 -. 269596 -. 417795 
06 . 152899 . 686099 . 295101 
07 - . 152805 -. 158282 . 106447 
08 _ . 164256 -. 268584E-01 . 208653 
09 . 284793E-01 . 388046 . 341639E-01 
10 . 797092 . 477682 . 267240 
11 
_. 810706E-01 . 101479E-01 . 133247 
12 . 298497 _. 447761E-01 . 258859 
Constant 1.05458 -. 112278 . 944342 
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market price or negotiation in the domestic market. It should also be 
mentioned that this observation confirms the view expressed in the 
literature that similar objectives may be achieved by using market price 
or negotiation. For example, Ronen and McKinney (1970, (17)) suggested 
using market price to achieve divisional autonomy whilst Dean (1955, 
(18)) proposed negotiation (see Chapters 2 and 3). 
The discriminant analysis sub-program in SPSS runs a test on the 
adequacy of the discriminant functions. The cases used in the analysis 
are classified using their discriminant scores and this classification is 
compared with the actual classification. The classification information 
table, Table 8.5, for the 41 companies mainly shows for each company 
(case) its discriminant scores, the predicted group and the actual group. 
Misclassified companies are identified by three asterisks. Out of the 
fourteen misclassified companies, six companies were confused between 
group 1 (market price methods) and group 3 (negotiation methods). Five 
companies were confused between group 1 and group 2 (cost methods), and 
two companies confused between group 3 and group 4 (other methods). The 
least confusion occurred between groups 2 and 3. It is also interesting 
to note that if the second highest group membership is used for the 
misclassified cases instead of the first highest group membership the 
number of the misclassified companies reduces from fourteen to only four 
cases. Thus, misclassification is most likely to occur in group 1 and 
group 3 and the confusion between the groups could be drastically reduced 
if groups land 3 were combined together. 
A summary of the results of the classification of the 41 companies 
using their discriminant scores is given in Table 8.6. The results show a 
lower percentage of correct classification for group 1 and 3,56.3% and 
54.5% respectively. Groups 2 and 4 have a higher percentage of correct 
classification, 81.8% and 100% respectively. Misclassification may be due 
to one or a combination of the following reasons: 
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a) The scores on the chosen determinants do not carry adequate 
discriminating information, i. e. the distinction cannot be 
made among the groups or some of them on the basis of the 
determinants' scores. 
b) Inaccuracy in the original score data possibly, due to 
misunderstanding by a respondent of the meanings of some of 
the determinants or due to unconsidered replies. 
c) The relationship between the transfer pricing method and the 
transfer pricing determinants in some companies differs from 
that prevailing in the majority. 
To examine whether the calculated determinant scores when used in 
the obtained discriminant functions will result in a statistically 
significant discrimination among the four groups, a comparison was made 
between the percentage of correct classifications which might happen by 
chance (Appendix D) and that produced by the discriminant scores. In 
fact, the X2 test of significance, Table 8.6, shows a X2= 36.496 
allowing Ho to be rejected at a 0.0005 leval and indicating a significant 
difference between the obtained classification and allocation by chance. 
However, X 
2 
does not tell us how strongly they differ (Nie et. al., 1975, 
(19)) and it does not explicitly illustrate the improvement gained by 
using the discriminant functions. Therefore, it is tried here to make a 
comparison between the classification by discriminant function and the 
classification by chance. The result of this comparison is given in Table 
8.7 which clearly shows that the percentages of correct classification by 
discriminant functions in each of the four groups are all higher than the 
corresponding percentage of correct classification by chance. The overall 
percentage of correct classification by the discriminant functions 
(65.9%) is more than twice that which might occur by chance (30.15%). 
These results clearly demonstrate th at discriminant analysis 
significantly improves classification over allocation by chance 
202 
indicating that the twelve transfer pricing determinants contain a high 
degree of discriminating information with respect to the four groups 
considered here. 
The above results tend to oppose the view that the lack of discrim 
inant information in the twelve transfer pricing determinants isla reason 
for misclassification. It could also be argued that misclassification due 
to inaccuracy in the collected data can be eliminated on the grounds that 
the number of misclassifications of the same respondent companies for the 
international market, as investigated later in section 8.3.2, is very 
small (one out of 33 cases). It is worth mentioning that 10 of the 14 
misclassified companies in the domestic market were included in the 33 
cases analyzed in the international market. This leads to the conclusion 
that misclassification of these companies in the domestic market is not 
due to inaccuracy of their determinants' scores but is mainly due to the 
existence of another type of relationship between transfer pricing method 
and transfer pricing determinants which is different from that followed 
by the majority of companies. Investigation of this type of relationship 
would require further analysis on a larger sample. 
Livesey (1967, (20)) reported that the relationship between 
transfer pricing method and a company's objectives has been considered 
far more in some companies than in others. Livesey did not evaluate the 
number of companies in his survey which did not recognise a clear 
relationship between transfer pricing method and objectives. Such 
evaluation, in Alexander's view (1979, (21)), would have been valuable. 
The results of the discriminant analysis obtained in this study allows a 
reasonable estimate to be made of the number of these companies and their 
percentage in the UK domestic market, namely: 14 out of a total of 41 
companies or 34.1%. In other words, about one third of the respondent 
companies in the domestic market do not follow the same relationship 
between transfer pricing method and company objectives which is adopted 
by the rest of the companies. 
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As mentioned before (section 8.2) the classification of cases can 
be made easier using a set of four classification functions instead of 
the discriminant functions, since the former are easier to compute. The 
coefficients of the classification functions for the domestic market are 
given in Table 8.8. Each classification function belongs to one group of 
the transfer price methods. The classification score of a company on any 
of the transfer price methods can be calculated as the sum of the 
products of the company's scores on the determinants times their 
corresponding classification coefficients (equation 8.2). The relevant 
transfer price basis for a company is the one which has the highest 
classification score. 
The advantage of identifying such classification functions is that 
they allow the prediction of the relevant transfer pricing methods for 
the general case, where the company has a number of unequally weighted 
objectives to be achieved by a transfer pricing system. These functions 
should, however, also be able to predict the relevant transfer pricing 
method for simple case in which all the weight is given to one objective. 
The relationship between specific objectives and transfer pricing method 
can be deduced from what has been recommended in the literature about the 
relevant transfer pricing method for the following objectives: 
Objective 
1. Overall profit of a company 
2. Maximizing divisional profits 
3. Divisional autonomy 
Relevant transfer pricing method 
- Cost (Rook, 1971, (22) 
- Market price (Cook, 1955, (23)) 
- Negotiation (Dean, 1956, (24)) 
4. Performance evaluation of 
divisions 
5. The preparation of financial 
- Market price 
(Bierman, 1959, (25)) 
- Cost 
statements 
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The behaviour of the classification functions, Table 8.8 can be 
checked against these relationships. The relevant transfer pricing 
methods can be predicted for these five cases of a single objective by 
assuming a full score of 5 given to the single objective and a nil score 
to the rest of the determinants. The results of this test are given in 
Table 8.9. 
The comparison between the transfer pricing method predicted by 
discriminant analysis and that recommended in the literature from the 
point of view of some writers for these simple cases shows a good 
agreement. The single missclassification occurs with the single objective 
of maximising divisional profit. In the latter case the predicted 
transfer pricing method is negotiation, whereas the recommended method in 
the literature being market price. 
8.3.2 Discriminating Determinants of International Transfer Pricing 
Methods 
The procedure and the presentation of the Discriminant Analysis for 
the international market are the same as described for domestic market. 
The analysis was carried out on the data of 33 companies which completed 
the sections of the questionnaire on transfer pricing method and transfer 
pricing determinants for their international operations. The score data 
of the twenty determinants of international transfer pricing were the 
input data to the discriminant analysis program. The results of the 
stepwise procedure are summarised in Table 8.10. This table presents the 
order by which the determinants were selected to enter the analysis. The 
information provided in Table 8.10 is plotted in Figure 8.4. 
Wilks' Lambda is used as described in Section 8.3.1. The 
significance of the obtained discrimination, i. e. the probability of this 
discrimination occurring by chance, at the end of each step decreased to 
a maximum at 0.001 for the first time when determinants 7,10,15,4 and 
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Table 8.10 A Summary of the Stepwise Wilks Method Applied to the Internationäl 
Transfer Pricing Determinants 
Step Determinant entering the analysis Wilks' Lambda 
No. 
No. Name Lambda signif- 
icance 
1 7 Market share of the end product . 697 . 014 
2 10 Volume of inter-division transfers . 552 . 009 
3 15 Restrictions imposed by foreign countries on 
the amount of royalty or management fees that 
can be charged against foreign subsidiaries . 414 . 003 
4 4 Performance evaluation of divisions . 323 . 002 
5 8 The relationship between transfer prices and 
the percentage ownership in the subsidiaries . 260 . 001 
6 3 Divisional autonomy . 216 . 001 
7 1 Overall profit of the company . 165 . 001 
8 16 Other restrictions imposed by foreign countries 
not included in Nos. 14 & 15 . 138 . 001 
9 13 Compliance with foreign tax and tariff 
regulations . 111 . 001 
10 17 Maintenance of adequate cash flows in foreign 
subsidiaries . 083 . 001 
11 19 Rate of inflation in foreign countries . 064 . 001 
12 6 Utilization of idle production capacity . 049 . 001 
13 14 Restrictions imposed by foreign countries on 
repatriation of profits or dividends . 041 . 001 
14 18 The need of subsidiaries in foreign countries 
to seek local funds . 033 . 001 
15 5 The preparation of financial statements . 027 . 002 
16 12 Compliance with UK non-tax regulations . 024 . 005 
17 11 Compiance with UK tax regulations . 022 . 011 
18 2 Maximizing the division profits . 020 . 026 
19 20 Risk of expropriation in foreign countries . 019 . 063 
20 9 Tax commitment . 018 . 133 
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8 were included in the analysis. This minimum level of significance 
remains the same with increasing number of determinants in the analysis 
up to the point where fourteen determinants are included. The inclusion 
of more determinants in the analysis then increases the probability of 
the discrimination occurring by chance gradually to 0.133 when all twenty 
determinants are included. 
Comparing the order of entry of transfer pricing determinants for 
domestic and international markets one can see that there are differences 
between them. For example, the order of the first five determinants as 
discriminators is 5,6,10,4,2 and 7,10,15,4,8 for domestic and 
international markets respectively. This result is not unexpected because 
the number of international transfer pricing determinants is larger than 
the number of determinants for domestic market and parallels the Factor 
Analysis results where the major factors were different in the two cases. 
The coefficients of the standardized discriminant functions 
resulting from the analysis when the twenty determinants of international 
transfer pricing are entered are given in Table 8.11. It is difficult to 
make an interpretation for the discriminant functions because the 
relationship between the determinants which are highly loaded in each 
function is not clear. Thus these discriminant functions cannot be 
designated. The coefficients of the unstandardized discriminant functions 
are presented in Table 8.12. 
Three discriminant functions were derived in the analysis; first, 
second and third functions accounting for 65.7,29.2 and 5.2% of the 
total discrimination respectively (Table 8.13). The remaining 
discriminating information in the original data, if only the first 
function is used, is 0.150. The probability of this result occurring by 
chance is 0.477. If the first and the second functions are used, the 
remaining discriminating information is 0.637 (Wilks' Lambda), with a 
probability of occurring by chance of . 959. However, the third function 
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Table 8.11 Standardized Discriminant Function Coefficients for the 
International Market 
Determinant Function 1 Function 2 Function 3 
01 . 40059 1.21191 -1.04275 
02 -. 0228 . 45826 -. 11253 
03 . 26666 -1.44080 1.17093 
04 -2.28571 . 93925 -1.19369 
05 1.18810 -. 06335 . 44888 
06 1.46095 -. 56094 . 48082 
07 -. 67210 -. 05087 1.10852 
08 -1.07949 1.17210 - ,. 
38838 
09 -. 08875 -. 12721 -. 71328 
10 2.21128 . 80753 . 43989 
11 . 04379 -. 02150 -1.48313 
12 . 88196 . 22818 . 95675 
13 -1.58669 -1.00858 1.39671 
14 -. 99163 -. 70855 -. 86410 
15 . 32677 -1.21246 . 27339 
16 1.28173. 1.27083 -. 11893 
17 . 69023 . 97226 -. 32300 
18 1.47642 -. 16825 . 02821 
19 -2.63780 -. 34151 -. 35180 
20 . 14015 . 29989 . 23745 
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Table 8.12 Unstandardized Discriminant Function Coefficients 
for the International Market 
Determinant Function 1 Function 2 Function 3 
01 
02 
03 
04 
05 
06 
07 
08 
09 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
Constant 
. 225519 
-. 438375E-01 
. 142613 
-1.16171 
. 685086 
. 806638 
-. 387916 
-. 674352 
-. 481090E-01 
1.51625 
. 190586E-01 
. 430607 
-. 721013 
-. 542524 
. 182165 
. 805767 
. 394293 
. 904117 
-1.49307 
. 863808E-01 
. 553897 
. 682259 
. 244157 
-. 770556 
. 487538 
-. 365283E-01 
-. 309711 
-. 293617E-01 
. 732204 
-. 689529E-01 
. 553714 
-. 935695E-02 
. 111404 
-. 458312 
-. 387646 
-. 673908 
. 798918 
. 555403 
-. 103034 
-. 193307 
. 184831 
-. 734958 
-. 587030 
-. 599529E-01 
. 626228 
-. 606692 
. 258833 
. 265477 
. 639803 
-. 242617 
-. 386636 
. 301627 
-. 645433 
. 467119 
. 634684 
-. 472748 
. 152407 
-. 747666E-01 
-. 184515 
. 172778E-01 
-. 199129 
. 146347 
-. 310351 
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was used in the analysis because it accounts for 5.2% of the total 
discrimination. This percentage is considered significant". 
The score. of the 33 companies on the three discriminant functions 
were calculated and the results were plotted on the two dimensional space 
of functions I and II, Figure 8.5, which account for about 95% of 
discrimination. The centroid and the boundaries which encircle each group 
are also shown in this figure. It is noticed from Figure 8.5 that none of 
the four groups overlap. 
A test of the adequacy of the discriminant functions was carried 
out by the discriminant analysis subprogram. The classification 
information table, Table 8.14 for the 33 companies. presents the results 
of this test. It can be seen that only one company was misclassified. The 
predicted group was negotiation methods whilst the actual group was the 
market price which is shown as the second highest choice. This 
misclassification between group 1 (market price methods) and group 3 
(negotiation methods) is not surprising. It confirms the results of the 
domestic run where the highest percentage of misclassification was 
between these two methods. It should be mentioned that the misclassified 
company here was one of the misclassified companies for the domestic 
market. 
A comparison of the results of the classification information 
tables for domestic and international markets, Table 8.5 and Table 8.13, 
shows that the three discriminant functions are more powerful in 
discriminating between the four transfer pricing methods for the 
international market than for the domestic market. 
A summary of the results of the classification of the 33 companies 
using their' discriminant scores is presented in Table 8.15.. The results 
show a. high percentage of correct classification (97%), 
It is clear from the above results that there is a significant 
discrimination among the four transfer price basis. A comparison between 
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the percentage of correct classifications which might happen by chance 
and that produced by the discriminant scores is given in Table 8.16. This 
table shows that the percentage of correct classification by discriminant 
functions in each of the four groups are all higher than the 
corresponding percentage of correct classification by chance. The total 
percentage of correct classifications by discriminant functions is 97%. 
This percentage is more than three times that of the correct 
classification which might occur by chance (32%). The Chi-square test of 
the classification results, Table 8.15, shows a X2 of 91.162 which is 
significant at the 0.0005 level. These results confirm that discriminant 
analysis significantly improves classification over allocation by chance. 
This also indicates that the twenty international transfer pricing 
determinants offer a high degree of discriminating information with 
regard, to the data examined here. ' 
The classification of companies according to their transfer price 
basis method can be carried out more easily, as mentioned before in 
Sections 8.2 and 8.3.1 by applying the coefficients of the classification 
functions as given in Table 8.17. The behaviour of these classification 
functions in predicting the transfer pricing method for a single 
objective, follows the same procedure given in Section 8.3.1 and is 
presented in Table 8.18. 
Comparing the results obtained with what is mentioned in the 
literature for the domestic market (Section 8.3.1) it is noticed that the 
prediction is identical only for the divisional autonomy objective. The 
reason might be the large differences among the coefficients of the 
classification functions for the international market compared with the 
domestic market. Thus, it can be argued that the classification functions 
are more appropriate for prediction in the case of multi-objectives 
rather than one single objective. 
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Table 8.16 A Comparison between the Correct Classification by Discriminant 
Function and Correct Classification by Chance for the International 
Market 
Group No. 1 2 3 4 Total 
Group size 9 14 6 4 33 
Correct No. 2.53 6.12 1.13 0.5 10.28 
classification 
by chance % "28.0 43.7 18.8 12.5 32.13 
Correct No. 8 14 64 32 
classification 
by discriminant % 88.9 100 100 100 97 
function 
Table 8.17 Classification Function Coefficients for the-.: International Markets 
Deter. Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 
01 . 57325 3.0713 . 41850 -. 12764 
02 1.6519 2.6063 1.8488 2.4656 
03 3.5685 . 16776 2.1484 1.1330 
04 -5.7166 -1.7318 . 36224E-01 4.4090 
05 3.8666 " 2.4610 . 55476 -1.6469 
06 2.2688 -. 26337 -1.4583 -4.7646 
07 . 98151 . 91869 1.4707 4.3049 
08 . -2.3726 1.3800 . 59903 4.4339 
09 -2.4088 -2.2323 -1.4904 -2.3035 
10 3.0072 2.3023 -4.0809 -8.0462 
11 -. 84638 -. 34329 . 23094 -1.2655 
'12 2.0175 1.3271 -. 65956 -1.0664 
13 1.0730 . 61197E-01 3.1277 6.2413 
14 -1.2488 -1.3254 2.0119 2.1926 
15 2.2778 -. 44599 1.5029 -. 47170 
16 -. 11213 1.4437 -3.6521 -5.0795 
17 1.2271 2.6799 -. 30376 -. 93540 
18 2.7084' . 94964 -1.0618 -4.8000 
19 -5.0675 -3.2562 1.6025 6.5491 
20 1.5808 1.9516 . 88745 1.3030 
Constant-12.720 -13.434 -14.061 -31.188 
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8.4 Testing the Classification Functions 
The need for the discriminant functions to better distinguish 
between the four groups of transfer. pricing methods can be demonstrated 
by the use of Cluster Analysis. The latter analysis offers a number of 
techniques for sorting individual cases into groups (clusters) which are 
similar. Hierarchical clustering using Ward's method with as Euclidean 
distance measure is one of the most popular clustering techniques 
(Everitt, 1974, (26)). This technique begins with the assumption that all 
cases are separate clusters. The two clusters that are most alike are 
then combined to form one cluster reducing the total number of clusters 
by one. The clusters are then compared to find the next most alike pair, 
then, these are combined in one cluster reducing the total number of 
cluster again by one. This sequence is repeated until all original 
clusters have been combined into one. The criterion for combining two 
clusters used in Ward's method is that two clusters may be joined to form 
a new cluster when the error sum of squares from the centroid of the new 
cluster to all the cases in this cluster is lower than if any other 
coupling is made. Such an analysis can be carried out using the Clustan 
Package (Wishart, 1978, (27)). 
Saunders (1980, (28)) has used Discriminant Analysis to test the 
quality of cluster analysis results. The objective of using cluster 
analysis in this study is the reverse, i. e. to illustrate to what extent 
the discriminant functions, as produced from the Discriminant Analysis, 
improves the ability to discriminate between the four groups of transfer 
pricing methods. mother words, Cluster Analysis is used here to show 
the need for and the effectiveness of Discriminant Analysis. The 
procedure involved the'following steps: 
a) Run a cluster analysis of all companies using their raw scores 
on the transfer pricing determinants (12 determinants for the 
domestic market and 20 determinants for the international 
market. 
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b) At the 4 cluster level find the frequency of each transfer 
pricing method in each cluster. 
c) Apply cluster analysis to all companies using their scores on 
the discriminant functions (3 functions). 
d) At the 4 cluster level find the freqency of each transfer 
pricing method in each cluster. 
e) Compare the frequencies obtained in steps b and d. 
The above procedure was carried out on both domestic and the 
international data. An attempt was made to apply cluster analysis using 
the factor scores of the transfer pricing determinants for the 
international market. The result was worse than using the raw scores, 
therefore this trial was not carried out for the domestic market. 
Two dendograms for each market were produced (Figures 8.6 and 8.7 
for the domestic market, and Figures 8.8 and 8.9 for the international 
market), one based on raw scores and the others on discriminant scores. 
The frequencies of transfer pricing methods in each cluster are 
summarised in Table 8.19, for raw scores and discriminant scores in both 
domestic and international markets. These frequencies show that companies 
using identical transfer' pricing methods are more concentrated in 
separate clusters in the discriminant score solution than in the raw 
score solution. The concentration is more pronounced in the results of 
the international market, reflecting the more effective classification 
for this market than for the domestic market. 
The contrast between the cluster solution based on discriminant 
scores and that based on raw scores can be made clearer by considering 
only the companies which were correctly classified by the discriminant 
analysis. The frequencies of these companies in each cluster are also 
given in Table 8.19 and plotted in Figure 8.10 for the domestic market 
and Figure 8.11 for the international market. It can be seen that for 
either the domestic or the international markets cluster analysis based 
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Table 8.19 A Summary of Cluster Analysis Results for both the Domestic and 
International Markets 
k t M Transfer 
Frequency 
ar e 
c ompanies Pricing Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 
Cluster 4 
Method Raw Discr. Raw Discr. Raw Discr. Raw Discr. 
Score Score Score Score Score Score Score -. Score 
Domesti 41 Market 
price 6 9 1 1 7 5 2 1 
Cost 2 0 2 0 4 7 3 5 
Negotiated 1 2 0 2 5 6 5 0 
Other 0 0 1 3 2 0 0 0 
27* Market 
price 4 7 0 0 4 2 1 
0 
Cost 2 0 2 0 3 5 2 5 
Negotiated 0 0 0 0 2 5 4 0 
Other 0 0 1 3 2 0 0 0 
Inter- 33 Market 
national price 0 0 1 0 5 1 3 
8 
Cost 3 0 3 14 5 0 3 0 
Negotiated 0 0 1 0 2 6 3 0 
Other 3 3 0 0 1 1 0 0 
32* Market 
price 0 0 1 0 5 0 3 8 
Cost 3 0 3 14 5 0 3 0 
Negotiated 0 0 1 0 2 6 3 0 
Other 3 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 
* No. of companies excluding the misclassified companies for both the raw- 
scores and the discriminant scores. 
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on the discriminant scores when compared with that based on raw scores, 
has produced clusters each of which mcstly contain companies using one 
identical transfer pricing method. This indicates the effectiveness of 
the discriminant analysis in revealing the differences among the four 
groups of transfer pricing methods. The results also show that there is 
no obvious simpler way to make the discrimination. 
8.5 Classification Functions for Prediction of Transfer Pricing Methods 
In order to assign new companies to one of the four groups of the 
transfer pricing methods, i. e. for prediction purposes, the number of 
determinants should be reduced to obtain discriminant functions that give 
better prediction. In other words, the reduction of the number of 
determinants would lead to an effective assignment rule (that is, one 
with a low error rate in prediction). The reason behind this reduction is 
that the size of the sample is small, the number of the determinants is 
large, and therefore the number of degrees of freedom is relatively 
small. The reduction can be achieved by considering the determinants 
which only significantly add to the differentiation among the groups 
(Lachenbruch, 1975, (29)). 
Referring to Figure 8.2, which shows the change in Wilks' Lambda 
and its significance level with the number of steps in the stepwise 
discriminant analysis of the domestic data, it can be seen that the first 
five determinants entered produce the most significant discrimination. 
Addition of determinants, although increasing the discrimination among 
the groups, also increases the probability of this discrimination 
occurring by chance. Therefore, it was decided to use only these first 
five- determinants in deriving the simplified classification. Similarly 
for the international market data, Figure 8.4 shows that the first 14 
determinants produced the highest discrimination. However, this number of 
determinants is still high and it was decided to choose the first 10 
determinants (half the total number) because these ten determinants 
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produce discrimination only slightly less than that of the fourteen 
determinants without reduction in the significance level. 
The coefficients of the classification functions based on the 
reduced number of determinants are given in Table 8.20 and 8.21 for the 
domestic and the international market respectively. The percentage of 
correct classifications of the respondent companies on the basis of the 
reduced number of determinants are compared with each of the percentage 
of correct classifications based on the full number of determinants and 
that occurring by chance as shown in Table 8.22. 
It is clear that reducing the number of determinants has decreased 
the percentage of correct classifications from 65.9 to 53.7 and from 97.0 
to 84.8 for the domestic and the international markets respectively. 
However, the percentage of correct classification using the reduced 
number of determinates is still highly statistically significant. Bearing 
in mind that this function is intended for prediction its performance on 
classification is not very relevant. 
In order to assess the performance of the simplified classification 
functions in predicting future cases. 'The leaving-one-out method' 
originally proposed by Lachenbruch (1975, (30)) was used. A brief 
description of the method and its results when applied to the data of 
each of the domestic and international markets are given in the next 
section. 
8.6 Performance Test of the Prediction Functions 
This section is devoted to a test of performance of the reduced 
classification functions in predicting the relevant transfer price basis 
hitherto unexamined cases. The test is 'The leaving-one-out method" 
referred to above. The procedure of the test as carried out in this study 
is as follows: 
a) A number corresponding to about one-third of the respondent 
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Table 8.20 Classification Function Coefficients for Prediction 
with Five Determinants of Domestic Transfer Pricing 
Determinant Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 
02 . 77730 . 45069 1.0836 . 
94307 
04 . 76926 . 17039 . 93924 . 
85204 
05 . 65330 . 82727 . 26802 
1.0911 
06 -. 28453 . 57386 -. 62884E-01 . 78853 
10 . 83628E-01 . 20689E-01 -. 65584 -1.6136 
Constant -3.1739 -2.7720 -3.3850 -6.3415 
Name of Determinants 
02 Maximizing divisional profits 
04 Performance evaluation of divisions 
05 The preparation of financial statements 
06 Utilization of idle production capacity. 
10 Volume of inter-divisional transfers. 
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Table 8.21 Classification Function Coefficients for Prediction with Ten 
Determinants of International Transfer Pricing 
Determinant Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 
01 -. 12761 1.8246 . 69177 1.6266 
03 2.3038 . 16751 2.1016 . 55795 
04 -1.0155 . 31484 -. 82672 1.4053 
07 . 86535 . 46902 1.2460: 1.6931 
08 -1.3226 1.0756 -. 33300 1.5295 
10 -. 28335 . 24081 -1.6474 -3.1944 
13 1.1076 . 10421 1.5123 1.7538 
15 1.1266 -. 93199 1.9173 . 13120 
16 -. 92926 . 81612 -1.1824 -1.0327 
17 . 87842 1.5197 . 21607 -. 34585 
Constant -6.2982 -7.4114 -9.4128 -14.860 
Name of Determinants 
1 Overall profit of the company 
3 Divisional autonomy 
4 Performance evaluation of divisions 
7 Market share of the end product 
8 The relationship between transfer prices and the percentage 
ownership in the subsidiaries. 
10 Volume of inter-divisional transfers. 
13 Compliance with foreign tax and tariff regulations. 
15 Restrictions imposed by foreign countries on the amount of 
royalty or management fees that can be charged against foreign 
subsidiaries. 
16 Other restrictions imposed by foreign countries not included 
elsewhere 
17 Maintenance bf adequate cash flows in foreign subsidiaries. 
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companies (15 companies for the domestic and 10 for the 
international) was randomly selected. 
b) Several discriminant analyses were carried out in each of 
which of the selected companies was omitted from the data, and 
the discriminant analysis was carried out using the remaining 
data. 
c) The classification functions obtained from each analysis were 
used to predict the transfer pricing method of the company 
omitted from the analysis (using equation 8.2). The predicted 
transfer pricing based method was then compared with the 
actual one. 
d) This was repeated for all the selected companies and the 
number of misclassifications noted. 
The percentage of misclassifications gives an almost unbiased 
estimate (Lachenbruch, 1975, (31)) of the expected performance of the 
classification functions predicting future cases. 
The results of this test are given in Table 8.23 and Table 8.24 for 
the domestic and. international data respectively. Five cases were 
misclassified from the 15 cases tested in the domestic market giving 
33.3% misclassification. Accordingly the estimated percentage of correct 
classification is 66.7%. Using the well known formula for the variance of 
the binomial distribution at a confidence level of 95%, the CI 
(confidence interval) is 42.4% to 91% correct classification. For the 
international market, only two companies were misclassified. This means 
that the best estimate of the percentage of correct classification is 80% 
and the corresponding 95% CI is 54.7 to 100%. It should be mentioned that 
with each test carried out, the change in each of the discriminant 
functions and the classification functions was very small. This is 
considered'an indicator of the stability of the discriminant functions 
and hence of their ability to perform 'effectively in practice. 
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The above results suggest that the reduced classification functions 
for both domestic and international markets are capable of predicting the 
transfer pricing methods of companies with an acceptable degree of 
success. The lowest estimate of the percentage of correct classifiaction 
is that for the lowest point of the confidence interval for the domestic 
case, i. e. 42.4%. This figure would be considered very satisfactory in 
many applications of Discriminant Analysis. 
8.7 The External Market and the Prediction Functions 
The analysis has been carried out so far in this chapter on the 
data collected without taking into account if an outside market of the 
transferred product exists or not. To investigate the impact of this 
environmental determinant on the results obtained here, a letter (see 
Appendix A) was sent to the respondents to ask: Does an outside market 
exist for the transferred product? The answers indicated that there are 
external markets for the transfers of all companies, except one in each 
of the international and the domestic markets. Therefore it appears that 
companies use cost-based transfer prices in spite of the existence of 
market prices for the internal trade. This suggests that the existence of 
an external market for the companies who participated in this study does 
not affect the derived relationship between transfer pricing methods and 
transfer pricing determinants, i. e. the derived prediction functions. 
8.8 Summary and Conclusions 
An attempt was made to discriminate among the four groups of 
transfer pricing methods namely: market price, cost, negotiation and 
other methods. Knowing to which group the transfer pricing method used by 
each company belonged discriminant analysis enabled the production of 
three discriminant functions (axes) along which the four groups of 
transfer pricing method significantly differ. Four classification 
functions were, derived which were used for the purpose of predicting the 
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transfer pricing method appropriate for a set of weighted determinants of 
transfer pricing of a company. 
The effectiveness and the adequacy of the discriminant functions, 
the classification functions, and the prediction functions were tested by 
the use of cluster analysis, by the statistical significance of correct 
classification of the respondent companies, and by the 'Leaving-one-out 
method'. 
The results of the work leads to the following conclusions: 
1. Discriminant analysis has indicated that the collected scores 
on transfer pricing determinants carry a high degree of 
discriminating power among transfer pricing methods. The 
obtained discrimination was statistically significant for both 
the domestic and international markets. 
2. Discrimination among the transfer pricing methods is 
non-trivial. The derived discriminant functions significantly 
improve the correct classifications of the companies surveyed 
over that which might be achieved by chance or indeed by using 
other classification techniques such as Cluster Analysis. The 
results of Cluster Analysis strongly suggest that there is no 
simpler method of attaining comparable discrimination. 
3. The relationship between transfer pricing method and transfer 
pricing objectives has been observed and reported in the 
literature but it has never been quantitativer evaluated. In 
this study, a measure of this relationship was produced in 
the form of a set of classification functions based on 
discriminant analysis of the data collected in the empirical 
study, and it was found to accord with the literature. 
4. The derived prediction functions (simplified classification 
functions) for the domestic and international markets are able 
to predict the appropriate transfer pricing method with an 
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acceptable degree of success. This prediction can be made for 
a company which is to establish a new transfer pricing system. 
It can equally be used for evaluating the current transfer 
pricing method of a company. These prediction functions will 
be most useful for selecting the relevant transfer pricing 
method in the cases where a company considers several 
determinants important. 
5. A similar approach could be used in future to implement the 
classification between the individual transfer pricing method 
rather than the four groups of transfer pricing methods. This 
will require a considerably larger size of sample. 
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CHAPTER 9 
An Evaluation of the Results in Practice 
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9.1 Introduction 
Interviews were carried out with three of the companies 
participating in this empirical study. The aim of the interviews was to 
evaluate the results of both Factor Analysis, and Discriminant Analysis 
in practice. This chapter, first, gives a general background of the three 
companies interviewed. The comments of the companies on the Factor 
Analysis' results and the Discriminant Analysis' results are presented 
for both domestic and international markets separately. 
9.2 General Background 
To preserve confidentiality the three companies in which interviews 
were conducted will be referred to as X, Y, and Z. The interviews were 
carried out with the company secretary and group controller of company X, 
the finance director of company Y, and the corporate planning director of 
company Z. They were the persons who had previously filled in the 
questionnaires. 
Company X is a subsidiary of one of the top 1000 companies in the UK 
and has five divisions operating in the domestic market and three 
divisions operating in the international market. This company provided 
information only for the domestic market. It operates in several 
industries in the engineering field. 
Company Y is one of the top 1000 companies in the UK and has fifty 
divisions operating in the domestic market and one hundred divisions 
operating in the international market. It is involved in the Rubber, 
Plastics, and Engineering industries. The annual turnover of company Y is 
about £125 million and the number of employees is 7000. 
Company Z is also one of the top 1000 companies in the UK and is in 
the Textile industry. It has six divisions operating in the domestic 
market and seven divisions operating in the international market. The 
annual turnover of this company is about £125 million and it also employs 
about 7000 people. 
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The companies interviewed represent different types of structure. 
Company X is horizontally integrated, internal trade being between 
manufacturing divisions and distribution divisions. Company Y is a 
conglomerate, in which thirty out of the total of 150 divisions trade 
with each other. Company Z is vertically integrated. 
9.3 Factor Analysis Results 
The following results were presented to the companies interviewed. 
1- The four factors derived for domestic transfer pricing and the 
six factors derived for international transfer pricing. 
2- The suggested assignment of determinants to each factor as 
shown in Chapter 7, Tables 7.22 and 7.23. 
3- Two rankings of the importance of the four factors for domestic 
transfer pricing and the six factors for international transfer 
pricing. The first ranking was the average order of importance 
as determined from all the companies participating in the 
study, as in Table 7.19 Chapter 7. The second ranking was the 
order of importance of the factors as calculated from the 
scores given to the transfer pricing determinants by the 
company concerned. 
Two main questions were then asked: 
1- Are there any transfer pricing factors (for either domestic or 
international markets) which come to mind other than those 
derived? 
2- What is the order of importance of the discovered factors from 
your company's point of view?. 
The aim of the first question was to establish -d if the derived 
factors are comprehensive. The second question was to compare the results 
obtained from the statistical analysis with views concerning the relative 
importance of the factors. 
On the first question, all the companies agreed that the discovered 
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factors were comprehensive and were not able to suggest any other 
factors. On the second question, the answers differed. 
Table 9.1 presents a summary of the order of importance of the four 
factors of domestic transfer pricing. Table 9.2 indicates the order of 
importance given to the six factors of international transfer pricing. 
9.3.1 Results for Domestic Transfers 
For the domestic transfers, Table 9.1 illustrates that' company X's 
practical viewpoint accords with the calculated order of importance. The 
point of view of company Y matches more closely the average calculated 
for all the companies surveyed rather than its own ranking. The last 
company Z, agrees with the order of importance of both the first and 
second factors calculated from its corresponding determinant scores. The 
order of importance calculated for the third and the fourth factors are 
in reverse order compared with the view expressed. Company Y indicates 
that the Integration Benefits Factor is more important than the 
Governmental Regulations, possibly because of the vertically integrated 
structure of the company. 
9.3.2 Results for International Transfers 
For the six factors of the international transfers, Table 9.2 shows 
that company Y disagrees with the order of the calculated ranking of the 
first 3 factors, and agrees with the calculated order of importance of 
the last 3 factors. Company Z's practical viewpoint accords with its 
calculated order of importance. 
The above results support the view that the discovered factors for 
both the domestic and the international transfers are comprehensive. None 
of the companies interviewed suggested any other factors. All companies 
agreed that in selecting their transfer pricing methods they give more 
attention to the order of importance of specific determinants rather than 
the order of importance of broader factors. These practical views support 
the use of Discriminant Analysis to predict the transfer pricing method 
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Table 9.1: A Summary of the Order of Importance of the Four Domestic Factors 
According to the Companies Interviewed. 
Individual Rankings of Each Company 
Overall XYZ Factors 
Rankings CVCVCV 
1 Decentralization 11 2 1 1 1 
2 Financial Reporting 33 3 2 3 3 
3 Governmental Regulations 44 1 3 2 4 
4 Integration Benefits 22 4 4 4 2 
C= calculated V= view expressed 
Table 9.2: A Summary of the Order of Imnortance of the Six International Factors 
According to the Companies Interviewed. 
Overall 
Rankings 
Factors 
Individual 
Company Y 
CV 
Rankings 
Company Z 
CV 
1 Governmental Regulations 14 4 4 
2 Decentralization 21 1 1 
3 Financial Reporting 42 2 2 
4 Ownership Ratio Effects 55 3 3 
5 Foreign Cash Transfer Restrictions 33 6 
=5 
6 Foreign Subsidiaries Funds Requirements 66 5 
C= calculated V= view expressed 
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based on the transfer pricing determinants rather than the transfer 
pricing factors. 
The results of the interviews also sustain the suggested idea of 
using the results of Factor Analysis to calculate the order of importance 
of the factors in terms of the scores given to the determinants. The 
order of importance of the transfer pricing factors is calculated by the 
use of the factor score coefficient matrix (Factor-estimate matrix), as 
detailed in Chapter 7, section 7.3.3. 
9.4 Discriminant Analysis Results 
The results of the Discriminant Analysis were briefly explained to 
the managers interviewed. The way the classification functions (given in 
Chapter 8, Table 8.18 for domestic transfers, and Table 8.19 for 
international transfers) can be used to predict the relevant transfer 
price method was demonstrated using a programmable calculator. The 
results of the prediction of the transfer pricing method according to the 
scores given to the transfer pricing determinants by each of the 
companies were presented individually to each of the managers (see Table 
9.3) who were then asked the following questions: 
1- What are your views regarding the practicability of the 
results? Is it useful for a company to be able to determine its 
transfer pricing policy by the use of a predictive method? 
2- Do you think an extension of this method to predict the 
individual transfer pricing method would be useful? 
3- Why, in your view, was the method not 100% successful in 
prediction? Is the range of determinants insufficient or are 
some inappropriate? 
On the first and the second questions all the managers agreed that 
the prediction of the basis of transfer prices or the individual method 
would be of practical use, particularly for setting new transfer pricing 
systems. Company X (subsidiary) stated that this device would be 
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specially helpful for the parent company which sees the transfer pricing 
as one of the main policies used to achieve the company's overall 
objectives. Company Y's viewpoint was that this approach is very useful 
for a company setting its transfer prices for the first time, and that 
small companies can benefit from some guidance in selecting the relevant 
method. The answer of the company Z is quoted below: 
"As a technique for analysing a company's objectives to indicate a 
potential transfer pricing method with somebody setting it off from 
the first approach I would say that it is an interesting new 
contribution and I think it would be of benefit in that context. 
Assuming that we had just bought a company or dividing the operation 
for the first time as a stimulus for setting the back-drop it is one 
that has not been exposed to me before. I think it would be 
interesting as such and I think it would make a contribution in this 
context. " 
On the third question, all companies confirmed the existence of the 
relationship between transfer pricing method and the determinants of 
transfer pricing. Two of them Y and Z feel that the relation is so 
complex and that more determinants could be added, such as the level of 
technological dependence between divisions in the vertically integrated 
structures, and the rates of currency exchange for international 
transfers. 
An interesting point arose from the interview with company Z. The 
predicted basis of transfer prices of this company falls into the 
'others' category which includes linear programming whereas the actual 
method used is market price. The company admitted that, five years ago, 
it thought seriously of using mathematical programming in determining 
transfer prices. It gave up the idea because of the complexity of its 
production process, the variety of the products, and the difficulty in 
tracing the quantities of intermediate products in the final products. 
Company X saw that the difference between its predicted basis of 
transfer prices, cost, and its actual basis, market price, might be due 
to one or more of the following reasons: 
a-. autonomy and measurement of divisional performance are the 
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dominant determinants in selecting the actual transfer pricing 
method. 
b- the volume of internal trade is small, only 2% of the annual 
turnover. 
c- The existence of a perfectly competitive market for the 
transferred products. 
The above comments of the practitioners as to the Discriminant 
Analysis results shows. that the approach suggested would be helpful as a 
guidance in selecting the relevant transfer pricing method in practice. 
9.5 Final Remarks 
The information relating to the transfer pricing objectives, 
conditions and methods of each of companies X, Y and Z were compared with 
those mentioned in the literature, Chapter 3. It was found that both 
companies X and Y are using the transfer pricing method recommended in 
the literature. 
For company Z both the literature and the discriminant analysis 
indicate that mathematical based transfer prices is appropriate. However 
this company is applying market based transfer prices. The company has 
explained this difference by the unique nature of the operation of the 
company. The production of this company is characterized by a high degree 
of inter-changeability between the various products (20-30 products). 
Also, the divisions face different degrees of external market forces, 
some in high demand and others in low demand. The company tries to use a 
policy that covers. all these situations. It did not claim that the method 
in use is perfect and mentioned that experience has shown that there is 
always a difference between what the company is using and what it would 
like to use. 
It was noticed from the discussions carried out with the managers 
interviewed that they are keeping pace with the transfer pricing 
literature and they are willing to benefit from it. This is supported by 
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the request of company Y to receive a copy of the results of the current 
study. It also stated that it will distribute these results to its 
divisional managers in domestic and international markets. 
CHAPTER 10 
Summary, Conclusions, and Further Research 
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10.1 Summary 
This study has examined the determinants of transfer pricing with 
the prime purpose of discovering the interrelationships among the 
determinants themselves and between them and the transfer pricing method 
used. The determinants include transfer pricing objectives and environ- 
mental issues. The identification of interrelationships among the 
transfer pricing determinants allows them to be reduced to their 
underlying factors and the evaluation of the relationship between the 
determinants and transfer pricing methods enables prediction of the 
latter according to the company's perception of the relative importance 
of the determinants. The investigation of domestic and international 
transfer pricing determinants permits a comparison to be made between the 
two markets and between UK practice and that reported in the US. 
The review of the literature of transfer pricing showed that 
extensive work has been done on both the theoretical and empirical 
aspects of the subject. The literature, in general, describes a large 
number of transfer pricing methods and an equally large number of 
transfer pricing determinants. Literature of a theoretical nature 
(Chapter 2 and Chapter 3) is mainly concerned with suggesting transfer 
pricing methods, appropriate for different objectives and conditions, 
which are based on economic, mathematical, accounting, and behavioural 
approaches. 
Reported empirical studies (Chapter 4) have mainly aimed at 
reporting the extent to which particular transfer pricing methods are 
used in practice, and the importance of the different transfer pricing 
determinants. A few empirical studies used simple statistical techniques 
to test certain hypotheses concerning methods or determinants. Apart from 
a few isolated comments on international transfers in three studies, the 
UK surveys have concentrated on domestic transfers. 
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The review of the literature indicates that a full investigation of 
the relationship between the determinants of transfer pricing and 
transfer pricing method is required as well as the interrelationships 
among the determinants themselves. It was decided to add to these 
investigations through an empirical study in UK companies for both 
domestic and international markets. The aim was to contribute to the 
understanding of transfer pricing practice and to develop a means by 
which transfer pricing methods may be selected in the case of multiple 
objectives. 
The survey undertaken in this study approached 250 UK companies 
(including multi-national companies) by postal questionnaires, and 
forty-six companies responded positively. The questionnaire was designed 
to obtain separate data about domestic and international transfers to 
allow comparison to be made. Interviews were also carried out at the end 
of the research to investigate the practicality of the results obtained. 
The analyses carried out in this study on the collected data 
involved different statistical techniques namely: Kendall's correlation 
coefficient, Factor Analysis and Discriminant Analysis. Recent use of the 
last two techniques in the field of management, and the behavioural 
sciences has demonstrated their power and capabilities. The application 
of these two latter techniques to the empirical data of this study is 
believed to be the first in the area of transfer pricing. 
10.2 Conclusions 
The analyses carried out on the data collected in this study suggest 
several distinct conclusions. 
10.2.1 Conclusions Related to the Current State of Transfer 
Pricing Practice 
The results of the primary analysis in Chapter 5 lead to the following 
conclusions: 
1- The role of management in setting and reviewing transfer pricing 
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is similar in both domestic and international transfers, but 
the involvement of UK corporate management in international 
transfer pricing is higher than in domestic transfer pricing. 
In relation to the setting of international transfer prices the 
proportions are lower than in US companies and Japanese 
companies. The results also show a wide range of review periods 
in both domestic and international transfers. 
2- Current market price is the most popular pricing method for 
domestic transfers while full manufacturing cost plus is the 
most common one for international transfers. The data showed 
that in the companies studied, market-based transfer prices are 
more likely to be encountered in domestic markets and that 
cost-based transfer prices are used more in international 
markets. However, this observed difference in the frequency of 
use of transfer pricing methods between domestic and intern- 
ational markets is not statistically significant. 
3- A comparative analysis between the findings of this study and 
other earlier surveys in UK restricted to domestic transfer 
pricing methods shows that there are considerable differences 
between the different studies (see Chapter 5, Table 5.6). The 
percentage of companies using transfer pricing methods based 
respectively on cost, market price, and negotiation varies 
between 3 and 72%; 0 and 85%; 0 and 28%. 
4- For the doihestic market, the results of all surveys including 
the present study show that the most common basis of transfer 
prices (46.9%) is cost, followed by market prices (41.3%) and 
much less frequently by negotiation (9.8%). 
5- The results also show that the UK companies surveyed are less 
inclined to use cost-based transfer prices than US and Japanese 
companies. 
6- The use of mathematical programming to determine transfer 
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prices is still restricted to a small proportion of companies. 
7- There appear to be five problems which are common to both 
domestic and international transfer pricing namely: 
a) the difficulty of acquiring information about true market 
price 
b) risk of the loss of market share of the end product 
c) difficulty in determining the true profitability of each 
division and the company as a whole 
d) lack of incentive to reduce cost 
e) the difficulty of establishing a fair base for negotiation 
There are two further problems which are confined to international 
transfer pricing namely: 
a) conflict between UK and foreign tax requirements 
b) conflict between the interest of the divisions and local 
shareholders and that of the company as a whole 
10.2.2 Conclusions as to the Order of Importance of Transfer Pricing 
Determinants 
The analysis carried out in Chapter 6 leads to the following 
results: 
1- The ranking of the main determinants of domestic transfer 
pricing policy in UK companies confirmed expectations based on 
the literature, although differences with reported practice in 
the US were noted. It seems that US companies give more 
attention to meeting governmental requirements whereas UK 
companies give priority to managerial objectives. The findings 
showed that there are five determinants on whose importance 
most: respondents agree for the domestic market namely: 
divisional 'autonomy, performance evaluation of divisions, 
maximizing divisional profit, overall profit of the company, 
and the preparation of financial statements. 
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2- In contrast with the domestic market, a much wider range of 
determinants is important in the determination of transfer 
prices in the international market. In the latter case the 
determinants involving compliance with foreign tax and tariff 
regulations receive as much attention as the five determinants 
described in the literature and referred to above. 
3- No statistically significant difference between the overall 
ranking of the determinants of transfer pricing in domestic and 
international markets was found. This suggests that type of 
market (domestic or international) does not affect the order of 
importance of transfer determinants in UK companies. These 
results contrast with US results reported. 
4- No evidence was found that the order of importance of the 
transfer pricing determinants varies from one industry to 
another in either domestic or international market. Similar 
results have been obtained in studies of US companies. 
5- No statistically significant difference was found in the order 
of importance of transfer pricing determinants for either 
domestic or international markets according to the transfer 
pricing method used. Thus, distinctions among companies which 
use different transfer pricing methods cannot be made on the 
basis of the order of importance of the transfer pricing 
determinants. In other words the Kendall correlation test was 
not able to discover the expected relationship between transfer 
pricing determinants and transfer pricing methods. 
6- The above conclusion suggests that simple statistical tests 
might in some cases fail to support hypothezised relationship 
between variables. In addition, these simple statistical tests 
might prove or disprove a relationship but certainly they 
cannot be used to quantify a relationship if it exists. The 
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identification and evaluation of these complex relationships 
seemingly requires the use of more advanced statistical 
techniques such as Discriminant Analysis. 
10.2.3 Conclusions Relating to the Factors Underlying the Determinants 
of Transfer Pricing 
In Chapter 7, Factor Analysis was applied to the score data given to 
the 12 and 20 determinants of domestic and international transfers res- 
pectively in order to reduce the determinants to the underlying and 
fundamental factors. The following are the results obtained from this 
analysis: 
1- Initial investigation of each of the domestic and international 
transfer pricing determinants showed that there are correlations 
between these determinants and a set of factors. The discovered 
factors are named on the basis of the common features of the 
determinants which are highly correlated with each factor. Four 
factors were discovered for the domestic market. These factors and 
the determinants which are highly loaded on them are given below: 
I-Governmental Regulations 
Related determinants: 1-Compliance with UK tax regulations. 
2-Compliance with UK non-tax regulations. 
II-Integration Benefits 
Related determinants: 1-Utilization of idle production capacity. 
2-Volume of inter-divisional transfers. 
3-Percentage ownership in the subsidiaries. 
4-Tax commitment. 
III-Financial Reporting 
Related determinant: The preparation of financial statements. 
IV-Decentralization 
Related determinants: 1-Overall profit of the company. 
2-Divisional autonomy. 
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Six factors were discovered for the international market; the 
factors and their highly loaded determinants are as follows: 
I-Foreign Subsidiaries Funds Requirements 
Related determinants: 1-Maintenance of adequate cash flows in 
foreign subsidiaries. 
2-The need of subsidiaries in foreign ccun- 
tries to seek local funds. 
3-Rate of inflation in foreign countries. 
II-Governmental Regulations 
Related determinants: 1-Compliance with UK tax regulations. 
2-Compliance with UK non-tax regulations. 
3-Compliance with foreign tax and tariff 
regulations. 
III-Decentralization 
Related determinants: 1-Maximizing divisional profit. 
2-Divisional autonomy. 
IV-Financial Reporting 
Related determinants: 1-The preparation of financial statements. 
2-Performance evaluation of divisions. 
3-Overall profits of the company. 
4-Market share of end product. 
V-Foreign Cash Transfer Restrictions 
Related determinants: 1-Restrictions imposed by foreign countries 
on repatriation of profits or dividends. 
2-Restrictions imposed by foreign countries on 
the amount of royalty or management fees that 
can be charged against foreign subsidiaries. 
3-Other restrictions imposed by foreign coun- 
tries not included in the above two deter- 
minants 
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VI-Ownership Ratio Effects 
Related determinant: Percentage ownership in the subsidiaries. 
2- In addition to the reduction and interpretive properties of 
Factor Analysis, this study made use of the results to obtain 
measures of how well the different discovered factors differentiated 
between companies and their importance. The procedures for doing 
this are explained in Chapter 7, section 7.3.3. 
The level of agreement of a Factor is taken as being inversely 
proportional to the amount of variance in the original data 
explained by the Factor. It is the inverse of the differentiating 
power of a Factor among companies. The factors are arranged in their 
order of importance which is measured by the average score that 
would be given to a factor by the companies. 
The level of agreement of the respondent companies and the ranking 
of transfer pricing factors in order of their importance are as 
follows: 
a- For domestic transfers. 
Order of Factor Level of Agreement 
Importance 
1 Decentralization 1 
2 Financial Reporting 2 
3 Governmental Regulations 4 
4 Integration Benefits 3 
b- For international transfers. 
Order of Factors Level of Agreement 
Importance 
1 Governmental Regulations 5 
2 Decentralization 4 
3 Financial Reporting 3 
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4 Ownership Ratio Effects 1 
5 Foreign Cash Transfer Restrictions 2 
6 Foreign Subsidiaries' Funds 6 
Requirements 
3- The results of the Factor Analysis offer an objective and 
comprehensive classification of transfer pricing determinants and 
their factors. 
4- Interviews carried out in this study (Chapter 9, section 9.3) for 
the purpose of evaluating the results of Factor Analysis from the 
point of view of the practitioners, support the following: 
a- The comprehensiveness of the four discovered factors of domestic 
transfers and the six discovered factors of international transfers 
as the managers interviewed were not able to suggest any other 
factors. 
b- The validity of using the results of Factor Analysis to calculate 
the order of importance of the factors in terms of the scores given 
to the transfer pricing determinants or vice versa. 
10.2.4 Conclusions Concerned with the Discriminant Analysis and the Rel- 
ationship between Transfer Pricing Determinants and the Methods. 
In pursuit of a predictive procedure for transfer pricing methods, 
it was decided to evaluate the relationship between the transfer pricing 
determinants and the transfer pricing methods used, and then to use the 
deduced relationship to predict the transfer pricing method. The 
relationship between transfer pricing method and transfer pricing deter- 
minants has been discussed in the literature but it has never been 
evaluated quantitatively. 
Discriminant Analysis, Chapter 8, was applied to the data collected. 
The companies were classified into four groups according to the basis of 
transfer pricing method used, namely: market-based, cost-based, 
negotiation-based, and others. The Discriminant Analysis produced 3 
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discriminant functions (axes) along which the four groups of transfer 
pricing methods differ significantly. The Discriminant Analysis also 
yielded 4 classification finctions, one for each transfer price basis. 
Each classification function is a linear combination of the weights given 
to the transfer pricing determinants. Knowing these weights, the four 
classification functions can be calculated for a company. 
The appropriate transfer price basis applicable to a company with 
multiple determinants to be satisfied by transfer pricing is that which 
corresponds to the largest classification function. The classification 
functions were simplified by reducing the number of determinants to 
improve their ability to perform effectively in prediction. The above 
approach leads to the following results: 
1- The classification functions for both domestic transfers and 
international transfers are able to predict the appropriate transfer 
pricing basis with an acceptable degree of success. This prediction 
can be made for a company which is to establish a new transfer 
pricing system. It can equally be used for evaluating how far a 
company's current transfer pricing method is in line with that used 
by other companies under similar circumstances. The classification 
functions are able to predict the transfer price basis without 
taking into account the availability of market price as a 
determinant. 
2- It was found that the derived classification functions of all 
determinants conform to the prescriptions of the literature for 
certain domestic transfer pricing situations when all the weight is 
placed on a single objective. In other words, the derived 
classification functions predict the same transfer pricing basis as 
the literature where the transfer pricing system has a single 
overriding objective. 
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3- The relationship between transfer pricing method and transfer 
pricing determinants has been quantitatively evaluated in this 
study. A measure of this relationship was produced in the form of a 
set of classification functions based on the discriminant analysis 
of the data collected in the empirical study. 
4- Discriminant Analysis shows that there is a reasonable consensus 
among companies about trade off in a multi-objective situation. It 
also indicates that the recorded scores on transfer pricing 
determinants carry a high degree of discriminating power among 
transfer pricing methods. The discrimination obtained was 
statistically significant for both the domestic and international 
markets. 
5- Figure 8.3 illustrates that companies using market-based and 
negotiation-based transfer prices are closer to each other than to 
companies applying cost-based or other-based transfer prices in 
their view of the relative importance of the transfer pricing 
determinants in the domestic market. This confirms opinions 
expressed in the literature which suggested using either, market 
price method or negotiation method alternatively to achieve the same 
objectives. 
6- Discrimination among the four groups-of transfer pricing method is 
non-trivial. The discriminant functions significantly improve the 
correct classifications of the respondent companies over that which 
might be achieved by chance or indeed by using other classification 
techniques such as Cluster Analysis or Factor Analysis. 
7- A discussion of the results of Discriminant Analysis with companies 
interviewed in this study shows that the approach suggested to 
predict the relevant transfer pricing method would be of benefit in 
practice (see Chapter 9, section 9.4). 
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10.3 Suggestions for Further Research 
The following are suggestions which could be the basis of further 
topics for study: 
1- It is suggested that Factor Analysis should be applied to transfer 
pricing determinants in other countries such as the US. This appli- 
cation would be useful to compare and contrast the underlying 
factors of transfer pricing practice in different countries. It 
would be beneficial if the Factor Analysis could be applied to the 
same list of transfer pricing determinants in different countries. 
This obviously makes comparisons between different studies easier. 
Earlier empirical investigations have used different numbers and 
types, of transfer pricing determinants. This is detrimental to a 
comparison of the empirical results of different studies. 
2- The work carried out in this study shows that the selection of a 
transfer pricing method or the revision of a currently used method 
can be made through an understanding of the relationship between the 
transfer pricing determinants and transfer pricing methods. A 
relationship was identified and evaluated for domestic and 
international transfers in this study using data from a small sample 
of UK companies. It would be of considerable practical importance if 
the derived relationship could be confirmed by the results of a 
larger sample. 
3- It would be of interest to see if similar relationships between 
transfer pricing determinants and transfer pricing methods hold for 
transfer pricing practice in other countries. Indeed, the researcher 
intends to extend the study in this direction. 
4- Discriminant Analysis could be extended to discriminate among 
individual transfer pricing methods rather than the four groups of 
transfer pricing methods used in this study. This would require a 
considerably larger size of sample. 
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5- It is recommended that in future Discriminant Analysis, the 
structure of the company, namely: vertically integrated or 
horizontally integrated or conglomerate, is to be considered as a 
discriminator variable in addition to the determinants involved in 
this study. It is expected that the structure of the company might 
affect the weights given to the determinants. 
6- An investigation of the characteristics of the misclassified 
companies in Discriminant Analysis might shed additional light on 
the nature of the relationship between the transfer pricing 
determinants and transfer pricing methods. 
7- The conditions suggested in the literature for a particular transfer 
pricing method to be used were discussed in Chapter 3. It would be 
of interest to collect data relating to these conditions and to 
include these in a Discriminant Analysis to see if the derived 
relationships are sufficient to predict the correct transfer pricing 
method. 
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Notes on the Questionnaire 
1 Some terms have been used which need definition. 
Units Departments or divisions of a company, or 
subsidiary companies within a group, which 
operate in the domestic or overseas market. ' 
These units are treated as profit centres whose 
management is judged on the profit earned. 
Inter-unit Trade: Transfers of saleable goods and services 
between units (as defined above) at a price 
(excluding transfers of goods and services 
within a unit). 
2 If the space provided for comments and explanations is insufficient, 
please attach additional notes. 
3 If the company wishes to preserve confidentiality I would be pleased to 
receive the questionnaire with identification suppressed. 
4 Please return the questionnaire in the envelope provided to: - 
Mrs. Azza Mostafa, 
Doctoral Programme. 
Management Centre, 
University of Bradford. 
Emm Lane, 
Bradford, BD9 4JL. 
1 
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Transfer Pricing Questionnaire 
Part I- General Information 
1 Name of Company (if possible) :- 
- Company Address: - 
- Tel. No. 
Person, and title, responsible for 
completing the questionnaire: 
2 Please specify number of units operating in 
a- Domestic market II 
b- Overseas market II 
3 Please check the industry group in which your company is best classified. 
() Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing. 
() Mining and Quarrying. 
() Food, Drink, Tobacco. 
() Coal and Petroleum Products. 
() Chemical and Allied Industries. 
() Metal Manufacture. 
() Mechanical Engineering. 
() Instrument Engineering. 
() Electrical Engineering. 
Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering. 
() Vehicles. 
() Metal Goods not elsewhere specified. 
() Textiles. 
( Leather, Leather Goods and Furs. 
( Clothing and Footwear. 
() Bricks, Pottery, Glass, Cement. 
( Timber, Furniture, etc. 
2 
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() Paper, Printing and Publishing. 
() Other Manufacturing Industries. 
() Construction. 
() Gas, Electricity and Water. 
() Transport and Communication. 
() Distributive Trades. 
( Insurance, Banking, Finance. 
() Professional and Scientific Services. 
( Miscellaneous Services. 
( Public Administration and Defence. 
( More than one of those listed above. 
4 Is there any inter-unit trading within your organisation? 
Yes Q No 
If "Yes" please complete the rest of the questionnaire. 
If "No" please return the questionnaire 
3 
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Part II - Who Sets the Transfer Prices 
1 Who sets and reviews the transfer prices? please tick. 
a- Corporate 
management 
b- Units 
managers 
c- Corporate 
management & 
Units Managers in 
consultation 
SETS REVIEWS 
Domestic International Domestic International 
2 How frequently are transfer prices reviewed? Domestic International 
- Monthly 
- Quarterly II I--1 
- Every six months 
- Yearly t-_ 
- Other (please indicate) ý--1ý 
4 
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Part III Transfer Pricing Methods Used in Inter-unit Trading 
3 Please state which transfer pricing method is used by your company. 
For domestic' trading 
For international tVading 
4 Please outline the practical problems related to your current approach to 
transfer pricing. 
For domestic: trading 
r'or International trading 
5 Is a computerised mathematical programming method used to determine 
transfer prices. 
a- ror domestic inter-unit trading. Yes II No II 
b- For international inter-unit trading. Yes CI No 
5 
268 
6 If your answer to question 5 is "No" please proceed to question 7. 
If your answer to question 5 is "Yes" what method is used? Please tick. 
Domestic International 
a- Linear programming C-1 I--- i 
b- Quadratic programming ýý II 
c- Decomposition programming 
d- Goal programming ^ 
t1 
e- Other 
* Please describe the particular approach adopted. 
7 Did your company dis-continue using or attempt to use computerised 
mathematical programming methods in de. brmining transfer prices? 
a- For domestic inter-unit trading Yes r----l No r---j 
L---j I 
b - For international inter-unit trading Yes No 
What was the reason for any discontinuation? 
Domestic International 
a - Because it was too difficult to apply r--ý 
b - Because it was too costly 
c - Because it required expertise which Q 
was unavailable in the company 
c - Other reasons 
Please describe. 
6 
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8 Does your company use Mathematical Programming, in any form, for co-ordinating 
unit activities (e. g. production plans)? 
For domestic units Yes No 
For international units Yes No 
If so, please describe briefly the nature and purpose of the application 
9 If an interactive computer based transfer pricing package designed 
specifically for management were available, do you think your company 
would be interested in adopting it? 
a- For domestic inter-unit trade. Yes No 
b - For international inter-unit trade. Yes No 
Please give reasons in support of your viewpoint. 
7 
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10 From your company's point of view, please indicate the importance of 
transfer pricing in relation to each policy variable or issue by a 
tick under the appropriate number in the table below. 
Policy Domestic Transfer International 
Transfer 
Variable 
or Issue 4, 
P., glc9 P4 -Oj 
`d -fa ö $4 
0 1.4 
ö°ö0 E 
q ºý qä "ý 
.., .4 
23 1ý 512345 
1 Overall profit of the 
company. 
2 Determining Pricing 
that may allow the 
buying unit and the 
selling unit to 
maximise their indi- 
vidual profits. 
3 Units autonomy 
Performance evaluation 
of units. 
5 The preparation of 
financial statements 
6 Utilization of idle 
production capacity. 
7 Market share of the end 
product. 
8 The relationship bet- 
ween transfer prices 
and the percentage 
ownership in the 
subsidiaries. 
9 Tax commitment. 
10 Volume of inter-unit 
transfers 
11 Compliance with U. K. 
tax regulations. 
12 Compliance with U. K. nc 
tax regulations. 
13 Compliance with foreign 
tax and tariff 
regulations. 
8 
271 
Policy Variable 
or Issue 
14 Restrictions imposed 
by foreign countries on 
repatriation of profits 
or dividends. 
15 Restrictions imposed by 
foreign countries on th 
amount of royalty or 
management fees that 
can be charged against 
foreign subsidiaries. 
16 Other restrictions 
imposed by foreign 
countries not included 
in Nos 14 & 15 
17 Maintenance of adequate 
cash flows in foreign 
subsidiaries. 
18 The need of subsidiarie 
in foreign countries to 
seek local funds. 
19 Bate of inflation in 
foreign countries. 
20 Risk of expropriation 
in foreign countries. 
Domestic Transfer I International Transfer 
ON 
"/ 
+3 
ä 
+' 
co 
0 
ä 
N 
ä 
to 
ä 
ice. 
4 
+3 
ö 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Are there any variables of importance which are not included in the above list? 
Please describe. 
For domestic transfer: - 
For International Transfer: - 
9 
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Would you be prepared to meet me to discuss this topic further? 
Yes 11 No 1I 
Thank you for your co-operation . 
10 
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UNIVERSITY OF BRADFORD 
MANAGEMENT CENTRE EMM LANE BRADFORD WEST YORKSHIRE BD9 4,11- TELEPHONE 42299 
Director and Professor of Management Sciences: JC HIGGINS BSc MA MSc PhD CEng MIEE FBIM 
Mrs. A; za Mostafa, 
Doctoral Programme, 
30.7.80 
Dear Mr. 
I am a Ph D student at the Bradford University Management Centre. I am 
currently undertaking research work in the field of transfer pricing. I 
should add that I am sponsored by the Egyptian Government and I have already 
obtained the degree of MSc at Southampton University specialising in 
Financial Managerial Control. 
Gaining accurate information about transfer pricing systems in practice is 
very necessary for my research. Therefore, I should be most grateful if you 
would complete the enclosed questionnaire and return it to me as soon as 
possible. An addressed envelope is enclosed for this purpose. 
Naturally, the value of my research depends to a large extent on the number 
of companies willing to provide me with the required information. All your 
answers-will, however, be kept strictly confidential and any reports written 
for general circulation will have the name of the organisation suppressed. 
You will of course be supplied with copies of such reports if you so wish. 
Your kind compliance with this request will be much appreciated. Thank you 
for your help and co-operation. 
Yours sincerely, 
Azza Mostafa. 
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UNIVERSITY OF BRADFORD 
MANAGEMENT CENTRE EMM LANE BRADFORD WEST YORKSHIRE BD94JL TELEPHONE 42299 
Director and Professor of Management Sciences: JC HIGGINS BSc MA MSc PhD CEng MIEE FBIM 
Mrs. Azza Mostafa, 
Doctoral Programme. 
2.9.80 
Dear Mr. 
On the 30th July I wrote to you asking whether your company would be willing 
to complete a questionnaire about transfer pricing to assist my research at 
Bradford University Management Centre. I have had a 60% response rate to 
date and I am therefore very anxious to get as: many additional replies as I 
can so as to ensure a representative picture. So far I do not appear to have 
heard from you. I wonder whether you have not received the questionnaire 
and the covering letter. Therefore, I enclose another copy. 
I should be very grateful if you could find the time to complete the enclosed 
questionnaire and return it to me. 
Thank you for your help. 
Yours sincerely, 
Azza Mostafa. 
275 UNIVERSITY OF BRADFORD 
MANAGEMENT CENTRE EMM LANE BRADFORD WEST YORKSHIRE BD94JL TELEPHONE 42299 
Director and Professor of Management and Information Sciences: JC HIGGINS BSc MA MSc PhD C Eng MIEE 
DOCTORAL PROGRAMME Chairman :K Howard BSc MSc PhD C Eng 
Mrs. Azza Mostafa, 
Doctoral Programme. 
27.4.1981. 
Dear Mr. 
Thank you for your co-operation and completing my 
questionnaire about Transfer Pricing. 
In analysis of the collected data, the answer to 
the following question is missing: 
Does a market price exist for the transferred product? 
Please tick: For domestic market Yes 
Q No Q 
For international market Yes 
0 No 
I should be very grateful if you could answer the 
above question and return this letter to me in the envelope provided. 
Thank you for your help. 
Yours sincerely, 
Azza Mostafa 
APPENDIX B 
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Correct Classification by Chance 
The number of cases correctly allocated to a group is proportional 
to the relative size of the group. For example if the number of cases 
(companies) that can be allocated to each of groups 1,2,3 and 4 are a, 
b, c, and d respectively, the number of correctly classified cases by 
chance for say group 1 is 
a. 
a 
a+b+c+d 
2 
a 
a+b+c+d 
and the percentage of correct classifiaction by chance in group 1 is 
2 
a 
a+b+c+d 
X 
100 
a 
a 
x 100 
a+b+c+d 
The total number of correct classifications by chance is given by 
a2 + b2 + c2 + d2 
a + b + c + d 
and the total percentage of correct classifications by chance is 
a2+b2+c2+d2 
x 100 
(a+b+c +d)2 
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